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Summary 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In 2008, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) published the report Pre-
paring for an Influenza Pandemic: Personal Protective Equipment for 
Healthcare Workers. At the time of that report, the major influenza-
related concern was avian influenza (H5N1). As novel H1N1 influenza A 
became a reality in 2009, the many unknowns about the virulence, 
spread, and nature of the virus raised to the forefront issues regarding 
personal protective equipment (PPE) for healthcare personnel. A major 
issue was the nature of respiratory protection required because much re-
mains to be learned about the mechanisms of influenza transmission. 
This report comes at a time when controversies continue on issues re-
lated to PPE for healthcare personnel, while at the same time, new hori-
zons in PPE research and attention to PPE innovations offer promise of 
improvements in healthcare worker safety. Keeping the research momen-
tum going is critical, because between pandemics the focus of research 
efforts often moves to other issues and the nation remains underprepared.  
 
 
SCOPE OF THE REPORT 
 
The 2009–2010 H1N1 experience and its accompanying unanswered 
research questions provided the impetus for the National Personal Pro-
tective Technology Laboratory (NPPTL) at the National Institute for Oc-
cupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) to ask the IOM to conduct a study 
 
1 
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that would update progress on research and identify future directions re-
garding PPE for healthcare personnel.1  
This report is the result of a 12-month study conducted by an ad hoc 
IOM committee composed of experts in the fields of infectious disease, 
infection control, public health, occupational safety and health, pulmo-
nary medicine, health promotion, microbiology, emergency response and 
preparedness, epidemiology, nursing, community health, industrial hy-
giene, and materials engineering. The IOM committee was charged with 
identifying new research directions, certification2 and standards-setting 
issues, and risk assessment issues specific to PPE for healthcare person-
nel to prevent transmission of pandemic influenza and other viral respira-
tory infections. The committee was specifically asked to focus on the 
following issues: 
 
• research needed to understand and improve the efficacy and ef-
fectiveness of PPE, particularly face masks and respirators, for 
preventing transmission of pandemic influenza or other viral res-
piratory infections. Specific attention was sought on issues re-
lated to the research needed to determine the type of respiratory 
protection needed for the given exposure, to determine the re-
quirements for protective ensembles to provide an appropriate 
level of protection based on work tasks, and to improve function-
ality and address human factor issues such as wearability, com-
pliance, and communications;  
• necessary certification, testing, and standards development is-
sues; and  
• priorities and resources for research and certification efforts.  
 
To accomplish its charge, the committee held three meetings and ga-
thered information through a scientific workshop that included a public 
comment session, through discussions with numerous individuals in the 
infection control and occupational safety and health fields, and through a 
review of the relevant literature. As mentioned above, this report builds 
on the work of the IOM committee that released the 2008 report, and 
 
1The committee broadly defines “healthcare personnel” to encompass all workers in di-
rect patient care and support services who are employed by private and public healthcare 
offices and facilities as well as those working in home health care and emergency medi-
cal services, including those who are self-employed.  
2The committee broadly defines “certification” to encompass the entire conformity as-
sessment process. 
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throughout this report, the prior work is summarized. In large part, this 
committee’s task was to examine research conducted since the 2008 re-
port, to assess where research stands on issues key to improving PPE for 
healthcare personnel exposed to infectious respiratory diseases, and to 
make recommendations to address current research gaps. Many PPE is-
sues relevant to healthcare personnel are also directly relevant to the PPE 
needs of workers in other occupations, as well as the general public. 
 
 
PPE FOR HEALTHCARE PERSONNEL 
 
The term “personal protective equipment” encompasses the special-
ized clothing or equipment worn by workers for protection against health 
and safety hazards. For healthcare personnel, PPE may include respira-
tors, face masks, gloves,3 eye protection, face shields, gowns, and head 
and shoe coverings. Integrating the various types of protective equipment 
to ensure that they work together as ensembles (e.g., eye protection with 
a respirator) is an ongoing concern. Infection prevention and control in 
healthcare workplaces involve, among many other measures, the use of 
PPE. Infection control precautions follow a tiered approach that consid-
ers the possible routes of transmission among patients and healthcare 
personnel. 
One of the challenges for the healthcare field is to clearly understand 
the differences between respirators and face masks as well as their ap-
propriate uses. Respirators are specifically designed as respiratory pro-
tection. They work either by purifying the air inhaled by the wearer 
through filtering materials or by independently supplying breathable air. 
For air-purifying respirators (often the type used by healthcare person-
nel) the major issues are the filtration and the fit—the effectiveness of 
the filter and the extent to which the respirator has a tight seal with the 
wearer’s face to restrict inward leakage.  
Face masks, including surgical masks and procedure masks, are 
loose-fitting coverings that are designed to protect the patient from secre-
tions from the nose and mouth of the physician, nurse, or other health-
care professional. Face masks are not designed or certified to protect the 
wearer from exposure to respiratory hazards; the role of face masks as 
PPE requires further research.  
 
3Hand hygiene is another important and effective component of infection control of 
respiratory diseases, but is not within the scope of this report.  
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Measures to prevent influenza transmission to healthcare personnel 
include all levels of hazard controls. PPE along with vaccination and an-
tiviral medications are components of an overall infection prevention and 
control program that uses engineering, administrative, and work practice 
controls. Although all levels of this hierarchy are important, this report is 
focused on opportunities to improve PPE and the correct use of PPE in 
healthcare settings. 
 In discussing the issues relevant to the use of PPE by healthcare per-
sonnel, the committee identified a set of criteria as a starting point for 
decisions on PPE selection and use. PPE for healthcare personnel should 
 
• effectively reduce risks of disease or injury to healthcare 
personnel; 
• minimize negative interactions with or effects on patients, their 
families, and caregivers; 
• be acceptable and usable by healthcare personnel in their daily 
tasks, including ease of communication and comfort; 
• be practical regarding issues of cost, time, and training; and  
• be appropriate to the occupational risk being encountered.  
 
Having recently been through the 2009–2010 experience with H1N1 
influenza, the committee is well aware of the ongoing challenges and 
controversies surrounding PPE for healthcare personnel. At this time, it 
is particularly important to build on that experience and take the actions 
needed to address the research and policy questions that will allow the 
healthcare community to be better prepared for the next epidemic or 
pandemic. Experience has shown that relevant research on these issues 
wanes between pandemics, and not permitting that to happen this time is 
crucial to resolving the research questions and setting evidence-based 
policies in place.  
 
 
UPDATE ON PROGRESS: 2007 TO 2010 
 
Transmission of Influenza and Other Viral Respiratory Diseases 
 
Animal studies have found that the ferret and guinea pig models ap-
pear to be highly representative of humans in terms of their susceptibility 
to infection, the influenza viral strains that display a transmissible pheno-
type, and the kinetics with which transmission occurs. Experiments per-
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formed in both of these animal models suggest that transmission of in-
fluenza viruses can proceed by both droplet spray and aerosol routes, 
which would include respirable particles. Animal studies have also 
pointed to a number of environmental factors, including relative humidi-
ty and temperature, that may influence transmission. Recent studies that 
employed environmental monitoring of air for influenza as well as others 
that examined the contamination of fomites and hands with H1N1 have 
provided insights on the potential for influenza virus contamination of 
the healthcare environment. Nonetheless, data on the viability of influen-
za and other respiratory viruses in air samples and on fomites in these 
settings are limited. Mathematical models have been developed to better 
characterize the relative contribution of influenza transmission modes. 
Available, well-specified parameters for these models are limited be-
cause information is lacking on the viability of influenza in aerosols, sal-
ivary virus concentrations, the amount of virus in respirable and inspira-
ble particles, and the quantity and persistence of viability on various fo-
mites in the healthcare setting. Taken together, progress has been made 
in understanding the modes of transmission, but the relative contribution 
of the modes are still unclear. Much remains to be learned about the ef-
fectiveness of control measures to prevent transmission. 
Observational and controlled studies relevant to PPE use and trans-
mission of influenza or other viral respiratory diseases are limited be-
cause study protocols were not usually in place for 2009 H1N1 or for 
recent seasonal flu periods, and studies have not provided adequate pow-
er to answer questions regarding the effectiveness of using PPE in reduc-
ing or preventing disease transmission.  
 
 
Designing and Engineering Effective PPE 
 
 PPE is a critical component in the hierarchy of controls used to pro-
tect healthcare personnel from influenza and other viral respiratory dis-
eases. Understanding the functional issues related to the design of PPE, 
as well as the factors that impact use, is critical to ensuring that health-
care personnel are adequately protected and comfortable and can perform 
their jobs. Important advances have been made in some areas since the 
last report, but other areas, particularly regarding improvements in 
gowns, gloves, face masks, and face shields, need to be more fully ad-
dressed. Much research has been done regarding filtration of respirator 
media, but ways to improve fit, including new technologies specifically 
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for filtering facepiece respirators, need more research because face seal 
leakage greatly exceeds filter penetration in the overall total inward leak-
age of respirators. The physiological impact of respirators has been stud-
ied in depth, but research in this area is lacking regarding other types of 
PPE. Integration issues concerning PPE and medical equipment and the 
impact on operational performance have not been adequately studied. 
Effective decontamination methods that do not impact the physical char-
acteristics of respirators have been studied for some types of respirators, 
but with inconclusive results. Finally, the characteristics of a respirator 
that would specifically address the needs of healthcare personnel (e.g., 
patient–provider interaction, comfort, reduced physiological burden) 
have been identified. Addressing these issues is important for developing 
PPE for healthcare personnel that is safe, effective, and comfortable. 
 
 
Using PPE: Individual and Organizational Issues 
 
Research during the past several years reveals modest gains in un-
derstanding that self-protective behavior in the healthcare settings in-
volves a constellation of interacting and independent components. At a 
minimum, consideration should be given to the user, the device, the task, 
and the general work and organizational context. The growing acknowl-
edgment of contextual and organizational factors means that research on 
PPE and healthcare personnel is closing in on the larger body of occupa-
tional safety research, which increasingly emphasizes those factors in 
understanding occupational safety performance.  
Although there are clear gaps and deficiencies in our knowledge base 
about PPE usage in health care, existing knowledge is sufficient to rec-
ommend a four-pronged strategy for immediate implementation. The 
four elements are: (1) deliberate planning and preparation at the leader-
ship and organizational levels; (2) comprehensive training, including 
supervisors and managers; (3) widespread and convenient availability 
of appropriate PPE devices; and (4) accountability at all levels of the 
organization.  
In essence, there should be universal acknowledgement that PPE 
use is an integral component of providing quality health care. As with 
other priorities, this aspect of healthcare delivery needs to be carefully 
planned at the organizational/institutional level. Furthermore, managers 
and frontline workers alike need to understand and accept their roles and 
responsibilities, and PPE use needs to be as easy and convenient as poss-
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ible. PPE should be factored into all decisions involving task design, 
staffing, and work assignments. Input from frontline workers should be 
used to facilitate planning and decision making and to maximize accep-
tance. Environmental/engineering controls should be utilized wherever 
possible to control exposures, with PPE used as a supplement or alterna-
tive when environmental/engineering controls are not sufficient or feasi-
ble. The overall implementation of the PPE program should be 
monitored regularly, with the goals of continuous improvement, adoption 
of best practices, and accountability of both supervisor and worker.   
 
 
Policy Research and Implementation 
 
Preparations and implementation of infection control plans for 2009 
H1N1 influenza brought into sharp focus the efforts by healthcare pro-
fessionals, emergency planners, professional associations, healthcare fa-
cilities, policy makers, government agencies, labor unions, and others to 
address PPE policies and logistics. Articles continue to be published on 
the recent experience and the challenges and successes in providing face 
masks, respirators, and other PPE to healthcare personnel. As lessons 
learned during that experience continue to add to the body of knowledge, 
incorporating this information into research, policy, and practice efforts 
will be important. In the initial phases of an epidemic or pandemic—
when there are many unknowns about the virus or agent—one of the 
challenges is to determine PPE policy and then to adapt those policies as 
information is gained on the severity, transmission, and nature of the dis-
ease, with an emphasis on communicating the changes. Standards-
setting, regulatory, training, and research efforts continue to move to-
ward improved respiratory protection, and recent work has begun to fo-
cus on the specifics of how to tailor PPE devices and PPE training to 
address the specific needs of healthcare personnel. 
 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS: A SYSTEMS APPROACH 
TO PPE RESEARCH 
 
Providing care to ill or injured patients involves a range of potential-
ly hazardous exposures for healthcare personnel. Current infection con-
trol precautions address this challenge by providing guidance on PPE and 
other precautions that varies depending on the mode of transmission of 
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the pathogen. The ultimate goal would be to have the definitive informa-
tion that would match the appropriate type of PPE with the pathogen, its 
mode of transmission, the infectious dose, and its risk to healthcare per-
sonnel. In many cases in industrial settings, this level of specificity is 
available for chemical exposures, although other industrial settings with 
unknown or mixed exposures continue to pose challenges. Reaching that 
point for protecting healthcare personnel will require concerted research 
efforts.  
This report explores an integrated approach that addresses the full 
spectrum of research (from basic research to policy research) and trans-
lates research findings into improvements in the standards of healthcare 
practice (Figure S-1). This approach ensures that basic science initiatives 
are fully explored while also addressing clinical needs and testing the 
results in real-world settings, with the expectation that adaptations along 
the way will be made and tested. Feedback loops to prior stages are also 
critically important. Such an integrated approach calls for active collabo-
ration and discourse among scientists and clinicians who may not have 
had previous interactions.  
Throughout this report, the committee has highlighted a number of 
areas in which research is needed. This research has the potential to 
quickly translate new understandings of disease transmission or PPE en-
gineering into more effective PPE products. Fully implementing these 
research directions and realizing breakthroughs for improved safety and 
health for healthcare personnel will require commitments from multiple 
 
 
 
CONCEPT 
PROOF OF 
PRINCIPLE 
STANDARD OF 
PRACTICE 
 
Basic Science 
Research 
(Safety) 
 
Clinical and  
Applied 
Research 
(Efficacy) 
 
 
Systems  
Research 
(Effectiveness) 
Policy and 
Regulatory  
Research 
(Disease Reduction 
in Populations) 
 
 
 
 
 T2 T3 T4 T1 
 
FIGURE S-1 An integrated system moving research into practice, depicting the 
translation of research from basic science research (T1) through policy and regu-
latory research (T4). See Chapter 1 for further discussion. 
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federal agencies as well as ongoing, innovative efforts by PPE designers 
and manufacturers. The report makes the following recommendations to 
advance research and transfer these into practice across the spectrum of 
research opportunities.  
 
 
Across the Spectrum of Research 
 
Recommendation: Develop Standardized Terms and Definitions 
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), in 
partnership with other relevant agencies and organizations, 
should work to develop standardized terms, definitions, and 
appropriate classifications to describe transmission routes 
and aerodynamic diameter of particles associated with respi-
ratory disease transmission. This effort should involve a con-
sensus from the industrial hygiene, infectious disease, and 
healthcare communities.  
 
Recommendation: Develop and Implement a Comprehensive 
Research Strategy to Understand Viral Respiratory Disease 
Transmission 
The National Institutes of Health, in collaboration with other 
research agencies and organizations, should develop and 
fund a comprehensive research strategy to improve the un-
derstanding of viral respiratory disease transmission, includ-
ing, but not limited to, examining the characteristics of 
influenza transmission, animal models, human challenge stud-
ies, and intervention trials. This strategy should include 
 
• an expedited mechanism for funding these types of 
studies and 
• clinical research centers of excellence for studying 
influenza and other respiratory virus transmission. 
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Safety to Efficacy: 
Basic Science Research (T1) to Clinical and Applied Research (T2) 
 
Recommendation: Continue and Expand Research on PPE 
for Healthcare Personnel 
NPPTL and other agencies, private-sector companies, and 
other organizations should continue to advance research in 
designing and evaluating the effectiveness of respirator pro-
tection for healthcare personnel and expand its research ef-
forts to improve and evaluate the effectiveness of gloves, 
gowns, eye protection, face shields, and face masks in pre-
venting the transmission of influenza or other viral respira-
tory diseases. Areas of focused research needs include 
 
• effectiveness in preventing fomite, droplet spray, or 
aerosol transmission; 
• decontamination and reusability; 
• comfort, fit, and usability; 
• impact on task performance; and  
• development of technologies specifically for health-
care personnel. 
 
Recommendation: Examine the Effectiveness of Face Masks 
and Face Shields as PPE 
NPPTL should investigate the effectiveness of face masks and 
face shields in preventing transmission of viral respiratory 
diseases. 
 
Recommendation: Improve Fit Test Methods and Evaluate 
User Seal Checks   
NPPTL should develop novel, simpler fit test methods and 
evaluate the effectiveness of performing user seal checks on 
N95 respirators.  
 
 
Efficacy to Effectiveness: 
Clinical and Applied Research (T2) to Systems Research (T3) 
 
Recommendation: Explore Healthcare Safety Culture and 
Work Organization  
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NIOSH and other relevant agencies, such as the Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality, and professional organiza-
tions should conduct research to better understand the role 
of safety culture and other behavioral and organizational 
factors on PPE usage in healthcare settings. These efforts 
should include 
 
• conducting human factors and ergonomics research 
relevant to the design and organization of healthcare 
work tasks to improve worker safety by reducing haz-
ardous exposures and effectively using PPE (e.g., re-
duce unnecessary PPE donning and doffing), 
• exploring the links between patient safety and 
healthcare worker safety and health that are relevant 
to the use of PPE, and 
• identifying and evaluating strategies to mitigate or-
ganizational barriers that limit the use of PPE by 
healthcare personnel.  
 
Recommendation: Identify and Disseminate Effective Leader-
ship and Training Strategies and Other Interventions to 
Improve PPE Use  
NIOSH and other relevant agencies and professional organi-
zations should support intervention effectiveness research to 
assess strategies, including innovative participatory ap-
proaches to training, for healthcare and supervisory staff at 
all levels to improve PPE usage and other related outcomes 
across the range of healthcare settings. To identify best prac-
tices, efforts should be made to 
  
• conduct observational studies of PPE use by health-
care personnel in different types of work settings; 
• develop, implement, and evaluate comprehensive 
leadership and training strategies and interventions 
that go beyond simple knowledge-based training; 
• design training interventions specifically for supervi-
sory and managerial personnel in different types of 
healthcare settings; 
• examine long-term practice change and safety culture 
implementation related to educational interventions;  
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• improve use and understanding of PPE by home and 
community healthcare personnel;  
• develop assessment tools and metrics that take a 
broader approach to PPE and acknowledge the inter-
action of worker, task, and environmental factors; 
and 
• be informed by a lessons-learned summit on PPE 
use by healthcare personnel during the 2009 H1N1 
experience. 
 
 
Effectiveness to Disease Reduction in Populations: 
   Systems Research (T3) to Policy and Regulatory Research (T4) 
 
Recommendation: Develop and Certify Powered Air-Purifying 
Respirators (PAPRs) for Healthcare Personnel 
NPPTL should develop certification requirements for a low-
noise, loose-fitting PAPR for healthcare personnel. 
 
Recommendation: Move Forward on Better Fitting Respirators 
NPPTL should continue rulemaking processes for total in-
ward leakage regulations that require respirators to meet fit 
criteria. To improve consumer and purchaser information on 
fit capabilities, NIOSH should establish a website to dissemi-
nate fit test results for specific respirator models on an an-
thropometric (NIOSH) test panel, where such data exist.   
 
Recommendation: Clarify PPE Guidelines for Outbreaks of 
Novel Viral Respiratory Infections 
NIOSH, other divisions of CDC, OSHA, and other public 
health agencies should develop a coordinated process to 
make, announce, and revise consistent guidelines regarding 
the use of PPE to be worn by healthcare personnel during a 
verified sustained national/international outbreak of a novel 
viral respiratory infection. The agencies should tailor their 
guidance in a timely and coordinated manner as the viru-
lence, contagiousness, and affected populations are further 
characterized.  
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Recommendation: Standards and Certification for Face Masks 
and Face Shields 
NIOSH, OSHA, and standards-development organizations 
should develop the standards and certification processes 
needed to assess the performance of face masks and face 
shields as PPE. The development of standards and certifica-
tion processes should be guided by research regarding their 
efficacy as PPE: 
 
• OSHA and CDC should clarify that face masks are 
governed by the general PPE standard (29 CFR 
1910.132) and not by the respiratory protection stan-
dard (29 CFR 1910.134).  
• NIOSH should work with other agencies and standards-
setting organizations to develop voluntary consensus 
standards and independent third-party testing and 
certification processes for face shields and face masks 
with specific tests for assessing prevention of trans-
mission of viral respiratory diseases. 
 
Recommendation: Establish PPE Regulations for Healthcare 
Personnel 
CDC, including NIOSH, and OSHA should develop and 
promulgate guidelines and regulations that are consistent re-
garding the use of PPE by healthcare personnel for influenza 
and other viral respiratory diseases: 
 
• To assist employers in complying with the OSHA 
PPE standard, OSHA should specify the voluntary 
consensus standards that are required to be met for 
non-respirator PPE (e.g., gowns, gloves, face shields, 
face masks) in the event of influenza and other viral 
respiratory diseases. 
• OSHA, with input from CDC and other agencies and 
organizations, should work toward promulgating an 
aerosol-transmissible diseases standard that would 
include prevention of the transmission of influenza 
and other viral respiratory diseases.  
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While the optimist can seek comfort in the fact that progress has 
been made in the past several years, the pragmatist must wonder about 
the rate of progress (or lack thereof) on such a critical issue that poten-
tially threatens the security and economic well-being of the nation and 
the world. The committee hopes that this review will jumpstart and 
strengthen improvements in PPE for healthcare personnel that could be 
relevant to a range of viral respiratory diseases. 
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Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In 2008, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) published the report Pre-
paring for an Influenza Pandemic: Personal Protective Equipment for 
Healthcare Workers (IOM, 2008). When the report was released, the ma-
jor influenza-related concern was avian influenza (H5N1). As novel 
H1N1 influenza A became a reality in 2009, the many unknowns about 
the virulence, spread, and nature of the virus raised to the forefront issues 
regarding personal protective equipment (PPE) for healthcare personnel. 
One of the major issues was the nature of respiratory protection required 
because much remains to be learned about the mechanisms of influenza 
transmission. This current report comes at a time when controversies 
continue on issues related to PPE for healthcare personnel while new 
horizons in PPE research and attention to PPE innovations offer promise 
for improvements in healthcare worker safety. Keeping the research 
momentum moving forward is critical, because between pandemics the 
focus of research efforts often moves to other issues and the nation re-
mains underprepared.  
 
 
SCOPE OF THE REPORT 
 
The 2009–2010 H1N1 experience and its accompanying unanswered 
research questions provided the impetus for the National Personal Pro-
tective Technology Laboratory (NPPTL) at the National Institute for Oc-
cupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) to ask the IOM to conduct a study 
that would update the progress on research and identify future directions 
regarding PPE use for healthcare personnel.  
15 
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This report is the result of a 12-month study conducted by an ad hoc 
IOM committee composed of experts in the fields of infectious disease, 
infection control, public health, occupational safety and health, pulmo-
nary medicine, health promotion, microbiology, emergency preparedness 
and response, epidemiology, nursing, community health, industrial hy-
giene, and materials engineering. The IOM committee was charged with 
identifying new research directions, certification1 and standards-setting 
issues, and risk assessment issues specific to PPE for healthcare person-
nel to prevent transmission of pandemic influenza and other viral respira-
tory infections. The committee was asked to focus specifically on the 
following areas: 
 
• research needed to understand and improve the efficacy and ef-
fectiveness of personal protective equipment, particularly face 
masks and respirators for preventing transmission of pandemic 
influenza or other viral respiratory infections. Specific attention 
was sought on issues related to the research needed to determine 
the type of respiratory protection needed for the given exposure, 
to determine the requirements for protective ensembles to pro-
vide an appropriate level of protection based on work tasks, and 
to improve functionality and address human factor issues, such 
as wearability, compliance, and communications;  
• necessary certification, testing, and standards development is-
sues; and  
• priorities and resources for research and certification efforts.  
 
To accomplish its charge, the committee held three meetings and ga-
thered information through a scientific workshop (Appendix A) that in-
cluded a public comment session, discussions with numerous individuals 
in the infection control and occupational safety and health fields, and a 
review of the relevant literature. As mentioned above, this report builds 
on the work of the IOM committee that released the 2008 report. 
Throughout this report, the prior work is summarized. In large part, this 
committee’s task was to examine research conducted since the 2008 re-
port in order to assess where research stands on issues that are key to 
improving PPE for healthcare personnel exposed to infectious respiratory 
diseases and to make recommendations to address current research gaps. 
 
1The committee broadly defines “certification” to encompass the entire conformity as-
sessment process. 
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Many PPE issues relevant to healthcare personnel are also directly rele-
vant to the PPE needs of workers in other occupations as well as the gen-
eral public. 
In 2009, an Institute of Medicine committee addressed the question 
of what type of PPE was needed for the 2009 H1N1 pandemic. In addi-
tion to recommending the use of respirators because respiratory protec-
tion was deemed appropriate, the report recommended increased research 
on “the next generation of personal respiratory protection technologies 
for healthcare workers to enhance safety, comfort, and ability to perform 
work-related tasks” (IOM, 2009). 
 
 
BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT 
 
Readers of this report may be familiar with the 2008 report or knowl-
edgeable about the extensive background issues regarding PPE and its 
use in healthcare settings. In lieu of including extensive background ma-
terials, the committee provides an overview of the context for this report 
by addressing the following series of questions. 
 
 
What Are PPE and Personal Protective Technologies? 
 
The term “personal protective equipment” encompasses the special-
ized clothing or equipment worn by workers for protection against health 
and safety hazards. Specific types of PPE are selected based on the occu-
pational hazard faced in specific work tasks or sites. “Personal protective 
technologies” is a broader term that includes the protective equipment as 
well as the technical methods, processes, techniques, tools, and materials 
that support their development, evaluation, and use (NIOSH, 2007; 
OSHA, 2002). This report most often discusses the equipment used by 
healthcare personnel and uses the term “PPE,” although in some cases 
the broader term is needed. 
For healthcare personnel, PPE may include respirators, face masks, 
gloves,2 eye protection, face shields, gowns, and head and shoe cover-
ings. Respirators provide respiratory protection; the other products are 
designed primarily to provide a barrier against microbes contacting the 
skin or mucous membrane surfaces. Integrating the various types of pro-
 
2Hand hygiene is another important and effective component of infection control of 
respiratory diseases, but it is not within the purview of this report.  
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tective equipment to ensure that they work together as ensembles (e.g., 
eye protection with a respirator) is an ongoing concern. Infection preven-
tion and control in healthcare workplaces involve, among many other 
measures, the use of PPE.  
 
 
What Are the Roles of Face Masks and Respirators? 
 
One of the challenges for the healthcare field is to clearly understand 
the differences between respirators and face masks as well as their ap-
propriate uses. In this report, the terminology used by the investigators or 
authors of the cited journal article or report is used, but in some cases, 
determining whether the authors’ use of the term “masks” refers to face 
masks, respirators, or both was impossible.  
Face masks, including surgical and procedure masks, are loose-
fitting coverings of the nose and mouth that are designed to protect the 
patient from secretions from the nose or mouth of the physician, nurse, or 
other healthcare professional. Face masks are not designed or certified to 
protect the wearer from exposure to respiratory hazards. Some studies 
have looked at the variation in filtration capabilities of face masks 
(Chapter 3), but the role of face masks as PPE requires further research.  
Respirators are specifically designed as respiratory protection and 
are certified by NIOSH (42 Code of Federal Regulations [CFR] Part 84). 
They work either by purifying the air inhaled by the wearer through fil-
tering materials or by independently supplying breathable air. For air-
purifying respirators (often the type used by healthcare personnel), the 
major issues are the filtration and the fit—the effectiveness of the filter 
and the extent to which the respirator has a tight seal with the wearer’s 
face to restrict inward leakage. A type of respirators, termed surgical 
N95 respirators, is cleared by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
as medical devices. To be effective, respirators must fit tightly to the 
face. Annual fit testing for respirators is required by the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), and user seal checks are re-
quired with each use (29 CFR 1910.134).  
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How Does PPE Fit into the Range of Other Workplace 
Safety and Preventive Measures? 
 
Efforts to promote worker safety and health traditionally follow a 
hierarchy of controls. Engineering and environmental measures, such as 
air exchanges (including non-recirculated exchanges) or negative-
pressure rooms that can isolate the hazard or reduce exposure, are ubi-
quitous measures that affect a large number of workers and patients and 
do not depend on individual compliance (IOM, 2008). Administrative 
controls are next in the hierarchy and include the policies, standards, 
procedures, and practices established within an organization to limit haz-
ardous exposures and improve worker safety (e.g., vaccination policies, 
cohorting or isolating patients, hand hygiene measures, provision of ap-
propriate and effective PPE, organizational commitment to creating and 
sustaining a culture of worker safety) (IOM, 2009). At the level of work 
practice controls, including individual practices, the healthcare employer 
and individual personnel are responsible for appropriate use of PPE as 
well as being vaccinated and adhering to work safety practices.  
Measures to prevent transmission of influenza or other viral respira-
tory diseases to healthcare personnel include all levels of hazard controls. 
PPE, along with vaccination and antiviral medications, are components 
of an overall infection prevention and control program that uses engi-
neering, administrative, and work practice controls. Vaccination against 
influenza has been found to be effective in preventing the illness in the 
recipient with overall efficacy rates over 70 percent (Fiore et al., 2009; 
Treanor et al., 1999).3 Although all levels of this hierarchy are important, 
this report focuses on opportunities to improve PPE and the correct use 
of PPE in healthcare settings. 
 
 
What Federal Agencies Are Involved in Healthcare Personnel PPE? 
 
The testing, regulation, and use of PPE by healthcare personnel in-
volve several federal departments and agencies. Responsibilities for oc-
cupational health and safety are within the purview of both the 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Department of 
 
3The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has noted that the influenza vaccination 
coverage goal for healthcare personnel should be 100 percent of employees who do not 
have medical contraindications and that the level of vaccination coverage among healthcare 
personnel can serve as a measure of a patient safety quality program (CDC, 2010b).  
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Labor (DOL). The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (Public 
Law 91-596) created two federal agencies that focus on worker safety 
and health: NIOSH (in HHS) is designated with responsibilities for rele-
vant research, training, and education; and OSHA (in DOL) is designated 
with responsibilities for developing and enforcing workplace safety and 
health regulations.  
NPPTL, a NIOSH laboratory, conducts and funds research on im-
provements in PPE and ensembles used in a variety of occupations. 
NPPTL also plays an integral role in standards-setting efforts relevant to 
PPE. Respirators used by personnel in OSHA-regulated workplaces, in-
cluding healthcare workplaces, must be NIOSH certified. OSHA respira-
tor regulations detail employer responsibilities for establishing and 
maintaining a comprehensive respiratory protection program, including 
selection, training, and fit testing requirements. For other types of PPE, 
OSHA specifies the voluntary consensus standards that the equipment 
must meet as well as relevant selection and training requirements. 
NIOSH, through NPPTL, conducts an extensive array of tests to assess 
respirator performance characteristics and to determine if the respirator 
meets the certification requirements.  
To be marketed in the United States as medical devices, manufacturers 
of respirators, face masks, and some other types of healthcare PPE are re-
quired to obtain FDA approval or clearance by demonstrating equiv-
alence with a similar product on the market. A number of other depart-
ments and agencies are involved in various aspects of healthcare PPE. In 
addition to NIOSH within the Centers for Disease Control and Preven-
tion (CDC), the National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious 
Diseases, in conjunction with the external Healthcare Infection Control 
Practices Advisory Committee (HICPAC), develops infection control 
guidance for healthcare settings (CDC, 2010c). Public health agencies at 
the local, state, and federal levels play an instrumental role in developing 
guidelines, providing training, and assisting healthcare facilities with 
PPE-related issues. The Department of Defense and the Department of 
Veterans Affairs are actively involved in testing and developing PPE for 
military and veterans’ care applications. The Department of Homeland 
Security focuses on emergency response PPE and works to coordinate 
and improve standards and equipment-related issues. The Environmental 
Protection Agency addresses PPE issues relevant to emergency response 
readiness. The Consumer Product Safety Commission has oversight re-
sponsibilities for products sold in the commercial marketplace, including 
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PPE.4 Professional associations, standards development organizations, 
and other entities also play important roles in ensuring that PPE products 
meet performance criteria. 
 
 
How Does This Report Define the Scope 
of the Term “Healthcare Personnel”? 
 
More than 14 million U.S. workers are employed in health care 
(BLS, 2010). The committee broadly defines “healthcare personnel” to 
encompass all workers in direct patient care and support services who are 
employed by private and public healthcare offices and facilities as well 
as those working in home healthcare and emergency medical services, 
including those who are self-employed. This broad definition of health-
care personnel encompasses those working in administration, patient 
care, and facilities upkeep, and it includes health professional students 
who are receiving instruction or who are working in healthcare facilities 
as well as volunteers trained to provide systematic, regulated, and li-
censed healthcare services (including emergency medical responders) 
(IOM, 2008, 2009). All relevant work situations with the potential for 
infection risk (e.g., cleaning patient rooms, delivering food) are consi-
dered part of the healthcare workforce. This definition is expanded from 
the definition used in the 2008 report. The committee acknowledges that, 
in the midst of an influenza pandemic, many people outside the tradition-
al healthcare workforce will become caregivers, including many family 
members, and they may need access to PPE.  
 
 
HEALTHCARE PERSONNEL AND PPE 
 
Many work environments offer challenges for protecting personnel—
the heat and smoke of firefighting, the heights of construction work on 
rooftops and high-rise buildings, and worksite noise or hazardous chemi-
cals in industrial settings—to name a few. For healthcare personnel, sev-
eral aspects of the job provide challenges for designing and wearing 
                                                 
4As noted in the 2008 report, PPE products that assert protection against a specific 
health hazard must have FDA approval or market clearance. Other PPE products sold in 
the commercial marketplace do not have requirements stipulating premarket or other 
testing prior to their sale to the public. For those products that assert NIOSH certification, 
NIOSH has the authority to act against mislabeled products. 
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appropriate PPE. These issues include interactions with patients and fam-
ily members that make communication critically important, split-second 
actions in some healthcare situations that can have major consequences, 
and challenges in exposure monitoring. Because most types of PPE work 
by acting as a barrier to hazardous agents, healthcare personnel face chal-
lenges posed by barrier materials, including having difficulties in verbal 
communications and interactions with patients and family members, 
maintaining tactile sensitivity through gloves, and addressing physiologi-
cal burdens.  
Some types of PPE are used routinely by clinicians as part of stan-
dard infection control precautions designed to protect both the healthcare 
professional and the patient from disease acquisition. CDC has devel-
oped a tiered approach to infection control precautions that is detailed 
and reviewed by HICPAC. Standard precautions5 (first tier) are applied 
to the care of all patients and include the use of gloves and hand hygiene. 
The second tier of precautions is used in cases where patients have do-
cumented or presumed infections or conditions that could be transmitted 
to healthcare personnel. The details of these transmission-based precau-
tions are specific to situations with the potential for contact, airborne, or 
droplet transmission of infectious agents as defined by HICPAC (Siegel 
et al., 2007). Care of patients with suspected respiratory infections with 
viral agents—such as respiratory syncytial virus, adenovirus, para-
influenza, influenza, or human metapneumovirus—requires the use of 
contact and droplet precautions to protect the healthcare worker from 
exposure to droplet spray and contact. The guideline further notes that 
once adenovirus and influenza have been ruled out, droplet precautions 
can be discontinued (Siegel et al., 2007, p. 121).  
As noted in the 2008 report, opportunities abound to provide innova-
tive approaches that could improve PPE design to better fit healthcare 
needs, incorporate an emphasis on worker safety, and integrate worker 
and patient safety efforts. In discussing the issues relevant to the use of 
PPE by healthcare personnel, the committee identified a set of criteria as 
a starting point for decisions on selecting and using PPE. PPE for health-
care personnel should 
 
• effectively reduce risks of disease or injury to healthcare  
personnel; 
 
5See Siegel et al. (2007) for details on PPE used at each level of precautions.   
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FIGURE 1-1 The major components and factors involved in the use of 
personal protective equipment in health care. 
 
 
• minimize negative interactions with or effects on patients and 
their families and caregivers; 
• be acceptable and usable by healthcare personnel in their day-to-
day tasks, including ease of communication and comfort; 
• be practical regarding issues of cost, time, and training; and  
• be appropriate to the occupational risk being encountered.  
 
In developing the report, the committee considered the issues rele-
vant to the pathogen (virus), the device, and the worker while realizing it 
needed to keep in mind the various work tasks of healthcare personnel, 
the safety culture, and other organizational issues regarding where and 
how they work, and the broader policy and regulatory issues. Figure 1-1 
is a depiction of the major components or factors involved in PPE use in 
health care. 
 
 
OVERVIEW OF INFLUENZA AND OTHER VIRAL 
RESPIRATORY DISEASES 
 
This report draws on the 2009–2010 experience with H1N1 influenza 
A. However, a brief background section is included here to set the con-
text for the report and to broaden the discussion to include other viral 
respiratory diseases. Although not the focus of this report, bacterial path-
ogens may also be transmitted via respiratory aerosols. 
Influenza is a serious respiratory illness caused by infection with 
influenza type A or type B virus. Each year, more than 200,000 U.S. 
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hospitalizations result from seasonal influenza and its complications 
(Thompson et al., 2004). Estimates of the number of deaths in the United 
States associated annually with seasonal influenza (from 1976 to 2007) 
ranged from a low of about 3,300 to a high of about 49,000, with most of 
the excess mortality in persons 65 years and older (Thompson et al., 
2010). Cases of influenza peak during the winter months in each hemi-
sphere. The influenza A virus is categorized by the subtypes of its major 
surface glycoproteins: hemagglutinin and neuraminidase.6 The influenza 
virus undergoes frequent changes in antigenicity. Vaccines and antiviral 
medications have been developed to prevent or mitigate the disease, al-
though major challenges remain, particularly in determining the appro-
priate viral strain to be included in the annual vaccine.  
In contrast to seasonal occurrences of influenza, global outbreaks or 
pandemics occur more rarely. In the twentieth century, influenza pan-
demics occurred in 1918, 1957, and 1968. The highest mortality was in 
the 1918 pandemic, which is estimated to have resulted in 675,000 
deaths in the United States and 50 million or more deaths worldwide 
(Johnson and Mueller, 2002; Morens and Fauci, 2007). The 2009 H1N1 
virus was first detected in Mexico in April 2009 and quickly appeared in 
the United States. Although the incidence was high and difficult to 
measure (as only a small percentage are laboratory-confirmed cases), it 
was milder than expected and more likely to affect people under age 65 
than seasonal influenza (CDC, 2010e). In the United States, CDC esti-
mates there were between 43 and 89 million cases of H1N1 between 
April 2009 and April 10, 2010, with an estimate of 8,870 to 18,300 
deaths related to the 2009 H1N1 (CDC, 2010e). 
In late April 2009, CDC began to release 25 percent of the supplies 
in the Strategic National Stockpile that could be needed to protect against 
the influenza virus and treat influenza patients. This equated to approx-
imately 11 million regimens of antiviral drugs and 39 million pieces of 
PPE, including face masks, respirators, gowns, gloves, and face shields 
(allocations were based on each state’s population) (CDC, 2010a).  
Other viral respiratory diseases are also a concern for the health and 
safety of healthcare personnel, ranging from emerging diseases, such as 
severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), to the highly prevalent and 
seasonal respiratory syncytial virus (RSV). In 2003, worldwide attention 
focused on an outbreak of infections caused by a previously unrec-
ognized coronavirus that resulted in SARS. Healthcare personnel, partic-
 
6Hemagglutinin mediates the binding of influenza virus to the cells. Neuraminidase is 
involved in the release of virus from infected cells.  
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ularly those not using PPE and other infection control practices, were 
among the vulnerable groups (CDC, 2003). RSV infections are especial-
ly a concern in infants and older adults. The symptoms of RSV infections 
are similar to other respiratory diseases, including influenza, and trans-
mission routes of RSV include direct and indirect contact, droplet spray, 
and aerosol routes. Each year in the United States, 75,000 to 125,000 
infants are hospitalized with RSV (CDC, 2010d), and their care may in-
volve many types of healthcare personnel.  
Having recently been through the 2009–2010 experience with H1N1 
influenza, the committee is well aware of the ongoing challenges and 
controversies surrounding PPE for healthcare personnel. Lessons contin-
ue to be learned regarding strategies to address why some healthcare per-
sonnel do not use preventive measures that are available and effective, 
particularly because preventing disease has implications for both improv-
ing the health of the workers and their patients.  At this time, it is particu-
larly important to build on the recent H1N1 experience and take the 
actions needed to address the research and policy questions that will al-
low the healthcare community to be better prepared for the next epidemic 
or pandemic. While the optimist can seek comfort in the fact that 
progress has been made in the past several years, the pragmatist must 
wonder about the rate of progress (or lack thereof) on such a critical is-
sue that potentially threatens the security and economic well-being of the 
nation and the world. Experience has shown that relevant research on 
these issues wanes between pandemics. Avoiding that scenario this time 
is crucial to resolving the research questions and setting evidence-based 
policies in place.  
 
 
DEFINING AN INTEGRATED APPROACH 
TO PPE RESEARCH 
 
Providing care to ill or injured patients involves a range of potential-
ly hazardous exposures for healthcare personnel. Current infection con-
trol precautions address this challenge by providing guidance on PPE and 
other precautions that varies depending on the mode of transmission of 
the pathogen. The ultimate goal would be to have definitive information 
that would match the appropriate type of PPE with the pathogen, its 
mode of transmission, the infectious dose, and its risk to healthcare per-
sonnel. In many cases in industrial settings, this level of specificity is 
available for chemical exposures, although other industrial settings with 
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unknown or mixed exposures continue to pose challenges. Reaching that 
point for protecting healthcare personnel will require concerted research 
efforts.  
This report explores an integrated approach that addresses the full 
spectrum of research (from basic research to policy research) and trans-
lates research findings into improvements in the standards of healthcare 
practice (Figure 1-2). This approach ensures that basic science initiatives 
are fully explored, while also addressing clinical needs and testing the 
results in real-world settings, with the expectation that adaptations will 
be made and tested along the way. Feedback loops to prior stages are 
also critically important. Such an integrated approach calls for active col-
laboration and discourse among scientists and clinicians who may not 
have had previous interactions.  
Chapters 2 to 5 each begin with a short summary of the relevant dis-
cussion of the 2008 report, followed by an update of recent research ef-
forts outlining the state of progress in that area, and concluding with the 
committee’s recommendations on research needs and directions. The 
committee examined four major areas of research: 
 
• transmission of influenza and other viral respiratory diseases and 
the use of PPE in preventing transmission (Chapter 2); 
 
 
 
CONCEPT 
PROOF OF 
PRINCIPLE 
STANDARD OF 
PRACTICE 
 
Basic Science 
Research 
(Safety) 
 
Clinical and  
Applied 
Research 
(Efficacy) 
 
 
Systems  
Research 
(Effectiveness) 
Policy and 
Regulatory  
Research 
(Disease Reduction 
in Populations) 
 
 
 
 
 T4 T3T2T1 
 
FIGURE 1-2 An integrated system moving research into practice, depicting the 
translation of research from basic science research (T1) through policy and regu-
latory research (T4). 
SOURCE: Adapted from Henderson and Palmore (2010) with permission from 
University of Chicago Press.  
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• design and engineering of PPE to be effective and wearable 
(Chapter 3); 
• use of PPE by healthcare personnel (Chapter 4); and  
• policy, standards setting, and certification (Chapter 5).  
 
The report covers PPE issues that are relevant to preventing the 
transmission of a number of viral respiratory diseases; however, much of 
the recent research and discussion is focused on influenza and, as a re-
sult, influenza is the primary disease discussed in the report. The priori-
ties noted throughout this report are to determine the type of PPE needed 
for given exposures and to move effective, wearable, and innovative PPE 
products through the basic research and initial testing phases and on to 
active use and evaluation by the worker community.  
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
BLS (Bureau of Labor Statistics). 2010. Career guide to industries, 2010-2011 
edition: Healthcare. http://www.bls.gov/oco/cg/cgs035.htm (accessed No-
vember 19, 2010). 
CDC (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention). 2003. Cluster of severe 
acute respiratory syndrome cases among protected health-care workers—
Toronto, Canada, April 2003. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 
52(19):433-436. 
———. 2010a. The 2009 H1N1 pandemic: Summary highlights, April 2009-
April 2010. http://cdc.gov/h1n1flu/cdcresponse.htm (accessed November 
19, 2010). 
———. 2010b. 2010-11 influenza prevention and control recommendations: 
Additional information about vaccination of specific populations. http:// 
www.cdc.gov/flu/professionals/acip/specificpopulations.htm (accessed No-
vember 30, 2010). 
———. 2010c. Prevention strategies for seasonal influenza in healthcare 
settings. http://www.cdc.gov/flu/professionals/infectioncontrol/healthcare 
settings.htm (accessed December 20, 2010). 
———. 2010d. Respiratory syncytial virus activity—United States, July 2008-
December 2009. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 59(8):230-233. 
———. 2010e. Updated CDC estimates of 2009 H1N1 influenza cases, 
hospitalizations and deaths in the United States, April 2009-April 10, 2010. 
http://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/estimates_2009_h1n1.htm (accessed November 
19, 2010). 
Fiore, A. E., C. B. Bridges, and N. J. Cox. 2009. Seasonal influenza vaccines. 
Current Topics in Microbiology and Immunology 333:43-82. 
Copyright © National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
Preventing Transmission of Pandemic Influenza and Other Viral Respiratory Diseases:  Personal Protective Equipment for Healthcare Workers: Update 2010
28 PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT FOR HEALTHCARE PERSONNEL 
 
Henderson, D. K., and T. N. Palmore. 2010. Critical gaps in knowledge of the 
epidemiology and pathophysiology of healthcare-associated infections. 
Infection Control and Hospital Epidemiology 31(Suppl. 1):S4-S6. 
IOM (Institute of Medicine). 2008. Preparing for an influenza pandemic: 
Personal protective equipment for healthcare workers. Washington, DC: 
The National Academies Press. 
———. 2009. Respiratory protection for healthcare workers in the workplace 
against novel H1N1 Influenza A: A letter report. Washington, DC: The 
National Academies Press. 
Johnson, N. P., and J. Mueller. 2002. Updating the accounts: Global mortality of 
the 1918-1920 “Spanish” influenza pandemic. Bulletin of the History of 
Medicine 76(1):105-115. 
Morens, D. M., and A. S. Fauci. 2007. The 1918 influenza pandemic: Insights 
for the 21st century. Journal of Infectious Diseases 195(7):1018-1028. 
NIOSH (National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health). 2007. Evidence 
for the National Academies’ review of the NIOSH personal protective 
technology program. http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/nas/ppt/pdfs/PPT_EvPkg_ 
090707_FinalR.pdf (accessed November 30, 2010). 
OSHA (Occupational Safety and Health Administration). 2002. OSHA fact 
sheet: Personal protective equipment. http://www.osha.gov/OshDoc/data_ 
General_Facts/ppe-factsheet.pdf (accessed November 30, 2010). 
Siegel, J. D., E. Rhinehart, M. Jackson, L. Chiarello, and the Healthcare 
Infection Control Practices Advisory Committee. 2007. 2007 guideline for 
isolation precautions: Preventing transmission of infectious agents in 
healthcare settings. http://www.cdc.gov/hicpac/pdf/isolation/Isolation2007. 
pdf (accessed December 20, 2010). 
Thompson, M., D. Shay, H. Zhou, C. Bridges, P. Cheng, E. Burns, J. Bresee, 
and N. Cox. 2010. Estimates of deaths associated with seasonal influenza—
United States, 1976–2007. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 
59(33):1057-1062. 
Thompson, W. W., D. K. Shay, E. Weintraub, L. Brammer, C. B. Bridges, N. J. 
Cox, and K. Fukuda. 2004. Influenza-associated hospitalizations in the 
United States. Journal of the American Medical Association 292(11):1333-
1340. 
Treanor, J. J., K. Kotloff, R. F. Betts, R. Belshe, F. Newman, D. Iacuzio, J. 
Wittes, and M. Bryant. 1999. Evaluation of trivalent, live, cold-adapted 
(CAIV-T) and inactivated (TIV) influenza vaccines in prevention of virus 
infection and illness following challenge of adults with wild-type influenza 
A (H1N1), A (H3N2), and B viruses. Vaccine 18(9-10):899-906. 
Copyright © National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
Preventing Transmission of Pandemic Influenza and Other Viral Respiratory Diseases:  Personal Protective Equipment for Healthcare Workers: Update 2010
2 
 
Understanding the Risk 
to Healthcare Personnel 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interest in the transmission of influenza viruses has increased in re-
cent years due to the ongoing zoonotic infection of humans with avian 
H5N1 influenza viruses and the pandemic spread of a swine-like H1N1 
strain in 2009. In particular, the recognition that person-to-person trans-
mission is a major criterion that must be met for pandemic infection has 
stimulated research into the mechanisms by which influenza viruses are 
transmitted and what factors enhance or interfere with this transmission. 
In considering preventive efforts to avoid viral respiratory disease trans-
mission, the committee emphasizes the importance of the use of a range 
of hazard controls, including vaccination, to protect healthcare personnel.  
This chapter provides a synopsis of the discussion in the 2008 report 
regarding influenza transmission followed by an overview of recent 
(2007 to mid-2010) research on viral respiratory disease transmission. 
Studies on personal protective equipment (PPE) use to prevent viral res-
piratory disease transmission are also reviewed. The chapter concludes 
with the committee’s thoughts on immediate research needs and long-
term research opportunities.  
 
 
BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT 
FROM THE 2008 REPORT 
 
The prior Institute of Medicine report examined research studies con-
ducted through 2007 on the modes of influenza transmission and high-
lighted the paucity of data on the relative contributions of each to the risk 
of illness in the community or clinical setting. A major challenge in re-
search on this issue has been the lack of consistency in the use of terms 
29 
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to describe particle size and to describe potential transmission routes 
(Box 2-1). As research efforts move forward, agreement is needed on 
terminology to be used so that studies can be compared. Box 2-1 provides 
the definitions used by the committee throughout the report, including 
in describing earlier studies. The terms and definitions of the transmission 
routes were developed at a recent Centers for Disease Control and Preven-
tion (CDC) workshop (David Weissman, personal communication, CDC, 
November 2010) and are provided as a starting point. These are operational 
 
BOX 2-1 
Terminology—Particle Size and Transmission Routes 
 
As noted above, the terms and definitions here are used to frame the dis-
cussion, and efforts are needed to reach consensus agreement among the 
many relevant areas of research and clinical care.  
 
Particle Size:  
• Respirable particles—particles with da ≤ 10 μm that can be inhaled 
and penetrate to the alveolar region; although a substantial fraction 
deposit in the alveolar region, they deposit throughout the respiratory 
tract. These are the equivalent of “droplet nuclei.” 
• Inspirable particles—particles with 10 μm ≤ da ≤ 100 μm, which can 
be inhaled but cannot penetrate to the alveolar region; nearly all de-
posit in the head airways region. 
 
Transmission Routes: 
• Contact transmission: 
o Direct contact transmission occurs when the virus is transferred 
by contact from an infected person to another person without a 
contaminated intermediate object.  
o Indirect contact transmission involves the transfer of viral 
agents by contact with a contaminated intermediate object.  
• Droplet spray transmission: Person-to-person transmission of the vi-
rus through the air by droplet sprays. A key feature is deposition by 
impaction on exposed mucous membranes.  
• Aerosol transmission: Person-to-person transmission of influenza or 
other respiratory viruses through the air by aerosols in the inspirable 
(inhalable) size range or smaller. Particles are small enough to be 
inhaled into the oronasopharynx and distally into the trachea and 
lung.  
 
NOTE: da = aerodynamic diameter. Terminology regarding particles with da > 
100 μm is needed. 
SOURCES: Nicas and Jones (2009); Personal communication, D. Weissman, 
November 2010.  
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definitions and are not CDC policy. The definitions of particle size are 
adapted from a set of definitions described by Nicas and Jones (2009). 
Further work is needed on standardization of terminology. A common set 
of definitions accepted by the industrial hygiene, infectious disease, and 
healthcare communities would be most helpful in discussing future re-
search and policy. 
Much of the discussion regarding influenza transmission has focused 
on the continuum between droplet spray and aerosol transmission, as 
well as on the role of contact transmission and the potential for transmis-
sion through inoculation of the conjunctivae. Aerosol transmission, an 
issue in healthcare settings where patients have diseases such as tubercu-
losis and measles, can occur at a short range between persons but can 
also involve infectious agents carried for longer distances by air currents. 
Fabian and colleagues (2008) collected exhaled breath of patients with 
active influenza. In 4 of 12 subjects, exhaled breath contained influenza, 
and more than 87 percent of exhaled particles were < 1 µm.  
One of the main reasons why there is no clear understanding of long-
range transmission is because aerosol transmission of influenza and other 
respiratory viruses is difficult to study in human populations. To study 
long-range aerosol transmission properly, the background prevalence of 
the disease would need to be low in the community, and many other fac-
tors would need to be controlled to rule out other transmission routes, 
such as droplet spray and contact (Tellier, 2009). Production of aerosols 
also varies by individual; some individuals produce large amounts of 
bioaerosols in coughs, sneezes, and even tidal breathing, while others do 
not. Therefore, some individuals may be more or less likely to transmit 
influenza infection or other viral respiratory diseases via aerosols.  
Context is likely to play an important role in shaping the importance 
of these transmission pathways in relation to illness occurrence. Re-
searchers have shown that contextual factors may include environment, 
humidity, temperature, number and types of fomites, air flow, age of sus-
ceptible and infected populations, and number of individuals and their 
interactions within space. Biological factors that may influence transmis-
sion include virus strain characteristics, human physiology, immune sta-
tus, and genetic susceptibility of the host.  
Modifications to the living environment have the potential to reduce 
the transmission of influenza virus or other respiratory viral agents. 
These modifications include increasing the rate of air exchange, using 
non-recirculated air, irradiating air prior to recirculation, and changing 
absolute humidity (Lowen et al., 2007; Shaman et al., 2010). Increased 
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air exchange is expected to affect transmission by an aerosol route 
through a reduction in the concentration of infectious particles in the air. 
Because both temperature and humidity are known to impact the stability 
of influenza viruses in an aerosol (Harper, 1961, 1963; Hemmes et al., 
1960; Schaffer et al., 1976), interventions to reduce transmission by al-
tering these environmental conditions may be useful.  
Influenza A transmission has been studied in various animal species—
including mice, guinea pigs, monkeys, and ferrets—with variable results. 
These studies show that animals develop influenza infection, and most 
demonstrate the possible role of aerosol transmission. Experiments per-
formed in the 1930s demonstrated that influenza virus–naïve, asympto-
matic ferrets that were caged with influenza virus–infected ferrets would 
subsequently develop disease and that, even in the absence of experimen-
tal infection, ferrets occasionally displayed an influenza-like illness, after 
which they became immune to subsequent virus inoculation (Francis and 
Magill, 1935; Smith et al., 1933). Andrewes and Glover (1941) demon-
strated transmission using an experimental design in which air flowed 
from infected to naïve ferrets through a tube containing S- and U-shaped 
bends, which would be expected to allow the transfer of only small  
(< 5 μm) respirable particles. In hamsters, by contrast, transmission of 
influenza viruses appeared to depend on contact between infected and ex-
posed animals (Ali et al., 1982). A series of experiments with mice in the 
1960s also provided some evidence suggesting aerosol transmission 
(Schulman, 1968; Schulman and Kilbourne, 1962). More recently, the gui-
nea pig has been successfully used to study influenza transmission (Lowen 
et al., 2006). 
Transmission among humans has been studied less. Early volunteer 
studies found that infection via inhalation of respirable particles requires 
considerably less virus than infection via droplets placed on the nasal 
membranes (Alford et al., 1966; Couch et al., 1971, 1974; Douglas, 
1975). Several observational studies of naturally occurring influenza 
provided insights into the challenges of studying transmission modes. 
One of the most well-known incidents of an influenza A outbreak hap-
pened among passengers on a grounded airplane (Gregg, 1980; Moser et 
al., 1979). An observational study of 49 passengers delayed on a 737 jet 
for 3 hours and exposed to an index case with influenza suggested aero-
sol transmission. Within 72 hours, 72 percent of the passengers became 
ill. Specimens from 31 of the 38 cases were cultured and found to have 
similar isolates. A second airline travel–associated outbreak also sug-
gested aerosol transmission with a 37 percent attack rate and wide seat-
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ing distribution of secondary cases throughout the aircraft (Klontz et al., 
1989). More recent studies of airline travel indicate close-proximity 
transmission (Baker et al., 2010; Han et al., 2009; Ooi et al., 2010), 
which could occur via one or more routes. Newer airplanes have more 
laminar air flow and improved filters over older planes, which may re-
duce long-range aerosol transmission. Studies examining how air flow 
may help prevent transmission of viral respiratory diseases in closed and 
crowded settings, such as an airplane, are warranted.  
Wong and colleagues (2010) recently reported a nosocomial out-
break of seasonal influenza in an acute-ward setting that appeared to be 
attributed to aerosol transmission. An aerosol-generating device was 
used on the influenza index case patient. At the same time, the authors 
identified an imbalance in the indoor airflow that likely created a direc-
tional dispersion of air and potentially carried influenza aerosols to other 
areas of the ward. Other patients were infected following a temporal and 
spatial pattern of air flow originating from the index patient. Two of the 
staff also became ill even though they were required to adhere to strict 
hand hygiene and medical mask use. 
Additional observational studies of human influenza have provided 
further descriptions of influenza outbreaks, but the findings do not clarify 
potential mechanisms of transmission (discussed in IOM, 2008). For ex-
ample, Drinka and colleagues (1996, 2004) compared influenza rates in 
several buildings of a long-term care facility during several seasons of 
influenza. Their initial study found that persons working in buildings 
with ventilation systems that provided outside air had much lower infec-
tion rates than those working in buildings with partially recirculated air 
(Drinka et al., 1996). However, an update of this study found similar in-
fection rates (Drinka et al., 2004). Reviews of other reported influenza 
outbreaks suggest droplet spray and contact transmission routes based on 
temporal and spatial patterns (Brankston et al., 2007; Cunney et al., 
2000; Drinka et al., 1996; Morens and Rash, 1995).  
Studies of the clinical effectiveness of PPE have had mixed results in 
preventing severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) or respiratory syn-
cytial virus (RSV) infections (see Appendix C). Challenges in studies of 
this type include difficulties in retrospectively separating the effects of 
PPE from the effects of other infection control measures. 
Specific issues regarding respiratory disease transmission to health-
care personnel have focused on medical procedures that have a potential 
for creating aerosols, and data are primarily available for SARS, not in-
fluenza. Fowler and colleagues (2004) observed a greater risk of devel-
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oping SARS for physicians and nurses performing endotracheal intuba-
tion. Similarly, in a retrospective study of 43 nurses who worked in To-
ronto with SARS patients, Loeb and colleagues (2004) found that 
assisting during intubation, suctioning before intubation, and manipulat-
ing the oxygen mask were high-risk activities for acquiring SARS; wear-
ing a face mask or N95 respirator was protective. 
As stated throughout the 2008 report, establishing how influenza is 
transmitted and understanding the contribution of each mode of trans-
mission is critical to preventing its spread and reducing morbidity and 
mortality due to influenza infection, especially in healthcare settings. The 
2008 report outlined a number of questions that remained to be addressed 
regarding influenza transmission (IOM, 2008): 
 
• Questions regarding transmission mode, including: What are the 
major modes of transmission? How much does each mode of 
transmission contribute individually or with other modes of 
transmission? What is the size distribution of particles expelled 
by infectious individuals, and how does that continuum of sizes 
affect transmission? Is the virus viable and infectious on fomites, 
and for how long? Are fomites a means of transmission, and are 
some more able to transmit than others?  
• Questions regarding infectivity, including: Can infection take 
place through mucous membranes or conjunctiva exposure? 
What is the time sequence of infectivity?  
• Questions specific to transmission in healthcare settings, includ-
ing: What activities in the healthcare setting are associated with 
minimal or increased transmission? How distinct is transmission 
in different venues including health care, schools, and house-
holds? 
• Questions specific to the role of PPE in preventing or reducing 
transmission, including: How effective is each type of PPE in 
reducing the risk of influenza transmission? How effective are 
face masks? What innovations regarding PPE are needed to en-
hance effectiveness? What is the impact on transmission risk 
when patients wear face masks? 
• Questions specific to other potential forms of prevention, includ-
ing: What is the role of ultraviolet (UV) light, humidity, temper-
ature, pressure differentials, air flow and exchange, and 
ventilation in preventing transmission? 
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The 2008 report concluded its discussion regarding research on in-
fluenza transmission with a recommendation that a Global Influenza Re-
search Network should be initiated and supported. This network would 
facilitate an understanding of the transmission and prevention of seasonal 
and pandemic influenza, with priority funding given to short-term clini-
cal and laboratory studies. Furthermore, the recommendation stressed the 
need to develop rigorous, evidence-based research protocols and imple-
mentation plans for clinical studies for use during an influenza pandemic 
(IOM, 2008).  
 
 
UPDATE ON RECENT RESEARCH 
 
In the 3 years since the writing of the prior report (IOM, 2008), re-
search efforts continue to examine the various routes of transmission and 
explore approaches to preventing transmission. The following section 
provides an overview of recent research (2007 to mid-2010) and de-
scribes animal studies, environmental monitoring and persistence studies, 
transmission modeling studies, and human studies. The literature 
searches on disease transmission conducted by the committee focused on 
influenza. Searches of bibliographic databases for studies on PPE use 
and transmission were broader and incorporated other viral respiratory 
diseases; only a few recent studies on other viral respiratory diseases 
were identified, however, and those are discussed and referenced in this 
report.  
 
 
Animal Studies 
 
Animal models complement epidemiological approaches by allowing 
the examination of influenza virus transmission from an infected to a 
susceptible host under well-controlled conditions. The ferret and guinea 
pig models are the current models of choice in influenza studies. Ferrets 
are naturally susceptible to infection with human influenza viruses, and 
these viruses transmit among them, making the ferret the current gold-
standard animal model for the study of influenza. Prompted by the need 
for a more convenient animal model than the ferret in which to study 
transmission, the guinea pig was recently developed as such a model host 
(Lowen et al., 2006). Although signs of disease are generally not ob-
served in influenza virus–infected guinea pigs, these animals are highly 
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susceptible to infection with human strains, and human influenza viruses 
transmit efficiently from one guinea pig to another.  
 
 
Animal Models on Modes of Transmission  
 
The relative contributions of the various modes by which influenza 
viruses transmit is currently a subject of debate in the field. In the context 
of experimental studies using animals, transmission by the contact route 
is normally modeled by placing infected and naïve animals into the same 
cage together. It is important to note, however, that this set-up does not 
allow one to distinguish transmission by a contact route from short-range 
spread mediated by an aerosol. To study transmission specifically by in-
spirable or respirable aerosols, animals are placed into separate cages so 
that air exchange can occur among them, but they cannot touch. Although 
this arrangement rules out contact-based transmission, when cages are 
placed in close proximity (as is usually the case), transmission may pro-
ceed via the droplet spray or aerosol modes.  
Transmission of human seasonal and 2009 H1N1 pandemic strains 
among either ferrets or guinea pigs occurs efficiently using both experi-
mental designs, indicating that transmission among ferrets and guinea 
pigs can proceed in the absence of direct or indirect contact among ani-
mals (recent studies include Lowen et al., 2006, 2007, 2008; Maines et 
al., 2009; Munster et al., 2009; Steel et al., 2010; Tumpey et al., 2007). 
In addition, evidence for transmission of influenza viruses by the aerosol 
route has been obtained in the ferret and guinea pig models; early work 
in ferrets (Andrewes and Glover, 1941) and recent experiments per-
formed in guinea pigs (Mubareka et al., 2009) demonstrate transmission 
over a distance of up to 3.5 feet.  
Recent attempts to model influenza virus transmission in BALB/c 
mice have been unsuccessful (Lowen et al., 2006); nevertheless, a mouse 
model was used by Schulman and Kilbourne to study transmission in the 
1960s (Schulman, 1968; Schulman and Kilbourne, 1962). Because of the 
inefficiency of transmission and the low susceptibility of mice to human 
influenza viruses that have not been serially adapted in this host, current-
ly the mouse model is not used widely for research on influenza virus 
transmission. Hamsters are also not in widespread use as a model for in-
fluenza virus infection, but Ali and colleagues (1982) showed that certain 
human influenza isolates transmitted well when infected and naïve ham-
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sters were housed in the same cage; transmission in the absence of con-
tact was not, however, observed.  
The potential for contact with contaminated surfaces to mediate in-
fluenza virus transmission among guinea pigs was examined by Mubareka 
and colleagues (2009). Naïve guinea pigs were placed in cages that either 
had previously housed an acutely infected animal or had been contami-
nated with high titers of influenza virus through direct application onto 
non-porous cage surfaces. In the former case, approximately 20 percent 
of exposed animals contracted infection, while with the latter design, no 
exposed animals became infected (Mubareka et al., 2009). When these 
results are compared to the high efficiency of transmission of the same 
virus by the aerosol route, they suggest that—at least in the guinea pig 
model—spread via fomites makes a minor contribution to the overall 
transmission of influenza viruses. 
 
 
Relationships Between Transmission and Symptoms, Timing  
Post-Infection, and Shedding Titers 
 
Because of their potential to produce infectious aerosols, coughing 
and sneezing are generally thought to promote transmission (Tumpey et 
al., 2007). Evidence against a critical role for sneezing and coughing 
arises from the guinea pig model: Although these animals do not sneeze 
or cough following influenza virus infection, viral spread is efficient 
among guinea pigs (Lowen et al., 2007). Influenza viruses have been 
isolated from the air surrounding infected guinea pigs (Mubareka et al., 
2009) and even mice (Schulman, 1967); this virus is most likely expelled 
into the environment through normal breathing (Fabian et al., 2008). 
The timing of transmission events relative to initial infection of do-
nor animals has not been examined closely (through the use of defined 
exposure periods) in the ferret or guinea pig models; the serial collection 
of nasal wash samples over the course of exposure does, however, allow 
an estimate of the time of transmission to be made. In the guinea pig 
model after exposure by contact and aerosol routes, virus was detected 
initially in the nasal washings of exposed animals at 1–3 days and 3–5 
days, respectively (Lowen et al., 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009; Steel et al., 
2009). The infection of exposed ferrets occurs with similar timing by 
contact and aerosol routes: Initial detection of virus in the nasal passages 
of exposed animals usually occurs between 1 and 3 days post-exposure 
(Itoh et al., 2009; Maines et al., 2006, 2009; Tumpey et al., 2007). Varia-
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tions in transmissibility among differing strains of influenza viruses do 
not show a strong correlation with differences in peak shedding titers 
(Maines et al., 2006, 2009; Mubareka et al., 2009; Steel et al., 2009; 
Tumpey et al., 2007), suggesting that, although efficient growth in the 
upper respiratory tract is most likely required for an influenza virus to 
transmit, additional criteria must be met for transmission to proceed. 
 
 
Relative Transmissibility of Influenza Viruses Derived from Different 
Host Species 
 
Viral strain and subtype specific differences in influenza virus 
transmission have been observed in recent studies of animal models. One 
strength of both the ferret and guinea pig models is that influenza viruses 
adapted to human hosts generally transmit more efficiently than avian-, 
swine-, or mouse-adapted strains. Thus, the low pathogenic avian strains 
A/duck/Alberta/35/1976 (H1N1) and A/duck/Ukraine/1963 (H3N8) did 
not transmit among guinea pigs, while certain highly pathogenic H5N1 
influenza viruses have been observed to transmit among co-caged guinea 
pigs to a limited extent (Gao et al., 2009; Steel et al., 2009). Swine in-
fluenza isolates of the H3 subtypes transmitted with 25 percent efficiency 
by the aerosol route among guinea pigs (Steel et al., 2010). By contrast, 
human H3N2 subtype viruses, as well as the H1N1 pandemic strain, gen-
erally transmit to all exposed guinea pigs by either contact or aerosol 
routes (Lowen et al., 2006; Steel et al., 2010). Overall, seasonal H1N1 
subtype viruses have been found to transmit less efficiently among gui-
nea pigs than epidemic strains of the H3N2 subtype (Mubareka et al., 
2009). A similar pattern of transmissibility is observed in the ferret mod-
el: Avian influenza viruses do not transmit to exposed animals by an 
aerosol route (Tumpey et al., 2007; Van Hoeven et al., 2009), but some 
low and highly pathogenic strains do transmit by contact to a limited ex-
tent (Belser et al., 2008; Maines et al., 2006; Sorrell et al., 2009; Van 
Hoeven et al., 2009; Wan et al., 2008). Human seasonal strains of both 
H3N2 and H1N1 subtypes transmit readily among ferrets (Itoh et al., 
2009; Maines et al., 2006, 2009; Wan et al., 2008), and the pandemic 
H1N1 strain has been observed to transmit with similar efficiency (Itoh 
et al., 2009; Munster et al., 2009) or somewhat lower efficiency (Maines 
et al., 2009) by an aerosol route than seasonal influenza viruses.  
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Interventions: Blocking Influenza Virus Transmission in  
Animal Models  
 
Interventions that offer the potential to limit transmission of influen-
za viruses in healthcare settings include vaccination; the prophylactic and 
therapeutic use of antiviral drugs; non-pharmaceutical interventions, such 
as the use of good hand hygiene and PPE; use of source control; cohort-
ing the patients; and modifications to the indoor environment. Changes 
in transmission achieved through vaccination were studied in the guinea 
pig model, and it was found that transmission could be abrogated through 
vaccination. This was the case whether the vaccinated animals were the 
donors or recipients in the transmission experiment. Vaccination was 
particularly effective in blocking spread if sterilizing immunity was 
achieved (as was seen using a live attenuated vaccine), but transmission 
was also reduced following suboptimal vaccination1 (Lowen et al., 
2009). Also in guinea pigs, twice-daily treatment with oseltamivir re-
duced titers shed from the upper respiratory tract of treated donor guinea 
pigs and, in turn, prevented transmission to untreated aerosol contacts. 
This is similar to recent and past studies of prophylactic treatment of 
household contacts of infected persons that has been found to be very 
effective (Halloran et al., 2007; Hayden et al., 2000, 2004; Monto et al., 
2002; Welliver et al., 2001).  
Research in the past several years has demonstrated in the guinea pig 
model that transmission between animals in separate cages occurs with 
lower frequency (or not at all) when the surrounding air is warm (30°C) 
or maintained at high (80 percent) or intermediate (50 percent) relative 
humidities (Lowen et al., 2007, 2008). Although field studies are re-
quired to translate these findings to the human situation, they suggest that 
the modification of relative humidity in healthcare settings may be a 
means of controlling the spread of influenza virus infection. The impact 
of UV treatment of air on influenza viral spread has not been assessed in 
an animal model; if transmission proceeds at least in part by an aerosol 
route, however, such treatment is expected to be effective.  
 
 
 
 
1The authors describe suboptimal vaccines as those that may provide only partial pro-
tection against the disease but are effective at limiting transmission (Lowen et al., 2009).  
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Environmental Monitoring and Persistence Studies 
 
 
Air Monitoring 
 
 To learn more about the distribution of aerosol influenza virus in an 
urgent care setting, two studies have recently been conducted. A study by 
Blachere and colleagues (2009) of real-time polymerase chain reaction 
(RT-PCR) identified the presence of aerosolized influenza in several 
areas of an emergency department, including a waiting room, a reception 
area, and personal samplers placed on physicians. On 3 of 6 separate 
days, aerosolized influenza A virus was detected. Half of the influenza 
particles were found to be in the respirable size range. The follow-up 
study by Lindsley and colleagues (2010a) looked at both influenza and 
RSV. Seventeen percent of the stationary samplers contained influenza A 
ribonucleic acid (RNA), and 32 percent contained RSV. Nineteen per-
cent and 38 percent of clinical staff samplers contained influenza A and 
RSV RNA, respectively. A correlation was found between samplers that 
contained influenza and presence of patients who were positive for in-
fluenza (r = 0.77). A slightly smaller proportion of the influenza A RNA 
was in particles ≤ 4.1 µm in aerodynamic diameter (42 percent) com-
pared with the earlier study by Blachere and colleagues (2009) (53 per-
cent). These studies indicate that aerosolized particles exist in this 
specific urgent care setting. However, the viability of the influenza vi-
ruses was not ascertained, and therefore it is not possible to quantify the 
importance of the identified aerosol particles to transmission in the hos-
pital setting.  
A recent study by Lindsley and colleagues (2010b) showed that 84 
percent (32/38) of influenza-positive patients had influenza viral RNA in 
their cough aerosols as identified by a National Institute for Occupational 
Safety and Health two-stage bioaerosol cyclone sampler or an SKC Bio-
Sampler. Of the influenza viral RNA detected, 65 percent was contained 
in particles in the respirable range (< 4 µm), suggesting that these par-
ticles could be inhaled and deposited in the alveolar region of the lungs. 
Viable virus was detected in the cough aerosols of some infected pa-
tients. A limitation of the collection system was the inability to collect 
larger particles. Therefore, this study was unable to quantify the propor-
tion of small versus large particles or the total amount of viral material 
contained in the cough of an influenza-infected patient. 
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Fomite Persistence 
 
 Studies examining fomite contamination have focused largely on 
virus survivability on environmental surfaces. The type of fomite surface 
appears to play a significant role in influenza virus survival with low 
survival times on porous materials, such as paper and cloth, ranging from 
8 to 12 hours and on non-porous materials, such as stainless steel and 
plastic, ranging from 24 to 72 hours (Boone and Gerba, 2007). Other fac-
tors likely to affect survival of influenza on fomites include cleanliness 
and moisture. In experimental studies reviewed by Boone and Gerba, 
transfer of influenza virus to the hands occurred up to 24 hours after con-
taminating stainless steel fomites with influenza virus. Hands appear not 
to be a very hospitable environment for influenza, with viral decay oc-
curring within the first 5 minutes of fomite-to-hand transfer. Nonethe-
less, if hands are continually inoculated by a touch to contaminated 
fomites, direct infection is likely. In the case of commonly touched fo-
mites, influenza virus may be transferred from the fomite to the hands of 
a human host through consistent contact. As noted in an earlier study, 
among clinicians, 1 in 3 healthcare professionals rubbed their eyes and 
42 percent picked their nose per 1-hour observation, suggesting that self-
inoculation of influenza virus among these healthcare personnel would 
be likely if hands became contaminated in the hospital environment 
(Boone and Gerba, 2007; Hendley et al., 1973).  
The significance of fomites in the spread of respiratory disease has 
been assessed through experimental seeding studies and assessments of 
inactivation rates (Boone and Gerba, 2007). Of the inactivation rates re-
viewed across a range of respiratory viruses (rhinovirus, RSV, corona-
viruses, parainfluenza virus, avian influenza, and influenza A and B vi-
ruses), avian influenza and influenza A viruses had the lowest log10 re-
ductions per hour. The log10 reduction per hour on non-porous fomites 
were 22 and 45 times lower for avian influenza and influenza A virus, 
respectively, compared to RSV, which had the highest log10 reduction 
per hour on surfaces. The only other respiratory virus with similar sur-
vivability as influenza on non-porous surfaces was rhinovirus, which can 
also survive for more than 24 hours. Avian influenza virus, in particular, 
was shown to have high survival rates on both porous and non-porous 
surfaces, including stainless steel, latex gloves, and cotton—as long as 
144 hours. Survival on fomites, therefore, is much longer than what has 
been observed for human influenza survival in artificially produced aero-
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sols, where rates ranged from 6 to 16 hours (Brankston et al., 2007; 
Mitchell and Guerin, 1972; Mitchell et al., 1968).  
In a recent experimental study, coronavirus was detected on PPE at a 
minimum of 4 hours following initial exposure (Casanova et al., 2010). 
N95 respirators, contact isolation gowns, and latex gloves all had detect-
able virus 24 hours after exposure. The authors concluded that corona-
viruses were able to survive on hospital PPE longer than the duration of 
contact with an infected patient. Far fewer observational studies have 
been done on influenza and other respiratory viruses on surfaces and PPE 
in the clinical setting. There are some developments in antimicrobial 
masks, but the utility and risks associated with these embedded materials 
are unclear. For example, Li and colleagues (2006) examined the antimi-
crobial activity of nanoparticle material with a mixture of silver nitrate 
and titanium dioxide for reducing bacteria on N95 respirators. There 
were large reductions in S. aureus and E. coli after 48 hours of incuba-
tion, but whether this material would have any activity against influenza 
was unclear because no respiratory viruses were tested in the study (Li et 
al., 2006). Macias and colleagues (2009) examined the extent of 2009 
H1N1 contamination on the hands of healthcare personnel and patients 
and on environmental surfaces in a hospital in Mexico. The computer 
mouse, hands, and bed rails were all found to be positive for the influen-
za virus, but viability of the virus was not assessed. Studies have also 
examined the role of the contact transmission route in the transfer of rhi-
novirus and RSV (Gwaltney et al., 1978; Hall et al., 1980, 1981). Taken 
together, these experimental and observational studies support a role for 
the contaminated environment and PPE as a potential source of viable 
respiratory viruses, such as influenza. Nonetheless, no recent studies 
identified by the committee have examined whether infection can be 
transmitted directly from contact with a contaminated fomite.  
 
 
Inactivation of Influenza A Viruses 
 
A review by Weber and Stilianakis (2008) examined studies on the 
inactivation of influenza A viruses in the environment and the impact on 
modes of transmission. Currently little is known about inactivation of 
influenza virus. Experimental studies indicate that low relative humidity 
in heated indoor areas promotes influenza survival in the closed envi-
ronment. However, the converse relationship has been observed outside 
of the United States, where outbreaks have occurred in tropical regions 
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during hot and rainy months. Relative humidity does not independently 
predict virus survivability. Because of the variability in global outbreak 
patterns by relative humidity, some have argued that contact transmission 
may predominate in tropical climates whereas aerosol transmission is 
more common in temperate climates (Lowen and Palese, 2009). Model-
ing studies support a role of humidity in predicting disease outbreaks. 
Shaman and colleagues (2010) report that absolute humidity provided a 
robust correlate for seasonal variation in temperate climates. 
 
 
Transmission Models 
 
Although empirical studies have shown that influenza transmission is 
feasible by aerosol, droplet spray, and contact routes, the results of these 
studies have not provided a comprehensive understanding of the relative 
contribution of each mode in causing outbreaks. Mathematical models 
can be used as a method for testing hypotheses about the spread of respi-
ratory infections (Brauer, 2009). Not all components of disease spread 
are measured in these models, but important parameters can be identified 
and estimated. Unfortunately, the lack of basic scientific data on trans-
mission and survivability of influenza makes it very difficult to accurate-
ly determine the parameters for these models or to assess the fit of these 
models with available data. Many transmission models looking at the 
spread of influenza and other respiratory diseases include simulations 
that provide varying estimates on different modes of transmission, in-
cluding the case reproductive number (R0), social patterning, suscepti-
bility, and influenza strain characteristics. The following summary of 
recent research in this area focuses on the key findings and assumptions 
inherent in these models in a way that may apply to healthcare personnel.  
Multiple modes of influenza transmission have been explored using 
modeling information. Potential sources of influenza transmission to 
healthcare personnel through community and nosocomial exposures have 
also been modeled.  
 
 
Models of the Dynamics of Influenza Transmission 
 
 Nicas and Jones (2009) examined the contribution of four modes of 
influenza transmission: hand contact; respirable particles (cough particles 
< 10 µm in diameter); inspirable particles (cough particles 10–100 µm in 
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diameter); and droplet spray (> 100 µm in diameter). This study used two 
very different assumptions regarding infectivity: (1) the ratio of infectivi-
ty was 3,200:1 for influenza virus deposited in the lower respiratory tract 
compared to the upper respiratory tract, and (2) the ratio of infectivity 
was 1:1 for influenza virus deposited in the lower respiratory tract versus 
the upper respiratory tract. The infectivity ratio assumptions played a 
major role in determining which method of transmission was most likely 
to cause disease. Assuming a 3,200:1 infectivity ratio for influenza virus 
deposited in the lower respiratory tract compared with the upper respira-
tory tract, droplet spray accounted for 58 percent of the infection risk at 
low salivary viral concentrations, compared to 27 percent of the risk for 
fomite or hand contact and 14 percent of risk from respirable particles. 
Little is known about virus saliva concentrations in humans, which may 
vary widely.  
As the salivary viral concentration increased, the risk of infection 
from droplet spray decreased, while the importance of hand contact in 
spreading disease increased. However, with a 1:1 ratio of infectivity in 
the lower versus upper respiratory tract, hand contact was the major driv-
er of infection across all viral salivary concentrations (Nicas and Jones, 
2009). The main measures assessed for reducing the risk of influenza 
transmission in the healthcare setting included hand washing, disposable 
gloves, and face masks to reduce touching the face. Measures for pre-
venting infection caused by droplet spray included fluid-resistant masks 
and eye goggles or face shields. Besides social distancing, the model 
found that the most effective way to reduce respirable and inspirable par-
ticles included the use of an N95 filtering respirator and/or increasing the 
room ventilation. When the model used an infectivity ratio of 1:1, the 
research found that if influenza-positive individuals have a low concen-
tration of salivary virus, healthcare personnel can significantly decrease 
the risk of transmission through simple methods, such as hand washing, 
standard surgical face masks with goggles, or face shields. At an infec-
tivity ratio of 3,200:1, respirable particles would make up a substantial 
part of the risks, and respirators would be required.  
 Chen and colleagues (2009a) specifically assessed the dynamics of 
aerosol influenza transmission and found the volume of particles released 
from a sneeze were approximately three-fold higher than for a cough. 
Using an equation to estimate the total volume of particles had the fol-
lowing results: with cough, the highest volume occurred with a particle 
sized 5.8 µm (which would be classified as respirable particles by Nicas 
and Jones [2009]), leading to a volume of virus of 500 × 10–10 mL, and 
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26 µm for sneeze (classified as inspirable particles by Nicas and Jones), 
with a volume of virus of 3 × 10–7 mL. The predicted tissue culture infec-
tive dose50 (TCID50) for influenza was estimated to be 0.57 at 5.5 µm per 
cough 2.6 days after infection, and 264 per sneeze at 10 µm after 2.6 
days. This model suggests that the TCID50 produced by a sneeze is high-
er than that emanating from a cough.  
A model of the risk of aerosol transmission was examined in the set-
ting of a commuter train. Assuming the inhalation of aerosol infectious 
agents during a commute, the estimated R0 was found to be 2.22 (geo-
metric standard deviation [SD] = 1.53), with a specified number of air 
ventilation cycles per hour (Furuya, 2007). An exposure time of less than 
30 minutes was found to reduce the likelihood of transmission, as were 
surgical masks to reduce droplet spray transmission (assuming a reduc-
tion in the risk of contaminated air inhaled by 40 percent), and high-
efficiency particulate air masks (assuming a reduction in contaminated 
air inhaled by 97 percent) to reduce smaller particulate transmission. Of 
significance for healthcare personnel, doubling the number of air ventila-
tion cycles per hour was found to reduce the risk of infection to R0 = 1. 
Although not all healthcare settings are comparable to the close and ex-
tended proximity found on a commuter train, the effectiveness of in-
creasing the number of air ventilation cycles per hour may be useful for 
reducing the likelihood of inhalation exposure to aerosol particles in the 
clinical setting. Other factors to consider in addition to ventilation would 
be the number of windows, number of stops, opening and closing of 
doors, and movement of people. 
 
 
Models of Household Transmission 
 
Household transmission models may be useful as a proxy for trans-
mission within the healthcare setting. A single household model with two 
bedrooms and a common living quarter was used to assess the likelihood 
of influenza infection (Atkinson and Wein, 2008). The model included 
one infected individual, one primary caregiver, and two other household 
residents. The authors assumed that the death rate (rate of viral inactiva-
tion) on porous surfaces was more than one magnitude higher than the 
death rate on non-porous surfaces (0.12 per hour versus 1.78 per hour). 
The death rate of virus in the air was estimated to be 0.36 per hour. The 
authors assumed viral transmission occurred from the infected individual 
to the caregiver only within the infected individual’s room, through un-
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protected aerosol transmission with no deposition on surrounding sur-
faces. Transmission was assumed through close contact at the time of the 
infected individual’s emission, and that aerosol virus would be deposited 
on either porous or non-porous surfaces. The authors then compared total 
influenza virus shed, infectious dose likely to infect half of the popula-
tion, and death rate of the viruses on different surfaces between influenza 
virus and the rhinovirus. They found a higher total shed virus (1.93 × 105 
TCID50 compared to 1.57 × 105 TCID50), higher TCID50 required for res-
piratory epithelium (0.671 TCID50 compared to 0.216 TCID50), and much 
higher TCID50 for nose and eyes (500 TCID50 compared to 0.032 TCID50) 
for influenza compared to rhinovirus. Although the death rate on hands 
was much higher for the influenza virus (55.3 per hour) compared to rhi-
novirus (0.61 per hour), the death rate on porous and non-porous surfaces 
was lower for influenza than rhinovirus. Atkinson and Wein (2008) con-
cluded that aerosol transfer was the most likely mode of infection in the 
described setting.  
 
 
Models of Healthcare-Associated Infection 
 
The committee was unable to identify any studies since 2007 that 
modeled transmission of influenza within the hospital setting among 
healthcare personnel. Earlier, Nicas and Sun (2006) modeled the risk of 
transmissible respiratory diseases in a healthcare setting. The authors 
provided an integrated method of examining transmission between in-
fected individuals, contaminated environments, and direct patient-to-
healthcare worker exposure, which could be used as a template for an 
influenza-specific model in the healthcare setting.   
 
 
Models of Asymptomatic Carriers 
 
The role of asymptomatic carriers in spreading influenza was ex-
amined using a Susceptible Exposed Infective Recovered model, with 
two additional categories: asymptomatic and hospitalized (Hsu and 
Hsieh, 2008). The model assumed that exposed individuals could either 
become infectious, and then move toward a hospital or recover without 
hospitalization, or become asymptomatic, and spread disease before re-
covering. Building on previous literature that up to a third of all influen-
za cases are asymptomatic, the authors assumed that asymptomatic 
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individuals contributed less to viral shedding as a result of a decrease in 
symptoms, such as coughing, that may spread disease. The authors found 
that the way that the public responds to information about an outbreak 
can reduce the number of influenza infections. However, due to asymp-
tomatic influenza infections, community response alone cannot affect the 
basic dynamics of the model without additional steps, such as quarantine 
or other intervention measures, which were not included in the model be-
cause of additional complexities in their basic model. Therefore, with an 
asymptomatic subpopulation that is shedding virus, influenza can continue 
to persist within the community even with an R0 of less than 1. 
 
 
Human Challenge, Observational, and Clinical Studies 
 
 
Infectivity, Viral Shedding, and Symptoms 
 
The timing of infection and quantity of viral shedding obviously play 
a role in the spread of influenza. A meta-analysis of 56 volunteer chal-
lenge studies attempted to quantify the time of peak viral shedding 
among healthy human volunteers (Carrat et al., 2008b). Two different 
strains of virus were examined: influenza A/H1N1 strains (recovered 
earlier than 2009 H1N1) and influenza A/H3N2. In human volunteers, 
viral shedding showed a quick increase the first day following inocula-
tion, with a maximum value reached after 2 days, and a return to base-
line, on average, 8 days following inoculation. The first signs of 
shedding were observed in 83 percent of subjects 1 day after inoculation, 
14 percent of subjects 2 days after inoculation, and 3 percent of subjects 
3 days after inoculation, with an average duration of 1.1 days until viral 
shedding occurred. The mean duration of viral shedding was 4.80 days 
(95% confidence interval [CI] = 4.31, 5.29), with no significant differ-
ence in duration between H1N1 and H3N2 strains. One dose-varying 
study included in the meta-analysis found that shedding duration was 
dependent upon the initial inoculation dose.  
Consistent with previous findings, Carrat and colleagues (2008b) de-
termined that an average of 66.9 percent of influenza-inoculated partici-
pants showed clinical symptoms. Total symptom scores peaked 2 to 3 
days after inoculation, and returned to baseline after 8 days. The mean 
duration of illness was 4.4 days (SD = 1.8 days). The curves plotted for 
influenza viral shedding and symptom severity were similar, with viral 
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shedding peaking 1 day prior to clinical symptoms. However, limited 
information across the studies was provided on the participants who did 
not develop clinical illness. The authors concluded that viral shedding 
peaked rapidly and that symptoms for influenza-like illness varied wide-
ly, making an influenza-like illness case definition unreliable for identi-
fying infectious individuals to implement control measures. Moreover, 
the study populations were adults and generally healthy. Thus, variability 
in age, immune status, and underlying health conditions may have pro-
found effects on these estimates, as has been observed recently for 2009 
H1N1 (Goodman, 2009). For example, children under age 9 infected 
with 2009 H1N1 shed virus for a median duration of 6 days after fever 
was detected, 1 day longer than overall median duration for all age 
groups, and some children showed signs of shedding for up to 13 days 
(Goodman, 2009). 
Historically, controlled viral challenge studies have provided key in-
sights on respiratory virus transmission (Carrat et al., 2008a). Current 
preliminary efforts to develop influenza voluntary challenge studies are 
under way in the United Kingdom and may provide an opportunity to bet-
ter understand the relative contribution of differing transmission modes of 
influenza (Van-Tam, 2010). 
A household model of transmission of pandemic 2009 H1N1 virus 
found an average time between symptom onset of the primary case and 
secondary cases to be 2.6 days (95% CI = 2.2–3.5 days), similar to pre-
vious reports of time of disease spread between household members, but 
shorter than the secondary infections reported below (Cauchemez et al., 
2009). Another study that recruited index patients to study the serial in-
terval of influenza leading to a secondary infection within the household 
found the period to be longer than previously reported: an average of 3.6 
days (95% CI = 2.9–4.3 days). The interval measured time from symp-
tom onset in a laboratory-confirmed case of influenza to the time of 
symptom onset in a corresponding household contact (Cowling et al., 
2009b). More recently, Lau and colleagues (2010) used a community-
based study of households to show that the bulk of viral shedding hap-
pened during the first 2 to 3 days after illness onset and only 1 to 8 per-
cent of infectiousness occurs prior to symptom onset. Moreover, only 14 
percent of cases that had RT-PCR–detectable influenza virus RNA were 
asymptomatic, and the quantity of viral particles was low among these 
cases, suggesting that asymptomatic cases are unlikely to play a large 
role in transmission.  
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An observational study examined influenza and rhinovirus infections 
among healthcare personnel. Bellei and colleagues (2007) collected both 
acute respiratory illness reports and laboratory samples among healthcare 
personnel. Nearly 50 percent of staff reporting influenza-like illnesses 
had rhinovirus rather than influenza. Thus, surveillance by symptoms 
may not accurately predict influenza viral activity among healthcare per-
sonnel. Influenza vaccination in this study population was low (19.7 per-
cent), and varied by the department where hospital personnel were 
assigned. Of the 203 personnel recruited with any acute respiratory ill-
ness symptom, 48.3 percent reported direct contact with a patient, and 
39.4 percent had preschool children exposure either at the hospital or at 
home.  
 
 
Disease Transmission  
 
 In a recent study in an infant ward, of 122 susceptible patients with 
single rooms, only 6 (5 percent) acquired influenza in the ward, while 17 
percent (13/77) of infants in a multiple-crib room acquired nosocomial 
infection (Hall, 2007). Overall, children with one or two roommates were 
nearly 4 times more likely to acquire influenza in the hospital (odds ratio 
= 3.90, 95% CI 2.88–4.92). The author notes that one to three separate 
influenza cases occurred before peak influenza activity began over the 
two influenza seasons that were studied, and that neither of these cases 
was followed by a quick outbreak in the ward. Similarly, novel data ex-
amining outbreaks of 2009 H1N1 in airplanes, buses, and schools pri-
marily implicate close proximity transmission (Baker et al., 2010; Han et 
al., 2009; Kar-Purkayastha et al., 2009; Ooi et al., 2010).  
In a review by Chen and colleagues (2008), transmission routes of 
SARS were examined. Major transmission modes that have been demon-
strated include close contact via droplet spray or contaminated fomites 
with respiratory excretion. In addition, diarrhea accompanied infection 
and SARS virus was found in the greatest quantities in feces compared to 
nasopharyngeal and urine samples 14 days after first onset of symptoms.  
Avian influenza H5N1 virus has been studied in several family clus-
ters, and both droplet spray and contact with stool have been hypothe-
sized as important transmission routes. In a household cluster study by 
Wang and colleagues (2008), an index case (the son) transmitted the in-
fection to his father while his father cared for him in the hospital. The 
index case had large amounts of sputum, frequent coughing, and watery 
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diarrhea with H5N1 infection. His father had no known exposure to poul-
try or other ill individuals. Neither the index case’s mother nor girlfriend, 
both of whom also had close contact, became infected. Transmission to 
the father may have occurred through inhalation of respirable or inspira-
ble particles or contact with feces-contaminated clothes. Of note, 2009 
H1N1 illness symptoms also included vomiting and diarrhea (Bryant et 
al., 2010; Riquelme et al., 2009). Research on the potential for fecal oral 
transmission of 2009 H1N1 influenza is warranted. 
 
 
PPE Use to Prevent Respiratory Disease Transmission  
 
 
Models on the Use of PPE 
 
 The effectiveness of surgical masks and N95 respirators in reducing 
the spread of influenza were directly modeled as a method of preventing 
the 2009 H1N1 (Tracht et al., 2010). Considering that the likelihood of 
wearing a surgical mask or respirator can vary by many factors, includ-
ing age and marital status, the authors assumed that compliance with the 
recommended intervention would only occur in the closed population 
when a minimal level of susceptible individuals became infected, and 
that individuals within the population could switch between wearing and 
not wearing masks or respirators. Several scenarios were explored, with 
the following results: 
 
• when neither masks nor respirators were used, the total percen-
tage of the population infected was estimated at 75 percent (in a 
population of 1 million people); 
• if 10 percent of the population wore surgical masks (assumed in 
this scenario to be 2 percent effective in reducing susceptibility 
and infectivity), the total number of cases would be only mini-
mally reduced (to approximately 73 percent);   
• increasing the percentage of the population wearing surgical 
masks to 50 percent (assumed in this scenario to be 5 percent ef-
fective in reducing susceptibility and infectivity) reduced the in-
fected population to approximately 69 percent;   
• if 10 percent of the population wore N95 respirators (assumed in 
this scenario to be 20 percent effective in reducing susceptibility 
and infectivity), the total number of cases would be reduced to 
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approximately 55 percent (a reduction of approximately 19 per-
cent from not wearing masks or respirators); and 
• increasing the percentage of the population wearing N95 respira-
tors to 50 percent (assumed in this scenario to be 50 percent ef-
fective in reducing susceptibility and infectivity) dropped the 
total number of cases drastically to approximately 0.1 percent.  
 
The authors concluded that surgical masks were unlikely to impact 
the epidemic because of low effectiveness at reducing the spread of in-
fluenza among susceptible and infected individuals, while N95 respirators 
could reduce the impact of the epidemic, though they could not reduce the 
R0 below 1. The authors acknowledge that the effectiveness of the inter-
ventions are time dependent and that delays in mask-use initiation can 
have strong effects on the findings. The results from the model suggest 
that healthcare personnel would benefit from widespread use of properly 
fitting N95 respirators among susceptible and infected individuals.  
 
 
Community Studies of PPE Use 
 
Several recent studies have looked at community use of PPE. Results 
of these studies have been inconsistent because of differences in study 
design, setting, intervention type, and ability to control for confounding 
factors. MacIntyre and colleagues (2009) conducted a study on the use of 
face masks in households in Australia during the winters of 2006 and 
2007. The participating 145 households included adults with known ex-
posure to a child with fever and other respiratory symptoms. The house-
holds were randomized to one of three arms of the trial: (1) surgical 
masks that were to be worn when in the same room as the ill child; (2) P2 
masks (equivalent to N95 respirators), also to be worn when in the same 
room; and (3) a control group with no masks used. Adherence to the use 
of masks was found to be low (less than 50 percent). Of those who used 
the masks, a reduction in the risk of acquiring a respiratory infection was 
noted in the range of 60 to 80 percent, and no differences were seen be-
tween surgical masks and P2 masks, but the study was underpowered to 
determine differences between these two interventions. In addition, the 
authors noted that some adults may have already been in the incubation 
period for infection because enrollment occurred in conjunction with a 
sick child visit to a healthcare facility. Thus, the mask intervention may 
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have been applied too late in the course of illness transmission within the 
household.  
Hand hygiene has been demonstrated to provide a reduction in respi-
ratory infections in the community setting (Aiello et al., 2008), but the 
role of face masks in combination with hand hygiene (i.e., layered inter-
ventions) had not been studied in a controlled intervention trial until re-
cently. Several recent randomized community intervention studies have 
attempted to compare face-mask use and hand hygiene or a combination 
of both interventions during seasonal influenza seasons. In one study, 
researchers randomized university residence halls housing 1,297 student 
participants to use of face masks, face masks with hand hygiene, or a 
control group for a 6-week period during the influenza season (Aiello et 
al., 2010). Significant reductions in influenza-like illnesses were seen in 
the group using face masks and hand hygiene as compared with the con-
trol group (reductions of 35 to 51 percent after adjusting for vaccination 
and other factors). Compliance data were difficult to ascertain, and the 
mild influenza season may have impacted the results. This study pro-
vided some insights on primary prevention rather than secondary preven-
tion of illness because the participants were asked to wear masks before 
influenza-like illness was observed on campus.  
Larson and colleagues (2010) conducted a study examining second-
ary transmission of influenza infection (i.e., other than the index case) by 
providing one of three interventions to urban households. The 509 
households were randomized to receive one of the following: (1) educa-
tion on the prevention and treatment of upper respiratory infections and 
influenza, (2) the same educational component plus alcohol-based hand 
sanitizer, or (3) the educational component plus hand sanitizer and face 
masks (Larson et al., 2010). Compliance with wearing the face masks 
was low; half of the households provided with face masks reported using 
the face masks when they had a household member with an influenza-
like illness. In multivariate analyses no differences were observed in the 
rate of infection.  
A study by Cowling and colleagues (2009a) assessed several interven-
tions in 259 households and used secondary transmission of laboratory-
confirmed influenza infection in family members as the outcome meas-
ure. Households were identified through household members presenting 
to outpatient clinics with influenza-like illness confirmed as influenza A 
or B by rapid testing. An education intervention was provided to the 134 
households in the control group, hand hygiene supplies were provided to 
136 households, and 137 households received face masks and hand hy-
Copyright © National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
Preventing Transmission of Pandemic Influenza and Other Viral Respiratory Diseases:  Personal Protective Equipment for Healthcare Workers: Update 2010
UNDERSTANDING THE RISK TO HEALTHCARE PERSONNEL 53 
 
giene supplies. Data for all the households in the study found that some-
one in the household developed confirmed influenza in 19 percent of the 
households. A significant reduction in confirmed influenza was seen for 
households receiving an intervention within 36 hours of the onset of 
symptoms in the index patient; no differences were seen in a comparison 
of the hand hygiene and the hand hygiene plus face masks groups.  
Challenges in studies of interventions in the community setting in-
clude adherence, observations for compliance, and disentangling the con-
tribution of layered interventions (i.e., face masks and hand hygiene 
together) when the effect estimate size between layered and non-layered 
interventions may be small. Moreover, in a light influenza season diffi-
culties in identifying cases rapidly can impact the statistical power and 
effectiveness of the interventions, respectively. Last, these types of stud-
ies are unable to provide insights on the modes of transmission of in-
fluenza because face masks may block both droplet spray and direct con-
tact inoculation from hands contaminated with influenza virus.  
 
 
Clinical Studies of PPE Use by Healthcare Personnel 
 
Although the benefits of vaccination are clear (Fiore et al., 2009; 
Treanor et al., 1999), much less is certain about what types of respiratory 
PPE are needed or the value of face masks worn by healthcare personnel. 
Few studies have been conducted of effective PPE interventions to re-
duce the transmission of influenza in hospitals or other healthcare facili-
ties to guide policy makers seeking to ensure the health and safety of 
healthcare personnel. The relative value of face masks versus N95 respi-
rators in preventing influenza transmission is especially debated, and 
recent reviews have concluded that there are insufficient data for recom-
mending effective PPE approaches for preventing influenza transmission 
(Cowling et al., 2010; Gralton and McLaws, 2010; Jefferson et al., 
2010). The possible modes of transmission of influenza, the confounding 
variables that exist in testing alternative interventions, and the common 
issues inherent with study design (see Box 2-2) suggest the complexity 
of the problem facing both investigators and policy makers. 
 Several observational studies have looked at various aspects of PPE 
use, but usually in small numbers of healthcare personnel. Ng and col-
leagues (2009) performed a survey of 133 on-duty nurses, and then di-
vided them into cases (nurses who contracted influenza-like illness 
during the study period) and compared them to nurses who did not. A 
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significant difference was noted between cases and controls in use of 
PPE, specifically the use of gloves, gowns, and face shields. No mention 
was made of respiratory protection. A significant difference between the 
cases and controls was that cases were less likely to be vaccinated and 
were also more likely to have been exposed to a sick colleague without 
using PPE. In a survey of healthcare personnel participating in a medical 
mission and treating patients in crowded conditions, fewer cases of acute 
respiratory illness were noted for personnel using hand sanitizer; howev-
er, use of face masks was not reported to make a difference (Al-Asmary 
et al., 2007). A study of 32 healthcare personnel (in which one group 
wore face masks and the other did not) found no differences in occur-
rence of the common cold, but the small number of study participants did 
not allow for adequate exploration of the study question (Jacobs et al., 
2009). A retrospective study compared “frontline” healthcare personnel 
confirmed to have SARS with those who did not acquire the disease 
(Chen et al., 2009b). The risk of contracting SARS increased for those 
who performed tracheal intubations of SARS patients and for those who 
cared for “super-spreader” SARS patients. Risk decreased for those 
healthcare personnel wearing multiple pairs of gloves and for those who 
avoided face-to-face contact with SARS patients.  
 Observations during the 2009 H1N1 epidemic were reported from a 
Singapore hospital that documented the varying requirements for respira-
tors or face masks based on different departments of the hospital or work 
tasks during three phases of the 2009 H1N1 epidemic (Ang et al., 2010). 
No difference was seen in the transmission of H1N1 to healthcare per-
sonnel. Many healthcare personnel who were confirmed to have H1N1 
had not cared for H1N1 patients and may have acquired the disease in 
community settings. This hospital had worked with cases of SARS in 
2003, and the authors stated that adherence to PPE, although not docu-
mented, was usually strict.  
Recently, the first randomized trial assessing the value of face masks 
compared with N95 respirators in preventing influenza among healthcare 
personnel was published (Loeb et al., 2009). Among the 446 nurses from 
8 tertiary care hospitals in Ontario who participated in the study, 225 
were assigned to wear surgical masks (the brand used at their respective 
hospitals), and 221 were assigned to wear N95 respirators during the 
2008–2009 winter influenza season. Study participants also wore gowns 
and gloves (as part of routine infection control practice) when caring  
for patients with febrile respiratory illnesses. Online questionnaires were  
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BOX 2-2 
Confounding Issues for Understanding the Transmission of 
Influenza and Other Viral Respiratory Diseases 
 
Confounding Variables in Testing Interventions 
• Variability in types of and fit of mask or respirator 
• Compliance with appropriate use of mask or respirator 
• Measuring compliance of mask or respirator use 
• Hand hygiene rates 
• Levels of environmental contamination  
• Duration and intensity of exposure to influenza 
• Variations among patients regarding dispersal of infectious particles af-
ter cough, sneeze, normal talking  
• Susceptibility of healthcare personnel (antibody titer, vaccine status) 
• Community and home exposure to the virus 
 
Issues with Study Design 
• Avoiding bias 
• Accounting for confounders 
• Measuring all possible modes of transmission 
• Study power 
• Measuring infection accurately, including measuring severity (indirect 
measure of exposure to infecting dose) 
 
 
used twice a week to assess symptoms of influenza. The primary out-
come examined by the study was laboratory-confirmed influenza. Com-
pliance with PPE use was determined through audits during several 
weeks in March and early April 2009 that were anticipated to be the peak 
of the influenza season. If the unit had patients with influenza or a febrile 
respiratory illness, auditors were sent to observe use of masks or respira-
tors. The study stopped collecting data in late April 2009, with the re-
porting of novel H1N1 influenza A and the recommendation by the 
Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care that N95 respirators be 
used for caring for patients with febrile respiratory disease. Laboratory-
confirmed influenza was documented in 50 of the 225 nurses allocated to 
wear surgical masks (23.6 percent) and in 48 of the 221 nurses allocated 
to wear N95 respirators (22.9 percent). The authors concluded that the 
similar results between groups indicated that surgical masks were nonin-
ferior to N95 respirators. Study limitations noted by the authors included 
challenges in assessing compliance with PPE use; lack of measurement 
on rates of hand hygiene or gown and glove use; and the source of infec-
tious exposure (hospital or community exposure) could not be ascer-
Copyright © National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
Preventing Transmission of Pandemic Influenza and Other Viral Respiratory Diseases:  Personal Protective Equipment for Healthcare Workers: Update 2010
56 PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT FOR HEALTHCARE PERSONNEL 
 
tained. Several subsequent letters to the editor noted issues including that 
measures of exposure risk were missing and the value of triage proce-
dures and the adherence to cough etiquette were not measured 
(Srinivasan and Perl, 2009), concerns about study power (Clynes, 2010), 
and concerns about the lack of eye-shield protection among nurses in the 
study (Finkelstein et al., 2010). This study has pointed out the many 
challenges in assessing the effectiveness of respirators and face masks in 
preventing influenza transmission, including the rates of correct use and 
fit of respirators and masks, the level of environmental contamination, 
the duration and intensity of exposure, and the susceptibility of health-
care personnel to H1N1. Similar to the community intervention studies, 
this type of study cannot provide information on the modes of transmis-
sion of influenza in the clinical setting. In future studies, the severity of 
infection might be an important secondary endpoint of interest because it 
may reflect infectious dose. Moreover, it will be important to add higher 
levels of monitoring for compliance and assessment of close contacts 
(such as household members) to better identify sources of infection in 
these types of studies.  
 
 
Use of Face Masks and Respirators as Source Control  
 
Face masks and respirators have also been used as source control, 
that is, placing a mask on patients with respiratory illnesses in clinics or 
emergency departments to reduce the potential for disease transmission 
to other patients, family members, or healthcare personnel. Johnson and 
colleagues (2009) studied nine patients with documented influenza and 
asked each to cough 5 times into a 90 mm diameter petri dish containing 
transport media. With no mask on, 7 of 9 patients had detectable virus. 
However, with either a surgical mask or N95 mask on, no virus was de-
tected. The authors concluded that as a source control, masks were equal-
ly effective in preventing dissemination. Because this was not a study of 
transmission, however, one can only say that the concept of droplet spray 
dissemination being controlled with a surgical mask is plausible, but  
unconfirmed.  
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SUMMARY OF PROGRESS  
 
Animal studies have found that the ferret and guinea pig models ap-
pear to be highly representative of humans in terms of their susceptibility 
to infection, the influenza viral strains that display a transmissible pheno-
type, and the kinetics with which transmission occurs. Experiments per-
formed in both of these animal models suggest that transmission of 
influenza viruses can proceed by both droplet spray as well as aerosol 
modes, which would include respirable particles. Animal studies have 
also pointed to a number of environmental factors, including relative 
humidity and temperature that may influence transmission. Recent stud-
ies that have employed environmental monitoring of the air for influenza, 
as well as others that have examined contamination of fomites and hands 
with H1N1, have provided insights on the potential for influenza-virus 
contamination of the healthcare environment. Nonetheless, data on the 
viability of influenza in air samples and fomites in these settings are li-
mited. Mathematical models have been developed to better characterize 
the relative contribution of influenza transmission modes. Available, 
well-specified parameters for these models are limited because informa-
tion is lacking on the viability of influenza in aerosols, salivary virus 
concentrations, amounts of virus in respirable and inspirable particles, 
and the quantity and persistence of viability on various fomites in the 
healthcare setting. Taken together, progress has been made in under-
standing the modes of transmission, but the relative contributions of the 
modes are still unclear. Much remains to be learned about the effective-
ness of control measures to prevent transmission. 
Observational studies and controlled studies relevant to PPE use and 
transmission of influenza or other viral respiratory diseases are limited 
because study protocols were largely not in place for 2009 H1N1 or for 
recent seasonal flu periods, and studies have not provided adequate pow-
er to answer questions regarding the effectiveness of using PPE in reduc-
ing or preventing disease transmission.  
 
 
FINDINGS AND RESEARCH NEEDS 
 
 As discussed throughout this chapter, much remains to be learned 
about the transmission of influenza and other viral respiratory diseases. 
The committee’s overall findings in this area (Box 2-3) highlight the cur-
rent limitations on data regarding transmission that are needed to inform 
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decisions on the protection of healthcare personnel and patients. The 
committee heard about a number of ongoing research efforts at its June 
2010 workshop (Appendix A). Sustained efforts will be critical, as prior 
research efforts from the 1940s to 1990s have largely ebbed between 
pandemics. 
The committee has identified a range of research efforts, some of 
which can be addressed expeditiously (in the next 6 to 12 months) and 
have a significant impact on improving the nation’s readiness for pan-
demic influenza; long-term studies are also needed to more fully under-
stand disease transmission and prevention strategies. As in the 2008 IOM 
report, the recommendations focus on a comprehensive research strategy 
to address critical questions in as expedited and coordinated manner as 
possible. 
 
BOX 2-3 
Findings 
 
• Standardized terms, definitions, and appropriate classifications are 
needed to properly describe transmission routes and aerodynamic di-
ameter of particles associated with respiratory disease transmission.  
• Influenza and other respiratory viruses differ in virulence and transmis-
sion routes. 
• A comprehensive research strategy is needed. Transmission routes 
need to be better understood to select appropriate personal protective 
equipment (PPE) and better protect healthcare personnel and patients. 
An in-depth understanding of the relative contribution of the transmis-
sion routes will require research at many levels, including basic science 
laboratory studies, monitoring studies, environmental intervention stud-
ies, and clinical and community-based studies. 
• To determine the risk of specific exposures and tasks, research should 
be done to characterize the aerodynamic diameter of particles and con-
centration of influenza in aerosols generated by various procedures to 
enable a comparison of aerosol sizes and concentrations of influenza 
generated by coughing, sneezing, talking, and exhalation.  
• The potential for confounding and complexity in conducting intervention 
studies of the effectiveness of PPE within the clinical setting makes it 
impossible to determine various routes of transmission in this setting. 
Instead, clinical intervention and observational studies of PPE will con-
tinue to be useful in determining the effectiveness of disease prevention 
measures albeit without a complete understanding of the specific mech-
anisms and to garner information on the best precautionary measures 
for future outbreaks of influenza or other viral respiratory diseases. 
• Little is known about the potential PPE role of face shields and face 
masks in preventing transmission of viral respiratory diseases. 
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Animal studies  Although data in ferrets and guinea pigs indicate 
that vaccination, antiviral treatment, and altered environmental condi-
tions can each reduce or abrogate transmission, confirmatory and more 
in-depth experimentation would be valuable in determining which inter-
ventions are likely to be the most effective. In vivo studies on the im-
pacts of increased air exchange and UV treatment of air would also be 
highly informative and relatively simple to execute in an animal model. 
Environmental studies  Future studies are needed to assess whether 
the identified influenza RNA in aerosol samplers (in multiple locations, 
e.g., schools, trains, healthcare facilities) are viable and reflect the extent 
to which individuals are exposed to aerosols of influenza within these 
environments. In addition, the impact of environmental factors, such as 
UV and humidity, on influenza transmission and infection should be ex-
amined in the community and healthcare setting.  
Modeling studies  Statistical and mathematical models need to 
be evaluated for their utility in prediction and inferences regarding 
the relative contributions of different transmission modes in varying 
environmental/community contexts. Collaborations between experimen-
tal or observational research and mathematical modelers are warranted so 
that the parameters used in mathematical models are based on rigorous 
data and provide evidence that would help narrow parameter estimates 
used in modeling.  
Clinical studies  Appropriately powered studies are needed that ex-
amine all possible modes of transmission, measure the rates of com-
pliance with each intervention of interest, and define the pre-exposure 
influenza antibody titers of study subjects. Environmental levels of con-
tamination need to be studied, including cultures from air sampling and 
swabs of hard surfaces. Serological studies of exposure to influenza virus 
in family members or roommates would be a reasonable marker of home 
exposure during the study period. Useful measures would also include 
the distribution of the size of respiratory particles of patients exposed to 
the healthcare personnel and some measure of the intensity of the expo-
sure to patients that might include distance from, time in contact with, 
and specific procedures performed on the infected patients. 
Studies on the role of PPE  The potential role of face shields and 
face masks as PPE should be explored to determine the level of protec-
tion from droplet spray transmission. The role of fomites is unclear in the 
healthcare setting. Additional studies are needed to determine what role 
gowns, gloves, face masks, and respirators might play in influenza 
transmission. Further work on donning and doffing processes is also 
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needed. Studies should examine whether antiviral-coated PPE provides 
any additional protection and how maintenance and reuse are affected.  
 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Recommendation: Develop Standardized Terms and Definitions 
CDC and the Occupational Safety and Health Administra-
tion, in partnership with other relevant agencies and organi-
zations, should work to develop standardized terms, def-
initions, and appropriate classifications to describe transmis-
sion routes and aerodynamic diameter of particles associated 
with viral respiratory disease transmission. This effort should 
involve a consensus from the industrial hygiene, infectious dis-
ease, and healthcare communities.  
 
Recommendation: Develop and Implement a Comprehensive 
Research Strategy to Understand Viral Respiratory Disease 
Transmission 
The National Institutes of Health, in collaboration with other 
research agencies and organizations, should develop and 
fund a comprehensive research strategy to improve the un-
derstanding of viral respiratory disease transmission, includ-
ing, but not limited to, examining the characteristics of 
influenza transmission, animal models, human challenge stud-
ies, and intervention trials. This strategy should include 
 
• an expedited mechanism for funding these types of 
studies and 
• clinical research centers of excellence for studying in-
fluenza and other respiratory virus transmission. 
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Designing and Engineering Effective PPE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Understanding workplace hazards is critically important to ensuring 
that personal protective equipment (PPE) is available to healthcare per-
sonnel facing an influenza pandemic or other hazardous working condi-
tions. Research on the transmission and virulence of the influenza virus 
and other potential infectious agents (Chapter 2) will inform decisions on 
the design and engineering of healthcare PPE.  
As innovative approaches begin to address the PPE challenges of the 
healthcare workplace, further efforts are needed that focus on how to 
address the unique or varied issues that healthcare personnel face—easy 
communications with patients and families, PPE that can be changed or 
reused between different patients, PPE that is comfortable during long 
wear times, and PPE that does not interfere with work performance. 
Healthcare personnel are not alone in having job-specific PPE require-
ments. Firefighters need PPE that addresses high temperatures, construc-
tion workers on roofs and high-rise structures need protection from falls, 
and both have many other PPE requirements. Innovations in healthcare 
PPE are starting to be seen in the marketplace, but much more needs to 
be done to move the design of PPE from an industrial perspective toward 
the realities of the healthcare workplace.  
This chapter focuses on research on designing and engineering effec-
tive PPE. The chapter begins with a brief overview of the 2008 report, 
followed by a synopsis of research that has been conducted in the past 
several years. The chapter concludes with the committee’s thoughts on 
research gaps and immediate and long-term research directions.  
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BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT 
FROM THE 2008 REPORT 
 
The 2008 Institute of Medicine (IOM) report provided the outline for 
a lifecycle approach to PPE and emphasized that, in addition to fit and 
filtration for respirators and functionality requirements for other types of 
PPE, numerous other factors play a significant role in the design and de-
velopment of healthcare PPE. These factors include issues involving vis-
ibility, comfort and wearability, durability, maintenance and reuse, aes-
thetics, and cost (Figure 3-1). 
In considering a framework for the design and development of PPE, 
the 2008 committee addressed the three phases of the design and engi-
neering process typically associated with a product’s lifecycle: 
 
 
• Product cost
• Total lifecycle
cost
• Minimal environ-
mental impact
• Protect against
influenza virus
• Guard against
contact with
contaminated
fluids and
aerosols
• Easy to
decontaminate and
discard disposable
elements
• Easy to clean and
replace parts in
reusable PPE
• Variety of styles
and colors
• Customizable
• Maintain biomechanical
efficiency and sense of touch
and feel
• Odor-free
• Hypoallergenic
• Accommodate wide range of
users (face and body profiles)
• Compatibility across various
elements of the PPE
ensemble and with other
equipment (e.g., stethoscope)
• Non-startling to patients and
families
• Facilitates communication with
others (verbal, facial)
• Comfortable—no skin
irritation or pressure
points
• Breathable—air
• Prolonged use
without  discomfort
permeable
• Moisture absorbent—
wickability
• Low bulk and weight
• Dimensional stability
• Easy to put on and
take off (don and doff)
• Adequate wear life
• Strength—tear,
tensile, burst
• Abrasion resistance
• Corrosion
resistance
 
 
FIGURE 3-1 A structured approach to evidence-based performance require-
ments for personal protective equipment (PPE).  
SOURCE: IOM (2008). 
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1. User requirements analysis: understanding the work hazards 
and barriers to PPE use;  
2. Design realization: identifying the key characteristics (Figure  
3-1) and translating the evidence-based performance require-
ments into the specific design of the PPE component while mak-
ing appropriate trade-offs among the factors that drive design, 
including degree of protection, comfort, and the cost of design-
ing the specific PPE component to meet the regulatory require-
ments; and 
3. Field use and evaluation: requiring that the new PPE be tested 
in the field in order to provide a realistic assessment of its per-
formance and to identify unintended consequences of use. 
 
Fit and filtration are the major functional issues in the design and en-
gineering of respirators. Most research has focused on filtration. National 
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) ratings for respira-
tors of 95, 99, or 100 percent filtration efficiency are based on the per-
centage of 0.3 μm particles that do not penetrate the test filter (IOM, 
2008). Influenza viruses, with estimated sizes ranging from approximate-
ly 0.08 to 0.12 μm (although droplets with the virus can vary widely in 
size), follow standard particle filtration theory, and therefore a number of 
types of filters are effective. Less is known about issues regarding inward 
face seal leakage and other aspects of respirator fit. The 2008 report rec-
ommended research on a number of respirator issues, including deconta-
mination and reuse methods, comfort and tolerability concerns, powered 
air-purifying respirators (PAPRs) designed to meet the needs of health-
care personnel, and improved face seals.  
The 2008 report also addressed research for gowns, gloves, eye pro-
tection, face protection, and other types of PPE that might be needed to 
protect workers from infectious disease. These types of barrier protection 
are designed primarily to protect against droplet spray and contact trans-
mission that might occur when particles are transferred to the respiratory 
mucosa or conjunctiva (of the eyes) of susceptible individuals within 
close range. Testing of gowns has focused primarily on liquid barrier 
performance and breathability of the fabric, with four levels of liquid 
barrier performance defined by the Association for the Advancement of 
Medical Instrumentation’s (AAMI’s) testing standard, AAMI PB70. The 
prior report emphasized the need to explore whether specific clinical sit-
uations require varying types of gowns or whether other specifications 
are needed, as well as issues regarding feasibility of reuse, interface with 
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other types of PPE (especially gloves), and advances in materials tech-
nology, including repellant finishes (IOM, 2008). For protective eye-
wear, including transparent face shields, issues regarding the interface 
with respirators were found to be a critical need. In addition, product per-
formance standards for eye protection need to be defined more clearly 
because they now focus on the thickness and impact resistance of eye 
protection but do not address issues relevant to influenza transmission 
(IOM, 2008).  
Healthcare personnel’s use of gloves can serve several purposes in 
infection control—creating a barrier to direct contact with contaminated 
surfaces, preventing patient-to-patient contamination if gloves are 
changed between patients and proper hand hygiene is performed, and 
increasing awareness of the potential for self-inoculation when gloved 
hands touch the mucosa of the mouth, nose, or eyes. Research needs re-
garding gloves that were identified in the 2008 report included better bar-
rier protection as well as wearability and improved interfaces with gowns 
and other PPE. Adherence to hand hygiene and other infection control 
practices are also important in preventing disease transmission.  
The 2008 report provided a list of immediate opportunities and long-
term research needs for improving the design and effectiveness of 
healthcare PPE. The report also provided a set of recommendations in 
this area, which can be briefly summarized as follows: 
 
• Define evidence-based performance requirements for PPE. 
• Adopt a systems approach to the design and development of 
PPE. 
• Increase research on the design and engineering of the next gen-
eration of PPE. 
• Establish measures to assess and compare the effectiveness of 
PPE. 
 
 
UPDATE ON RECENT RESEARCH 
 
 Research efforts since the prior report have continued to address a 
range of design and engineering issues with the goal of improving the 
PPE available to healthcare personnel and others. The following section 
provides an overview of recent research efforts, beginning with the re-
search focused on respirators and face masks.  
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Respirators and Face Masks: Fit and Filtration 
 
The protection provided by a particular respirator is a function of 
both the filtration capabilities of the material and how well the device fits 
the wearer. Total inward leakage (TIL) is the combination of filtration, 
face seal leakage, and leakage through respirator components, such as the 
exhalation valve.  
 
 
Filtration 
 
Several issues concerning filtration have been raised recently. First, 
the filtration efficiency of face masks is a concern because they are not 
developed as filtration devices. Second, researchers have been concerned 
about the penetration of nanoparticles (which includes the size range of 
influenza and other viruses) through respirator filter media and whether 
current NIOSH respirator certification methods accurately account for 
those particles. Third, shortages of respiratory protection may occur dur-
ing a pandemic, so alternative filter materials and equipment have been 
investigated.  
 
Filtration efficiency of face masks Two recent studies investigated the 
filtration efficiency of face masks. Oberg and Brosseau (2008) evaluated 
filtration performance of nine face masks (cup, flat, duckbill, one and 
two straps, ear loops, surgical, laser, and procedure). Filter efficiencies 
ranged from 0 to 84 percent for the latex sphere tests and 4 to 90 percent 
in the sodium chloride (NaCl) tests. Dental masks showed significantly 
higher penetration (6 to 75 percent for latex and 53 to 90 percent for salt) 
than hospital masks (0.02 to 0.7 percent for latex and 4 to 37 percent for 
salt). Only 1 of the hospital masks (mask H) had less than 5 percent pen-
etration of the salt particles. Lee and colleagues (2008c) investigated the 
protection factor of face masks and respirators with a challenge of par-
ticles representing bacterial and viral size ranges (aerodynamic size: 0.04 
to 1.3 µm) and found that none of the masks had protection factors > 10. 
The protection factors of the tested N95 respirators were an average of 8 
to 12 times greater than those of masks. One previous study (Li et al., 
2006) reported that face masks provided 95 percent filtration efficiency 
for potassium chloride. However, Brosseau and Harriman (2007) pointed 
out that the study did not use a standard method and that the authors did 
not fully describe the technique. None of the face masks tested by Oberg 
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and Brosseau (2008) or Lee and colleagues (2008c) provided sufficient 
protection to be considered respirators. This is not surprising considering 
the fact that face masks were not intended to be respiratory protective 
equipment.   
 
Penetration of small particles NIOSH certification tests for N95 respi-
rators use an NaCl aerosol challenge with a 300 nm most penetrating 
particle size (MPPS).1 However, many electret filter media that use elec-
trostatic charge to capture particles have an MPPS ranging from 30 to 
100 nm (Shaffer and Rengasamy, 2009). Concerns have been raised re-
garding the filtration performance of N95 respirators against smaller 
viral- and bacterial-sized particles. Eninger and colleagues (2008b) re-
viewed the NIOSH aerosol particle-size distribution and measurement 
method. The authors found that, although the salt aerosol does contain a 
significant fraction of ultrafine (diameters < 100 nm) particles, the method 
and equipment used cannot accurately measure the contributions of par-
ticles below 100 nm. In fact, 68 percent by count and 8 percent by mass of 
salt particles below 100 nm did not significantly contribute to the filter 
penetration measurement. Therefore, the existing NIOSH certification 
protocol may not adequately reflect the penetration of ultrafine particles.  
Several groups of researchers have investigated the filtration perfor-
mance of respirators against nanoparticles. Eninger and colleagues 
(2008a) investigated the filtration performance of one N95 and two N99 
filtering facepiece respirators against one inert particle and three virus 
aerosols at flow rates of 30, 85, and 150 L/min. The respirators were 
sealed on a manikin. The most penetrating particle size for challenge 
aerosols was < 0.1 µm for all three respirators. Mean particle penetration, 
by count, was increased significantly when the size fraction of particles  
< 0.1 µm was included compared to particles > 0.1 µm. Penetration of 
the salt aerosol was greater than that of the tested biological aerosols, 
suggesting that inert aerosols can be used to assess filter penetration of 
virions. Inhalation airflow rate had a significant effect on particle pene-
tration. The authors suggested that further research is needed with cyclic 
flows with high peak inspiratory flows.  
A study of the filtration performance of five N95 and two P100 fil-
tering facepiece respirators against monodisperse silver aerosol particles 
 
1The MPPS is the particle size that has the lowest filtration efficiency. Particles near 
the MPPS are too large to be efficiently captured by diffusion, but they are too small to 
be efficiently captured by the filtration mechanisms of impaction and interception. 
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in the 4 to 30 nm range at 85 L/min found that both types of respirators 
showed a decrease in percentage of penetration, with a decrease in par-
ticle diameter down to 4 nm (Rengasamy et al., 2008). This study sup-
ports prior studies that indicate that NIOSH-approved air-purifying 
respirators provided expected filtration protection against nanoparticles. 
A follow-up study using a polydisperse NaCl aerosol test with a 238 nm 
mass median aerodynamic diameter and two monodisperse aerosol tests 
concluded that the eight filtering facepiece respirator models tested met 
expected filtration performance against nanoparticles (Rengasamy et al., 
2009). The NIOSH-certified respirators have a minimum efficiency of 95 
percent for the N95 and 99.97 percent for the P100. The European Norm 
requires a minimum efficiency of 94 percent for a filtering facepiece res-
pirator class P2 (FFP2) and 99 percent for a filtering facepiece respirator 
class P3 (FFP3). Penetrations from the polydisperse aerosol test were < 1 
percent for the N95 and FFP2 models and < 0.03 percent for the P100 
and FFP3 models.  
In a study by Eshbaugh and colleagues (2009), the researchers ex-
amined the effects of varying flow conditions on aerosol penetration for 
both N95 and P100 filtering facepiece respirators and cartridges. Chal-
lenges were inert solids and oil aerosols with particle sizes in the range 
of 0.02 to 2.9 µm; three constant flow and four cyclic flow conditions 
were used. Penetration increased under increasing constant- and cyclic-
flow conditions. The MPPS for the P100 filters was 50 to 200 nm and 50 
nm for N95 filters. Shaffer and Rengasamy (2009) reviewed research 
published since 2000 on respirator filtration and leakage data for nano-
particles. The MPPS was in the 30 to 100 nm range and was impacted by 
the filter media and test conditions, particularly flow rate. They found 
that filtration of monodisperse nanoparticles at the MPPS varied from 1.4 
to 10 percent for the N95 filtering facepiece respirator. They identified 
the greatest need for further research as human laboratory or workplace 
protection factor studies to measure TIL for respirators used for protec-
tion against nanoparticles. Wander and Heimbuch (2009) tested one N95 
and one P100 filtering facepiece respirator with aerosolized particles 
(count mode diameter ~0.8 µm) of H1N1 and inert beads at 85 L/min 
using the Laboratory-Scale Aerosol Tunnel. The N95 removed > 99 per-
cent of viable H1N1 while the P100 removed > 99.99 percent. They per-
formed the same against the inert beads. The authors concluded that 
infectious microorganisms and inert particles of the same size have the 
same impact on the filtering efficiency of filtering facepiece respirators.   
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Although these studies used different challenge aerosols and differ-
ent test methods, several common results emerge. Inhalation airflow rate 
had a significant effect on particle penetration (Eninger et al., 2008a; 
Eshbaugh et al., 2009). NIOSH- or European Norm–certified filtering 
facepiece respirators achieved expected filtration performance when 
challenged with nanoparticle aerosols (Eninger et al., 2008a; Eshbaugh et 
al., 2009; Rengasamy et al., 2008, 2009). The MPPS is below 100 nm for 
most electret filter media (Eninger et al., 2008a; Eshbaugh et al., 2009; 
Rengasamy et al., 2009), though one researcher (Eshbaugh et al., 2009) 
reported 200 nm for two models of filtering facepiece respirators. Final-
ly, inert particles have penetration performance similar to virus particles 
(Eninger et al., 2008a; Wander and Heimbuch, 2009).  
 
Alternative filter materials In the event of a pandemic, there may not 
be enough respirators available to meet demand. Rengasamy and col-
leagues (2010a) examined the filtration performance of common cloth 
materials, such as sweatshirts, T-shirts, towels, scarves, and cloth masks, 
against nanoparticles using polydisperse and monodisperse aerosols (20 
to 1,000 nm) at two face velocities. The cloth materials had penetration 
levels of 40 to 90 percent for polydispersed NaCl, well above that of N95 
respirators. Penetrations of 9 to 98 percent were obtained for different 
monodisperse NaCl aerosol nanoparticles. These materials had penetra-
tion levels similar to some face masks that were tested previously. They 
concluded that only minimal protection would be provided by wearing 
masks made out of these cloth materials, especially when considering 
that face seal leakage will decrease protection further. 
 
 
Fit 
 
Face seal leakage is a critical factor in the amount of protection pro-
vided by a respirator. Although much research has been done on filtering 
media and improving filter efficiency, the fit side of the equation has not 
been explored in such depth. Several recent studies examined aspects of 
fit related to healthcare personnel. 
 
Face masks Two recent studies examined the extent to which face masks 
fit the face. Duling and colleagues (2007) assessed six face masks. The 
simulated workplace protection factor fifth percentile value was 1.4 and 
the lower 90 percent confidence limit was 1.2, indicating that none of the 
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masks provided adequate protection. Oberg and Brosseau (2008) eval-
uated facial fit of 5 face masks using qualitative and quantitative fit tests 
with 20 human volunteers. When the subjects put on the face masks 
themselves, they all failed the qualitative fit test. When they were as-
sisted with donning the face masks, 18 subjects failed the fit test. For 
unassisted donning, average quantitative fit factors were 2.5 to 6.9; for 
assisted donning, they ranged from 2.8 to 9.6. None of the masks tested 
attained an individual fit factor of 100, the minimum passing level re-
quired by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) 
for a half-mask filtering facepiece respirator.  
 
Loose-fitting PAPRs Loose-fitting PAPRs may be worn by healthcare 
personnel who have beards or who cannot otherwise wear an N95 filtering-
facepiece or elastomeric air-purifying respirator. The unfiltered, exhaled 
air from the PAPR may transmit virus from the wearer to others. An N95 
respirator may be worn inside the PAPR to prevent this from happening. 
Roberge and colleagues (2008) used a manikin to assess the protection 
factor of a loose-fitting PAPR with and without an N95 respirator glued 
to the manikin. Flow rates were 25 L/min and 40 L/min. The N95 signif-
icantly increased the PAPR protection factor even when the PAPR blow-
er was turned off. However, consideration should be given to the 
possible negative impact of the additional physiological burden of wear-
ing an N95 respirator inside a PAPR (Roberge, 2008). Additionally, their 
results might not hold in the work setting because the N95 was glued to 
the face (Roberge et al., 2008). Some loose-fitting PAPRs do not fully 
encapsulate the head, making it possible for the wearer to overbreathe the 
blower and possibly be exposed to contaminants (Roberge et al., 2008). 
Johnson and colleagues (2008) found that the 1.1 L of air inside the 
loose-fitting PAPR they tested would act as a buffer against contami-
nated air that leaks into the respirator due to overbreathing the blower. 
That volume could also help if an N95 were worn under the PAPR and 
face seal leaks occurred.  
 
Fit testing and inward leakage  Several large-scale fit tests of health-
care personnel were completed recently (Lee et al., 2008b; McMahon et 
al., 2008; Oestenstad et al., 2007; Wilkinson et al., 2010; Winter et al., 
2010). McMahon and colleagues (2008) found that 5 percent of men and 
15 percent of women could not pass the fit test with the first respirator 
tried, while Lee and colleagues (2008b) had 26 percent of workers fail 
the fit test with the first respirator. Winter and colleagues (2010) found 
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that 28 percent of 50 staff members did not fit the 3 respirators tested. 
Wilkinson and colleagues (2010) found that 82.9 percent of 6,160 
healthcare personnel were successfully fitted with the first respirator, 
12.3 percent required testing with a second respirator, and 4.8 percent 
required testing with 3 or more respirators. Therefore, multiple respira-
tors are likely to be needed to get passing fit tests for all staff. First-time 
pass rates may improve after NIOSH incorporates the new sizing panels 
(Zhuang et al., 2007, 2008) into its TIL certification requirement.  
Gender and age in women may be significant factors in achieving a 
successful fit (McMahon et al., 2008), though Oestenstad and colleagues 
(2007) did not find a gender difference in the 41 subjects they tested. 
Gender, respirator brand, and test repetition did not have any significant 
effects on location or shape of leaks assessed on half-mask respirators 
using a fluorescent tracer during fit tests (Oestenstad and Bartolucci, 
2010). There was a difference in fit test leak-site distribution for women, 
and the authors suggested that facial dimensions may be an important 
factor. In fact, their prior research showed that fit was significantly asso-
ciated with face length and lip width and possibly face width (Oestenstad 
et al., 2007). Weight gain during pregnancy may impact fit due to 
changes in facial anthropometrics (Roberge, 2009). Wilkinson and col-
leagues (2010) found that personnel who reported their race as Asian had 
the highest failure rate and that race was correlated with facial shape. 
Training improved the fit test pass rate (Lee et al., 2008b; Winter et al., 
2010). However, as time elapsed from the fit test, pass rates were similar 
to those prior to training, although frequent use after training led to in-
creased pass rates (Lee et al., 2008b).  
Experience of the fit testers was found to be a significant factor in 
achieving a successful fit test with the first respirator tried (Wilkinson et 
al., 2010). Their testers selected a respirator based on observations of the 
subject’s facial characteristics, the physical fit of the respirator, and the 
“real-time” option on the PortaCount® fit tester. Janssen and colleagues 
(2007) evaluated the workplace protection factor of an N95 filtering face-
piece respirator during light, moderate, and heavy intensity tasks in a 
steel foundry and found a large variability in protection because of re-
moving and re-donning the respirator. This may also be a problem in 
healthcare settings. They suggested that a time-weighted, average 
workplace protection factor be considered to estimate ongoing protection.  
Participants at a NIOSH-sponsored workshop (Brosseau, 2009) ex-
pressed interest in developing a respirator that did not require initial and 
annual fit tests and provided suggestions for improving the fit capabili-
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ties of respirators. Au and colleagues (2010) proposed using a customiz-
able, reusable mask with high-efficiency air filters. They investigated the 
efficacy of this mask without fit testing versus a fit tested N95 respirator 
in 22 volunteers. The median filtration factor was significantly higher for 
the N95 respirators compared to the mask that is cut to size. Only 16 of 
the 22 volunteers had a fit factor greater than 100. This was lower than 
the pass rate for the N95 (19/22), but was not significantly different. The 
authors concluded that the customizable mask should be studied further, 
but that it should not be used without fit testing at this time. 
Face seal leakage is an important factor in respirator protection, and 
it depends on several factors, including proper respirator selection, fit, 
and donning. Cho and colleagues (2010) found that most particle pene-
tration occurs through face seal leakage even when the respirator fits 
well (workplace protection factor = 515), and that particle penetration of 
the face seal decreases with increases in breathing rate and particle size. 
Similarly, Grinshpun and colleagues (2009) found that the number of 
particles penetrating through the facepiece seal far exceeded penetration 
through the filter medium for both an N95 respirator and a face mask 
using challenge particles in the 0.03 to 1 µm range. Lee and colleagues 
(2008c) investigated the protection factor of four N95 respirators and 
three face masks with a challenge of particles representing bacterial and 
viral size ranges (aerodynamic size: 0.04 to 1.3 µm). Prior research 
(Coffey et al., 2004) had demonstrated high protection levels for Respira-
tor A and medium protection for Respirator B. Respirators C and D were 
the same except D had an exhalation valve. Overall, 29 percent of N95 
respirators and 100 percent of face masks had protection factors of < 10, 
the assigned protection factor for the N95 (Lee et al., 2008c). The per-
centages of N95 respirators with protection factors of > 10 for all particle 
sizes tested were 86, 36, 89, and 78 percent for Respirators A to D, re-
spectively. There were no significant differences in the protection factor 
between the N95 and N95 with the exhalation valve. The protection fac-
tors of the N95 were an average of 8 to 12 times greater than those of 
face masks. 
Particle size–dependent face seal leakage has not been fully investi-
gated (Shaffer and Rengasamy, 2009). However, NIOSH has initiated 
studies to determine whether face seal leakage of nanoparticles is consis-
tent with the leakages observed for gases/vapors and larger particles. 
Further research on leakage of nanoparticles is important to better under-
stand the effectiveness of filtering facepiece respirators in workplaces 
where nanoparticles are present. 
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Preventing a Patient from Spreading Virus 
 
One suggestion for protecting personnel from virus exposure is to 
place a face mask or N95 respirator on a patient with confirmed influen-
za. Huang and Huang (2007) demonstrated greater bacterial leakage at 
close range for a face mask (15.8 percent of no mask control) than for an 
N95 respirator (4.1 percent of control). Placing positively charged poly-
propylene edging on the mask and respirator decreased leakage to 4.5 
and 1.8 percent of control, respectively. This indicates that masks and 
respirators could be modified easily to decrease virus transfer. 
Tang and colleagues (2009) used a schlieren optical method to vis-
ualize cough flows of volunteers wearing either a face mask or N95 res-
pirator. With the N95, more of the cough went through the front of the 
respirator compared to the face mask, and the N95 was better at prevent-
ing leakage of the cough. The face mask on the standing people who 
coughed blocked the forward motion of the cough jet and directed it up-
ward, downward, and out of the sides of the mask. The leakage air from 
both the mask and respirator had little momentum. They concluded that 
both face masks and N95 respirators decelerated and redirected the ex-
pelled air, which then joined the general upward motion of the cougher’s 
thermal plume created by body heat. This prevented the cough from be-
ing projected forward as a rapid turbulent jet over distances sufficient to 
reach the breathing zones of other individuals. 
Diaz and Smaldone (2010) recently developed a headform-based 
system to evaluate the effectiveness of N95 respirators and loose- or 
tight-fitting face masks in preventing transmission of infectious aerosols 
from a source to a receiver. Although an N95 on the source filtered sig-
nificantly more particles than the face masks, the simulated workplace 
protection factor did not differ for the unmasked receiver. When the re-
ceiver wore each mask or respirator, < 1 percent of the particles were 
filtered and the simulated workplace protection factor was 1.4 to 2.2. 
Sealing an N95 to the source using Vaseline® yielded a simulated 
workplace protection factor of 4,082, and sealing it to the receiver re-
sulted in a protection factor of 118. The authors concluded that the face 
masks worn at the source resulted in greater protection than a face mask 
or respirator worn on the receiver.  
Both Huang and Huang (2007) and Tang and colleagues (2009) 
showed greater leakage with the face mask than with the N95 respirator. 
This seems to contrast with the results of Johnson and colleagues (2009), 
who showed that both fully blocked virus expulsion. However, Huang 
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and Huang as well as Tang and colleagues considered leakage from the 
sides of the face mask and respirator, while Johnson and colleagues had 
volunteers cough directly onto the collection plate. Although Tang and 
colleagues (2009) indicated that the cough flow was directed away from 
the receiver, they did not assess filtration, so virus particles that could not 
be observed with the schlieren optics could have reached the receiver. 
Diaz and Smaldone (2010) did not use heated manikins, so there were no 
thermal plumes that may have directed the particle flow upward and 
away from the receiver. More research is needed to understand the par-
ticle dynamics of exhaled viruses while wearing a face mask or respirator 
in order to make a recommendation regarding patient mask or respirator 
wear.  
 
 
Summary: Respirator and Face Masks—Fit and Filtration 
 
Several studies have shown that face masks do not have sufficient 
filtration or fit to provide adequate inhalation protection of small par-
ticles to wearers. NIOSH-certified N95 respirators have been shown by 
several studies to provide expected filtration levels of nanoparticles. 
However, high filtration efficiency alone does not ensure that the wearer 
will be protected. Mask D in Oberg and Brosseau’s study (2008) had the 
second highest filtration efficiency, but the lowest fit factor. Because 
face seal leakage far exceeds penetration through the filter (Cho et al., 
2010; Grinshpun et al., 2009), future research should focus on improving 
respirator fit.  
Although Lee and colleagues (2008c) showed that some N95 respi-
rators may not achieve an assigned protection factor of 10 when nano-
particles are present, whether higher fit factors would have been 
achieved with a different model respirator is unknown. The rates of fail-
ure from their study were similar to the fit-factor failure rates of large-
scale protection-factor tests performed on healthcare personnel (Lee et 
al., 2008b; McMahon et al., 2008; Winter et al., 2010). Multiple respira-
tors should be available for healthcare personnel, as currently required by 
OSHA’s respirator standard, because it is unlikely that one model or size 
will fit all employees. Long-term storage of these additional respirators 
should have little impact on penetration levels (Viscusi et al., 2009a). 
Participants in a no-fit respirator workshop (Brosseau, 2009) identified 
the need for a user seal check that works, continuous fit checking rather 
than a no-fit test, and a respirator that can be put on easily multiple times. 
Copyright © National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
Preventing Transmission of Pandemic Influenza and Other Viral Respiratory Diseases:  Personal Protective Equipment for Healthcare Workers: Update 2010
84 PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT FOR HEALTHCARE PERSONNEL 
 
These features would be beneficial because protection varies with re-
peated donning (Janssen et al., 2007).  
 
 
Respirators: Decontamination 
 
Reuse of filtering facepiece respirators has been suggested as a strat-
egy to counteract anticipated supply shortages during a pandemic and to 
reduce costs. The potential for the respirator to serve as a fomite is a se-
rious concern. Safe, effective decontamination methods that inactivate 
the virus without altering the respirator performance and physical charac-
teristics are necessary for this to occur. Respirators impregnated with 
antiviral particles may decrease the risk of virus transmission because of 
improper handling of virus-exposed protective equipment. To study this 
issue, methods are first needed to effectively deposit virus onto respira-
tors, and then their potential to act as fomites can be investigated. Final-
ly, the effectiveness of treated filter media and decontamination methods 
can be assessed.  
To assess the efficacy of decontamination methods, reliable and re-
peatable methods of applying contaminant aerosols to filter media are 
needed. NIOSH has developed two systems for applying virus aerosols 
to respirator filter media that pass the aerosol through the filter media 
rather than depositing it on the surface. The bioaerosol respirator test 
system (Fisher et al., 2009) loads filter media with virus-containing par-
ticles while the droplet-phase aerosol respirator test system (Vo et al., 
2009) applies droplets onto media. Another system, the Dry Aerosol Dep-
osition Device (Heimbuch et al., 2009), deposits biological aerosols onto 
the surface using impaction, a system that allows the aerosol to be deliv-
ered quickly and with reproducible loading.  
Additionally, to assess the number of viable particles on PPE, re-
covery methods are needed that allow removal without killing the virus. 
Casanova and colleagues (2009) developed a new technique for recover-
ing bacteriophage MS2, a non-enveloped virus, from contaminated 
gloves, gowns, respirators, and goggles. Recovered viruses were not in-
activated, indicating that this technique can be used for viral survival 
studies. 
Rate and length of virus survival are key facts needed to assess the 
potential for respirators to serve as fomites. Rengasamy and colleagues 
(2010b) applied MS2 as both an aerosol and as liquid drops onto N95 
filter coupons. They demonstrated that > 10 percent of the challenge 
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MS2 bacteriophage survived for 20 hours at 22°C and 30 percent relative 
humidity. Fisher and Shaffer (2010) subsequently assessed MS2 surviva-
bility at 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 10 days. The authors found that 10 percent of 
initial MS2 survived for 4 days for both deposition methods, and that all 
samples had detectable levels of MS2 on the tenth day. Because MS2 is a 
non-enveloped virus, enveloped influenza virus survivability cannot be 
estimated from the current study. MS2 survives for longer periods of 
time on surfaces than influenza does. Because fomites may be a source 
for indirect contact transmission, decontamination may be required be-
fore reuse.  
 
 
Decontamination Methods 
 
Studies of various types of decontamination methods have not yet 
been successful in identifying an effective means for decontamination 
that does not affect the structure and integrity of the respirator. Viscusi 
and coworkers (2007, 2009b) assessed the effect of decontamination meth-
ods on filter aerosol penetration, physical appearance, and airflow resist-
ance. From their initial list of 10 potential decontamination methods (au-
toclave, isopropyl alcohol, bleach, hydrogen peroxide, microwave, soap 
and water, ultraviolet [UV] radiation, dry heat, vaporized hydrogen per-
oxide, and ethylene oxide) (2007), liquid hydrogen peroxide, vaporized 
hydrogen peroxide, and UV radiation caused the least change in filter 
performance. The authors (2009b) then further evaluated five decontam-
ination methods (UV germicidal irradiation, ethylene oxide, vaporized 
hydrogen peroxide, microwave oven irradiation, and bleach) on three 
models each of N95, P100, and surgical N95 filtering facepiece respira-
tors. Ethylene oxide and UV germicidal irradiation were the only meth-
ods that did not cause any observable physical changes to the respirators. 
The bleach method left a noticeable odor, even after overnight drying, 
and bleach off-gassed when the decontaminated respirators were rehy-
drated with deionized water. UV germicidal irradiation, ethylene oxide, 
and vaporized hydrogen peroxide were the most promising decontamina-
tion methods, although there are concerns regarding throughput for the 
latter two methods.  
Fisher and colleagues (2009) investigated a process for applying vi-
ral droplets to respirators to evaluate decontamination methods. Two de-
contamination methods, one physical (steam) and one chemical (bleach), 
were examined as well as two concentrations of organic matter (protec-
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tive factor) in the aerosol medium. The organic matter had a protein con-
centration similar to the organic challenge in ASTM E1053-97, Standard 
Test Method for Efficacy of Virucidal Agents Intended for Inanimate En-
vironmental Surfaces. The organic matter may protect the virus by neu-
tralizing the decontamination solution or by providing a physical barrier 
to the decontaminant. Detectable differences were noted in the efficacy 
of the bleach decontamination, depending on the concentration of bleach 
and protective factor. Steam showed an effect for treatment time, but not 
protective factor. Viruses recovered were more likely to be found on the 
outer layer than when low concentrations of organic matter were used. 
This would be important for a decontamination method such as UV light 
that only reaches the outer layer of filter material. 
A study of bleach and UV radiation (Vo et al., 2009) found that 
bleach concentration and UV exposure time were factors in decontami-
nation. UV radiation was recommended for further study, such as assess-
ing the impact of pleats or folds in filtering facepiece respirators, because 
it was non-toxic and did not leave an odor. Low-dose UV radiation re-
sulted in 3-log10 reductions in MS2, while higher doses resulted in no 
detectable MS2. The authors discussed that further research is needed 
because non-enveloped MS2 may not behave in the same manner as en-
veloped viruses, and because the composition and size of particles used 
might not exactly mimic respiratory secretions.  
Finally, Salter and colleagues (2010) assessed the amount of residual 
chemicals on six models of filtering facepiece respirators after seven de-
contamination methods: ethylene oxide, vaporized hydrogen peroxide, 
UV light, and four liquids (hydrogen peroxide, bleach, mixed oxidants, 
and dimethyl dioxirane). Six of the seven methods did not deposit signif-
icant amounts of toxic residue. The ethylene oxide–treated respirators 
had detectable levels of 2-hydroxyethyl acetate, a hazardous byproduct 
that may have been formed when the ethylene oxide reacted with rubber 
parts of the respirator. As noted by other authors, bleach-treated respira-
tors had a bleach odor after treatment. The bleach also corroded metal 
parts and discolored others. Dimethyl dioxirane and mixed oxidants also 
oxidized metal parts and had distinct odors.  
Practical decontamination methods are needed as decontamination of 
filtering facepiece respirators is not currently an option. Although bleach 
is readily available and inexpensive, it has been shown to cause offensive 
odors and can cause corrosion. Ethylene oxide may react with rubber 
straps to create a hazardous byproduct. It also has problems with 
throughput, as does vaporized hydrogen peroxide. Other techniques such 
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as soap and water, isopropyl alcohol, and microwaving can cause 
changes to the physical characteristics of the respirator. UV radiation 
shows promise, although its effectiveness on inner filter layers and pleats 
is unknown, as is its affect on electrostatic properties of electret filters. 
Additional research with enveloped influenza viruses is needed. 
 
 
Treated Filter Media 
 
Several studies investigated the decontamination efficacy of treated 
filter media. Oxford and colleagues (2007) found that masks impregnated 
with QR-435, a green tea extract mix, trapped a significantly greater 
amount of virus compared to an untreated mask. Lee and colleagues 
(2008a) exposed iodine-treated filter media to aerosolized bacteria at an 
equivalent of 85 L/min flow. Viability of collected spores from control 
and treated media were assessed. Survival fraction was significantly low-
er for the treated filter versus untreated at room temperature and low 
relative humidity. However, there were no differences in viability at 
room temperature and high relative humidity or at high temperature and 
high relative humidity. Lee and colleagues (2009) then investigated the 
efficacy of iodine-treated filter media against MS2 aerosols. Treated me-
dia showed significantly higher viable removal efficiencies than un-
treated. Rengasamy and colleagues (2010b) applied MS2 virus droplet 
nuclei onto four coupons from antimicrobial respirators and controls. 
Antimicrobial agents included iodine, embedded silver-copper through-
out the fibers of the outer layer of the mask, EnvizO3-Shield technology 
on the outer layer, and titanium dioxide–coated filter layers beneath the 
outer layer. MS2 is less sensitive to many antimicrobial agents because it 
is a non-enveloped virus, which is hardier and able to survive longer than 
enveloped viruses such as influenza. The iodinated fibers from Respira-
tor C had a significant increase in the log10 reduction of MS2 at 37°C and 
80 percent relative humidity, but not at lower temperatures and relative 
humidity. MS2 droplet nuclei survived for more than 20 hours at room 
temperature and 30 percent relative humidity. For an antimicrobial agent 
to be effective, it needs to reduce viability faster. At 22°C, 30 percent 
relative humidity, all four antimicrobial respirators had < 1 log10 reduc-
tion, which was not significantly different from the control. The iodin-
ated respirator showed 3.7 log10 reduction of MS2 at 4 hours. This was 
significantly higher than the control, while the others were not signifi-
cantly different from the control. Therefore, the decontamination efficacy 
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of the antimicrobial respirators depends on storage conditions and the 
antimicrobial agent. Iodine from the filter that enters the extraction me-
dium may also inactivate virus.  
Borkow and colleagues (2010) investigated the antiviral properties of 
a copper oxide–containing N95 respirator. Treated and control respira-
tors were exposed to aerosolized human influenza A virus and avian in-
fluenza virus at a constant airflow rate for 1 minute. The number of 
infectious virus titers recovered from the masks was measured 30 min-
utes after exposure. The researchers found that the copper oxide particles 
did not impact filtration efficiency, but there was a statistically signifi-
cant difference in retrieved infectious influenza between the control and 
copper oxide–impregnated masks. This could offer the possibility of re-
ducing the risk of hand or environmental contamination, with potential 
subsequent infection due to improper handling of exposed respirators.   
 
 
Summary: Decontamination 
 
Various techniques have been developed for applying viruses to res-
pirators. Recent research has shown that non-enveloped viruses can per-
sist on respirators for up to 10 days in hospital-like environments (Fisher 
and Shaffer, 2010). Although enveloped viruses such as the influenza 
virus may not survive as long, it is reasonable to assume that the virus 
will survive long enough to render the respirator a potential fomite. Cur-
rent decontamination research has not demonstrated an effective tech-
nique for killing viruses that does not also have a detrimental impact on 
respirator physical characteristics or function. More research in this area 
is needed. Iodine-treated and copper oxide–impregnated filter media 
show promise for inactivating virus in the respirator.  
 
 
Respirators: Tolerance, Physiological Responses, 
and Communications 
 
Respirators worn by healthcare personnel have the potential to im-
pact comfort, physiological responses, task performance, and communi-
cations with each other and with patients. Protective equipment, such as 
respirators or face shields, may create pressure points that cause discom-
fort. The breathing resistance and dead volume of the respirators may 
alter respiration and lead to a build-up of carbon dioxide. Because respi-
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rators may alter the wearer’s field of view, some tasks may be more dif-
ficult to perform and thus may take longer. The respirator covers the 
mouth, muffling speech and removing visual cues for the listener. Addi-
tionally, the noise created by a PAPR blower and environmental noise 
both hinder communications. Several researchers have investigated the 
impact of respirators on healthcare personnel. 
 
 
Respirator Tolerance 
 
Consistent use of PPE by healthcare personnel during exposure to 
hazards is essential to achieve the benefits afforded by the devices. One 
of the critical features in helping to achieve consistent compliance in the 
wearing of PPE may be the comfort and tolerability of the equipment 
itself. 
Although most healthcare personnel appear to be assigned N95 respi-
rators for use, elastomeric respirators represent an alternative type of res-
piratory protection that could be used. Roberge and colleagues (2010c) 
reported the comfort responses of healthcare personnel wearing a half-
face elastomeric respirator who completed exercise regimes for a 1-hour 
period. The healthcare personnel’s mean comfort scores were low, indi-
cating that the elastomeric respirators were generally comfortable, and 
the comfort scores were not significantly different from controls (no res-
pirator). Complaints of subjective symptoms and design features of the 
respirator included facial heat, skin irritation, and weight of the respira-
tor, among others. 
Little is known about the tolerability of healthcare personnel to wear-
ing respirators, particularly during an influenza pandemic where they 
likely would be required to be worn for long periods of time within an 8-
hour work shift over a duration involving a number of weeks or more. 
Radonovich and colleagues (2009) determined the mean tolerance time 
that healthcare personnel would be willing to wear a variety of respirator 
ensembles (including N95s, PAPRs, half-face elastomerics, and face 
masks in various combinations) while performing their normal job du-
ties. Healthcare personnel stopped wearing their respirator ensemble be-
fore the end of an 8-hour shift in 59 percent of the total work shifts 
evaluated by the study. Reasons given for discontinued wear included 
communication difficulties (visual, auditory, or vocal), heat, pressure or 
pain, and dizziness or difficulty concentrating, among others. Median 
tolerance times varied by the respirator ensemble worn, ranging from 4.1 
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to 7.7 hours. Wearers of disposable models often complained of facial 
heat and pressure, while users of reusable models often reported commu-
nication problems. A cup-shaped N95 with an exhalation valve had a 
greater median tolerance time (7.7 hours) compared to a similar model 
that was not equipped with a valve (5.8 hours). The ensemble combina-
tion of cup N95 plus a face mask had the shortest median tolerance time 
of 4.1 hours. The PAPR had a slightly lower median tolerance time (7.6 
hours) than either the cup-shaped N95 with exhalation valve or face 
mask, which had the same median tolerance time (7.7 hours). Although 
the difference is not likely to be clinically significant, it is surprising that 
the tolerance time for the PAPR was lower than that for the N95 with 
exhalation valve. It is also interesting to note that the tolerance time for 
the face mask was similar to both the PAPR and the N95 with exhalation 
valve. However, the N95 with exhalation valve had a higher number of 
complaints (24) than the PAPR (17) or face mask (17).    
Harber and colleagues (2009) evaluated a number of subjective tol-
erance measures to respirator use by subjects selected from the general 
population, including some with mild respiratory impairment, while en-
gaging in exercise and work simulation. Respirators evaluated included 
half-face elastomerics and N95s. Under work simulation, the subjective 
tolerance measures (e.g., comfort, heat, speech) for all variables as-
sessed, except heat, were more “adverse” for the elastomeric half-mask 
respirator than for the N95. The largest adverse subjective ratings were 
for comfort, face, breathing, heat, and heavy weight of the device. The 
largest differences between the two types of respirators were for subjec-
tive measures of nose impact and heavy weight, with the elastomeric 
model demonstrating the greater adverse impact among subjects on these 
two measures. Overall, however, the study concluded that while both 
respirator types were “relatively well tolerated,” N95 respirators may be 
preferable to elastomeric respirators. 
Although not much is known about what workers would like to see 
incorporated into future respirator designs to assist in increasing com-
pliance, one recent study surveyed healthcare personnel to assess their 
perspectives on this issue (Baig et al., 2010). Of 149 survey respondents, 
only 24 percent reported that their N95 respirator was comfortable most 
of the time or always, and only 6 percent indicated that they would be 
able to tolerate wearing an N95 respirator continuously for an 8-hour 
shift. Overall, 56 percent of respondents believe there is a need to devel-
op a new N95 respirator for healthcare personnel, 44 percent preferred an 
N95 that does not require fit testing, and 60 percent preferred wearing a 
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disposable device. Problems identified by respondents that need to be 
addressed in future respirator design included discomfort, difficulty 
breathing, heat, and low tolerability for use over extended time periods. 
 
 
Physiological Impact 
 
The physiological impact of respirators on workers is an important 
factor in designing wearable PPE. Recent studies have investigated the 
physiological impact of respirators during physical tasks and while walk-
ing on a treadmill. Vojtko and colleagues (2008) found small but statisti-
cally significant increases in both inhalation and exhalation resistances of 
a face mask placed over an N95 filtering facepiece respirator for minute 
volumes of 25 and 40 L/min, but the total did not exceed NIOSH limits 
(although those are measured at 85 L/min). Although their study was per-
formed with a simulator, the authors concluded that the slight increases in 
resistance should not impact the wearer’s respiratory effort.   
Bansal and colleagues (2009) assessed the impact of one dual-
cartridge elastomeric and one N95 half-face mask respirator on both 
normal and respiratory-impaired volunteers (respiratory impairments 
were listed as chronic rhinitis, mild chronic obstructive pulmonary dis-
ease, and mild asthma). No control condition was used. Sedentary (bolt 
sorting), low-intensity (walk across room and put papers in appropriate 
bins), and moderate-intensity (stock shelves with cereal boxes and juice 
jugs) tasks were included. The authors found small but statistically sig-
nificant differences between the two respirators for inhalation time 
(longer for half-face models, 1.14 versus 1.10), exhalation time (shorter 
for half-face models, 1.39 versus 1.44), and increased duty cycle for half-
face models (0.46 versus 0.45). However, the differences are not likely to 
be clinically significant. The authors stated that neither respirator should 
cause hypoventilation and that both types of respirators should be well 
tolerated for most individuals, including those with mild respiratory im-
pairments. 
Another study used thermal imaging to assess surface temperature of 
two N95 respirators and two N95 respirators with exhalation valves from 
the same manufacturer (Monaghan et al., 2009). Respirators were placed 
on a headform with an Automated Breathing Metabolic Simulator sup-
plying air at 100 percent relative humidity and 33°C at 10 L/min for an 
hour. The authors concluded that at the breathing rate used, exhalation 
valves provided no heat dissipation benefits over a mask without one. 
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However, they also noted that the exhalation valve was not activated at 
the low breathing rate. 
Roberge and colleagues (2010a,b,c) completed a number of studies 
that assessed the physiological impact of various respirators during a 1-
hour treadmill walk at 1.7 and 2.5 mph. There were no significant differ-
ences between N95 filtering facepiece respirators with and without exha-
lation valves and the control in physiological variables, exertion scores, 
or comfort scores. The comparison of the N95 with and without the ex-
halation valve found no differences in the partial pressure of carbon di-
oxide (CO2). Similar results were reported for face masks worn over the 
N95s either with or without the exhalation valve. The authors did note 
that face masks decreased oxygen levels in the filtering facepiece respira-
tors at the low work rate and in the respirators with the exhalation valves 
at the higher work rate. An elastomeric air-purifying respirator resulted 
in decreased breathing rates and higher tidal volumes at both work rates, 
although the minute ventilation did not differ. While transcutaneous CO2 
values did not statistically differ (elastomeric air-purifying respirator ver-
sus control), some subjects had elevated levels that the authors suggested 
should be investigated further.  
The elastomeric air-purifying respirator imposed little additional 
physiological burden over an hour of wear at the work rates assessed. 
Exhalation valves in N95 respirators may decrease exhalation resistance 
and help dissipate heat and CO2 build-up; however, at low flow rates, 
these benefits may not be realized. Monaghan and coworkers (2009) 
noted that the exhalation valve was not activated at 10 L/min ventilation 
rate. This means wearers may not notice any difference in thermal sensa-
tion of the face during sedentary or low-intensity activities. Roberge and 
colleagues (2010b) found that at low work rates, excess CO2 was not a 
problem. Therefore, the benefit of the exhalation valve may be seen only 
at higher work rates.  
Healthy workers and those with mild respiratory impairments should 
be able to physiologically tolerate respirators. Little physiological burden 
should be imposed by filtering facepiece respirators (with or without a 
face mask) or by elastomeric respirators. However, the impact of filtering 
facepiece respirators on pregnant women is not well understood 
(Roberge, 2009). Respirators designed to accommodate the respiratory 
limitations of pregnant healthcare personnel may improve comfort and 
tolerability for other wearers (Roberge, 2009). Although loose-fitting 
PAPRs were not investigated, they should not impose a respiratory bur-
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den due to their positive air flow. However, the weight of the blower 
may increase the physiological workload. 
 
 
Communications 
 
Healthcare personnel must be able to communicate effectively and 
accurately with each other and with patients while wearing PPE. Com-
munications while wearing PPE typical of healthcare personnel has been 
investigated by Mendel and colleagues (2008) and Radonovich and col-
leagues (2010). A third study involving air traffic controllers also pro-
vides useful information (Hah et al., 2009).  
Mendel and coworkers (2008) assessed the impact of face masks on 
speech intelligibility using the Connected Speech Test with normal and 
hearing-impaired listeners in either a quiet room or with prerecorded 
noise from a dental drill played at 45 dBA. No impact was reported on 
speech intelligibility for either the normal or hearing-impaired listeners. 
A small but significant difference in scores for both mask and no-mask 
scores was noted due to background noise. Radonovich and coauthors 
(2010) used a Modified Rhyme Test with modified scoring to investigate 
the impact of face masks and respirators on speech communications. Re-
ported scores were not corrected for guessing. The first set of trials was 
performed in an intensive care unit (ICU) room with simulated noise, 
with only the speaker wearing the device. The scores of the N95 cup-
shaped respirator, duck bill N95, face mask, and control were statistically 
the same at both 3 and 7 feet in an ICU room with simulated noise. The 
elastomeric half-mask respirator with exhalation valve was the worst per-
former at 72 percent, scoring even lower than the loose-fitting PAPR (84 
percent). However, the cup-shaped N95 with a face mask, cup-shaped 
N95 with an exhalation valve, PAPR, and cup-shaped N95 with exhala-
tion valve and overlying face mask all had scores significantly lower 
than the control.  
The second set of trials was performed with elastomeric respirators 
with and without exhalation valves in an audiometric test room with 
background noise. All six respirators had scores significantly different 
from the control, and the three respirators with speech augmentation per-
formed better than those without augmentation. The final set of trials was 
performed in an audiometric test room with background noise with only 
the listener wearing a PAPR. The PAPR significantly impacted scores 
(79 percent) compared to the control (90 percent). Intelligibility was 
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higher at 3 feet than at 7 feet, but was not significantly different. Control 
scores were higher in the audiometric room than in the ICU, possibly due 
to reverberation and distractions in the ICU area. The authors suggested 
that respirators should be developed that improve communication among 
coworkers in noisy medical settings. 
Hah and colleagues (2009) investigated loose-fitting PAPRs and 
N95s for air traffic controllers who would have to work during an in-
fluenza pandemic. Although they focused on communications using 
headsets, some of their observations are applicable to the healthcare en-
vironment. The blowers for the three loose-fitting PAPRs that they inves-
tigated created noise between 52 dBA and 81 dBA. As expected, the 
respirator with the highest blower noise had the lowest speech intelligi-
bility scores. Although the authors used a modified rhyme test that was 
different than the test employed by Radonovich and colleagues (2010), 
these authors found error rates of 3 to 18 percent with the PAPRs for 
electronic communications and error rates of 32 to 55 percent with 3 sub-
jects performing face-to-face communications. The quietest PAPR had 
the lowest error rates. Their N95 tests with two filtering facepiece respi-
rators and one elastomeric respirator had error rates of 0 to 16 percent, 
though only 2 volunteers were used. The highest errors were with the 
elastomeric respirator, similar to the Radonovich findings. The elasto-
meric respirator was rated as obstructing maintenance tasks more than 
the filtering facepiece respirator. 
These three studies showed that background noise, whether it is from 
a dental drill, ICU room, or PAPR, has a detrimental effect on speech 
communications. Efforts should be made to decrease ambient noise, se-
lect PAPRs with low-noise blowers, or develop and certify PAPRs with 
lower flow rates that could be used by healthcare personnel. Speech 
augmentation devices or voice projection units may also improve com-
munications. The Department of Homeland Security has a current Small 
Business Innovation Research project (Topic Number H-SB09.2-006) 
(Department of Homeland Security, 2009) that is investigating improved 
speech intelligibility in noise for first responders. Some of the techniques 
being developed may be applicable to PAPRs and elastomerics, the res-
pirators that the studies by Radonovich and Hah and colleagues identified 
as having the greatest decrement on speech recognition. Additionally, the 
impact of decreased communications on patient care and procedural out-
come is unknown.  
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Current Research Directions 
 
 NIOSH recently supported a research effort (Brosseau, 2009) that 
examined ways to improve fit for half-mask respirators. The effort cul-
minated in a workshop that included presentations on recent research 
efforts, innovation, design, and impediments to bring new products to 
market as well as breakout sessions during which participants discussed 
characteristics of good design, areas where research is needed, wearer 
characteristics that impact fit, and necessary design changes. Characteris-
tics of good design identified during the breakout session included “low 
weight, able to fit many facial profiles, does not impair field of vision, 
uniform pressure on the face, good strap design, can be easily donned 
multiple times, has a limited number of parts, does not interfere with 
communication and is portable and easy to store” (Brosseau, 2009,  
p. 33). Participants identified the following as important research areas: 
decontaminating respirators, cross-contamination occurrence during re-
peat donning, efficacy of biocidal coatings, and whether respirator use 
reduces infection rates in emergency departments. Wearer characteristics 
that the group identified as contributing to fit were symmetry, chin char-
acteristics, sweat, nose dimension, and head dimension. Participants also 
identified the need for a user seal check that works and said they would 
like continuous fit checking rather than a no-fit test. Overarching rec-
ommendations for future research were to further investigate the rela-
tionship between respirator design and fit; to clarify the impact of 
facepiece design, facepiece sizes, and aging on the relationship between 
facial measurements and respirator fit; to determine how user seal check 
impacts respirator fit; to explore new methods for checking facepiece 
seals; and to determine the impact of environmental conditions and other 
protective equipment on respirator fit.   
The Department of Veterans Affairs is leading a collaborative effort 
with the National Personal Protective Technology Laboratory (NPPTL) 
to develop a respirator specifically designed for healthcare personnel en-
titled Project Better Respiratory Equipment Using Advanced Technolo-
gies for Healthcare Employees (B.R.E.A.T.H.E.) (Department of 
Veterans Affairs, 2010). The project has been divided into four stages: 
interagency working group information exchange, prototype develop-
ment, prototype lab and human subject testing, and commercialization. 
Nine federal departments and agencies are participating in the working 
group. The group met in 2008 to discuss issues of safety and effective-
ness, impact on occupational activities, comfort and tolerability, and 
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healthcare policies and practices. On December 14, 2009, a notice was 
placed in the Federal Register describing the project and seeking letters 
of interest from commercial organizations with the ability to design and 
manufacture a respirator that meets the needs of Project B.R.E.A.T.H.E. 
(Federal Register, 2009). It is anticipated that the report will be published 
in 2011. 
 
 
Summary 
 
Efforts are under way to develop more comfortable and easier to fit 
respirators that will be more conducive to interactions with patients, col-
leagues, and family members. Research to date has shown that the low 
inhalation and exhalation resistance rates of filtering facepiece respira-
tors do not significantly impact respiration. Although hypoventilation 
occurs with full-facepiece air-purifying respirators, neither the Bansal 
and colleagues (2009) nor the Roberge and colleagues (2010a,b,c) stud-
ies showed any evidence of such a burden with N95 filtering facepiece 
respirators or elastomeric respirators. Respirators do impact communica-
tions. However, the impact of decreased speech intelligibility on task 
performance is unknown. Loose-fitting PAPRs may make many health-
care tasks more difficult because of their bulkiness, added weight of the 
blower, flexible visor, and blower noise.  
 
 
Protective Clothing 
 
Gowns and other forms of protective clothing are designed for 
healthcare personnel primarily to act as a barrier to prevent the penetra-
tion of liquids or solids from coming into contact with the wearer’s skin 
and clothing. As the barrier properties of the protective clothing increase, 
the breathability of the material generally decreases, which then has the 
potential to impact comfort and tolerability (i.e., cause an increase in heat 
levels experienced by the wearer). A recent study has demonstrated that 
medical personnel who wear chemical protective clothing while perform-
ing basic life-saving tasks (e.g., connecting an intravenous [IV] line) ex-
perience discomfort and heat stress along with needing more time to 
perform the task (Rissanen et al., 2008). Using phase-change materials 
for the construction of protective clothing offers the potential to help re-
duce heat stress and improve thermal comfort for healthcare personnel. 
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Phase-change materials provide cooling by absorbing heat when they 
change from a solid to a liquid state. A surgeon wearing a vest containing 
phase-change materials reported subjective improvements in thermal 
comfort over that compared to regular clothing (Reinertsen et al., 2008).  
A 2008 review of protective clothing for healthcare personnel high-
lighted additional issues that are considered in designing protective 
clothing, including antibacterial finishing treatments, the impact of tem-
perature and relative humidity in the work environment, the use of mul-
tiple layers, and changes that can result from laundering or cleaning that 
might impact the protective effects of the clothing (Laing, 2008). The 
issue of laundering was further reviewed by Wilson and colleagues 
(2007), who assessed the limited available literature and found that in-
dustrial laundering and home laundering both were effective in decon-
tamination of healthcare clothing, including lab coats.  
A large-scale study (Manian and Ponzillo, 2007) examined com-
pliance of gown wear for hospital personnel (n = 1,150)  and visitors (n = 
392) to general wards and an ICU. Overall compliance by hospital per-
sonnel was 76 percent, while visitors complied 65 percent of the time. 
However, there were differences among healthcare personnel by occupa-
tion, with respiratory therapists having the highest compliance rate (96 
percent) and physicians having the lowest (67 percent). Female health-
care personnel (79 percent) were more likely than males (66 percent) to 
wear gowns. Overall compliance was higher in the ICU (83 percent) than 
in the general wards (71 percent). The study authors did not note whether 
an individual healthcare professional was included in multiple observa-
tions. Additionally, knowing they were being watched may have influ-
enced the decision to wear a gown. The reasons for non-compliance are 
unknown. However, the study showed that improvement is needed in 
gown compliance and that educational efforts should focus on male 
healthcare personnel as well as both healthcare personnel and visitors to 
general wards.   
 
 
Gloves 
 
Gloves also serve as barrier protection, although the role of gloves in 
preventing the transmission of influenza or other respiratory viruses is 
unknown. For bloodborne pathogens, gloves can prevent transmission 
through direct contact with non-intact skin. Gloves can provide a barrier 
between contaminated surfaces and the skin and can serve as a reminder 
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to avoid self-inoculation. However, gloved hands can be a means of self-
inoculation if healthcare personnel inadvertently touch their mouth, nose, 
or eyes with contaminated hands (IOM, 2008). Changing gloves between 
patients and paying rigorous attention to hand hygiene protocols can re-
duce contamination between patients or self-inoculation. Glove donning 
and doffing procedures have been examined to reduce contamination 
(Jones et al., 2010; Newman et al., 2007). 
As with gowns and protective clothing, one active area of research is 
the use of antiviral coatings or other virus-inhibiting mechanisms. Caillot 
and Voiglio (2008) examined the tolerance and ease of use of gloves that 
had a disinfecting agent between the two layers of the glove. They found 
that tactile feeling, grip quality, and other measures were comparable to 
double latex gloving. Other areas of study are indicators of perforation in 
gloves, double gloving, and tolerance of powder or other irritant reducers 
(e.g., aloe vera) (Fry et al., 2010; Hubner et al., 2010; Korniewicz and El 
Masri, 2007; Partecke et al., 2009).  
  
 
Eye Protection and Face Shields 
 
Transmission of influenza through the mucosa of the eyes, nose, and 
mouth is plausible, but not confirmed (Chan et al., 2010). Case reports of 
conjunctivitis have been noted with the H7N7 avian influenza virus 
(Fouchier et al., 2004). Protective eyewear and face shields can reduce 
self-inoculation and may provide protection against droplet spray. Little 
is known about how well these devices protect the wearer from direct 
contact, when this protection is needed regarding transmission from pa-
tients to healthcare personnel, and the extent to which extra precautions 
are needed during aerosol-generating procedures.  
Face shields may be a useful form of protection in lieu of face masks 
for workers exposed to droplet spray, particularly regarding comfort and 
tolerability issues, reduced breathing resistance, and improved speech 
communication. Decontamination and reuse may be possible for face 
shields, but much remains to be learned. It is unknown whether health-
care personnel would find face shields to be an acceptable alternative to 
masks and whether face shields would provide similar or superior (by 
protecting the eyes) protection to masks. 
The recent literature on eye protection and face shields appears to be 
limited and focused on blood-splash concerns. A study by Mansour and 
colleagues (2009) examined eye protection during orthopedic surgery 
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and made comparisons of several types of glasses, loupes, or face 
shields. Modern prescription glasses offered no benefit over the control 
condition, with both resulting in contamination rates of 83 percent. These 
rates were significantly lower for all other eye-protective devices (50 
percent for standard surgical telescopic loupes, 30 percent for face-mask 
and eye-shield combinations, and 3 percent for disposable glasses). Stud-
ies have also examined eye protection for blood-splash concerns (Davies 
et al., 2007; Wines et al., 2008) and found that face masks, eye shields, 
and glasses worn by surgeons and scrub nurses had high incidence of 
blood and body-fluid splashes. Similar studies would be useful to eval-
uate the exposure of healthcare personnel to droplet spray during patient 
care and to assess which types and combinations of eye protection and 
face shields provide the greatest protection.   
 
 
Cross-Cutting Issues: Task Performance and New Materials  
 
 
Task Performance 
 
The ability of medical staff to perform tasks and medical procedures 
while wearing PPE is a concern. Several recent studies assessed the im-
pact of various levels of PPE on the ability of healthcare personnel to 
perform medical tasks. The ability to complete a simulated resuscitation 
was investigated for paramedics wearing an air-purifying respirator and 
PAPR (Schumacher et al., 2009) and for paramedics and anesthesia train-
ees wearing an air-purifying respirator with a binocular or panoramic 
lens (Brinker et al., 2007; Schumacher et al., 2008). No differences in 
task completion times were found in any of these three studies. Delays 
resulting from donning a protective gown were seen in the initiation of 
chest compressions and cardiopulmonary resuscitation in a study of fire-
fighter defibrillator instructors who were videotaped performing cardiac 
arrest scenarios (Watson et al., 2008). Rissanen and colleagues (2008) 
found that completing two medical tasks while wearing chemical, biolog-
ical, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) PPE, including an impregnated 
charcoal suit, overalls, an air-purifying respirator, and cotton and rubber 
gloves, took longer—19 percent for ventilation and 18 percent for con-
necting an IV line. Udayasiri and colleagues (2007) assessed the ability 
of emergency department doctors and nurses to perform trauma resusci-
tation in level C PPE (air-purifying respirator, hooded suit, and inner and 
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outer gloves) versus gowns and gloves. Although volunteers believed the 
PPE impaired pulse assessment, IV cannulation, IV-line attachment, 
mini-jet use, bag and mask ventilation, and communication, only the 
time to control hemorrhage (38 to 47 sec, p = 0.02) was significantly im-
pacted. Castle and colleagues (2009) assessed the ability of 64 clinicians 
to perform intubation, laryngeal mask airway placement, and insertion of 
an IV cannula and intraosseous needle twice while in CBRN PPE and 
once unsuited. Eight percent of intubation and 12 percent of IV cannula-
tion attempts were unsuccessful in CBRN PPE.  
Donning of PPE has also been noted to delay the onset of patient 
care. Watson and colleagues (2009) conducted a simulation of a patient 
on a pediatric ward who developed respiratory failure. Donning of full 
PPE delayed the first response to the simulated “code” situation by 2 
minutes, and other care measures were also delayed.    
These results show that many medical tasks can be performed in var-
ious levels of PPE, but that the tasks may take longer. No studies were 
performed that assessed the impact of filtering facepiece respirators, elas-
tomeric respirators, or loose-fitting PAPRs on task performance. Howev-
er, a filtering facepiece respirator or elastomeric respirator is unlikely to 
have a greater impact on task performance than a full-facepiece air-
purifying respirator. The bulkiness and visor of a loose-fitting PAPR 
may have a different impact on performance than the more close-fitting 
air-purifying respirator and PAPR used in these studies. Castle and col-
leagues (2009) report that the reason some tasks could not be completed 
may be because clinicians were wearing full chemical, biological suits. 
The individual impact of respirators, suits, and rubber gloves cannot be 
separated. Additional studies that assess the impact on task performance 
of PPE likely to be worn during an influenza pandemic or outbreak of 
other viral respiratory diseases are warranted. 
 
 
Using Multiple Types of PPE: Integration and Use Issues  
 
 Because healthcare personnel frequently need to use several PPE 
items for protection against bloodborne or other infectious agents, in-
cluding a respirator, gloves, a gown, eye or face protection, and in some 
cases head and shoe coverings, issues arise about the integration and in-
terface of these items and how best to don and doff the PPE to ensure 
that maximum protection is provided and contamination is avoided. 
Workers in fields such as law enforcement, firefighting, and health care 
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have critical needs to be able to perform specific tasks while wearing 
multiple types and models of PPE. The impact of PPE on occupation-
specific tasks and the equipment used to perform those tasks should be 
considered in designing and selecting PPE.  
 Studies on the impact of PPE on medical tasks have focused on 
chemical and biological protective equipment (Brinker et al., 2007; 
Castle et al., 2009; Rissanen et al., 2008; Schumacher et al., 2008, 2009; 
Udayasiri et al., 2007). These studies did not address healthcare-specific 
PPE used to protect against influenza transmission. The impact of indi-
vidual PPE items was not assessed, so it is not known whether the respi-
rator, gloves, or suits or a combination of equipment caused the 
interference. Additionally, face shields were not used in these studies. 
Integration of common healthcare PPE with medical equipment should 
be assessed and their impact on task performance determined. 
 
 
SUMMARY OF PROGRESS 
 
 Personal protective equipment is a critical component in the hier-
archy of controls used to protect healthcare personnel from influenza and 
other viral respiratory diseases. Understanding the functional issues re-
lated to the design of PPE as well as the factors that impact use are criti-
cal to ensuring that healthcare personnel are adequately protected, 
comfortable, and able to perform their jobs. Important advances have 
been made in some areas since the 2008 IOM report, but other areas, par-
ticularly regarding improvements in gowns, gloves, face masks, and face 
shields, need to be more fully addressed. Much research has been done 
regarding filtration of respirator media, but ways to improve fit, includ-
ing new technologies specifically for filtering facepiece respirators, need 
more research because face seal leakage greatly exceeds filter penetra-
tion in the overall TIL of respirators. The physiological impact of respi-
rators has been studied in-depth, but research in this area is lacking for 
other types of PPE. Integration issues concerning PPE and medical 
equipment and the impact on operational performance have not been ade-
quately studied. Effective decontamination methods that do not impact the 
physical characteristics of respirators have been studied for some types of 
respirators, but with inconclusive results. Finally, the characteristics of a 
respirator that would specifically address the needs of healthcare personnel 
(e.g., patient–provider interaction, comfort, reduced physiological burden) 
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have been identified. Addressing these issues is important for developing 
PPE for healthcare personnel that is safe, effective, and comfortable. 
 
 
FINDINGS AND RESEARCH NEEDS 
 
 This chapter provides an overview of the range of ongoing work on 
designing and engineering effective PPE to prevent transmission of in-
fluenza and other viral respiratory diseases. At its June 2010 workshop 
and through its literature review, the committee realized that many re-
search efforts have been completed recently and that ongoing research 
efforts in this area continue. The challenge will be to sustain these efforts 
and to broaden them into areas that will result in wearable and effective 
PPE for healthcare personnel. Box 3-1 highlights the committee’s find-
ings in this area. 
 
• Wearability: 
 
o Respirators: Continue examining the features of N95s, 
PAPRs, and elastomeric respirators that impact comfort and 
tolerability among healthcare personnel. Identify alterations 
in respirator design and construction that show promise in 
improving problem features that adversely impact comfort 
and tolerability. 
o Other PPE: Initiate research to identify factors affecting the 
comfort and tolerability of protective eyewear and clothing, 
and identify changes having the potential to positively influ-
ence comfort and tolerability. Evaluate differences between 
short- and long-term use of PPE as it affects comfort and tol-
erability. Develop and field test new designs and features for 
PPE for healthcare personnel that offer potential for improv-
ing comfort and tolerability. 
 
• Decontamination and Feasibility of Reuse: 
 
o Decontamination methods: Continue to assess promising de-
contamination methods for all types of PPE, including re-
search on the impact of decontamination methods on 
respirator protection and on the physical characteristics of 
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BOX 3-1 
Findings 
 
• Respirators are designed to provide respiratory protection, and respira-
tors certified by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 
are tested to provide effective filtration. Issues remain regarding respira-
tor fit, which currently depends on fit testing and user seal checks. Ef-
forts focused on addressing total inward leakage may resolve some of 
these issues, and research on respirators that do not require fit testing is 
needed.  
• Face masks and face shields do not provide a tight seal to the wearer’s 
face. Laboratory research to date on the performance of face masks has 
focused on inhalable particulates, and there has been little or no re-
search as to the performance of these devices on droplet spray. 
• There is a lack of knowledge as to the performance of eye protection, 
face shields, gloves and gowns, and other PPE in protecting the wearer 
from influenza and other respiratory viruses.  
 
  
 the respirator (inner, middle, and outer layers). Assess de-
contamination effectiveness using either influenza virus or a 
suitable surrogate. 
o Feasibility of reuse: Develop a protocol for donning and 
doffing PPE to minimize self-inoculation. 
 
• TIL and Protection: 
 
o TIL: Finish development of the TIL certification require-
ments for half-mask air-purifying respirators. Assess TIL of 
very small particles (< 100 nm) with respirators.  
o Face masks and face shields: Assess the TIL of face masks 
against droplet spray. Conduct research using manned and 
unmanned tests to determine if face shields can offer suitable 
alternative protection to goggles and/or face masks to protect 
healthcare personnel against droplet spray. 
o Fit: Evaluate the impact of facepiece materials and design on 
improving the fit of filtering facepiece respirators. Develop 
improved and simpler fit testing methods. Examine the ef-
fectiveness of performing a user seal check for an N95 respi-
rator each time it is donned.    
o Workplace protection studies: Conduct workplace protection 
studies to assess protection during typical tasks and time 
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changes in protection. Determine how using typical instru-
ments impacts protection, and identify integration issues.  
 
• Equipment and Technologies: 
 
o Integration: Conduct human factors (field of view, visual 
acuity, communication) and operational performance studies 
to assess the ability of healthcare personnel to perform medi-
cal procedures in typical healthcare-specific PPE ensembles.  
o New technologies: Continue development of an air-purifying 
respirator that specifically addresses the needs of healthcare 
personnel. New materials and technologies should be devel-
oped specifically for filtering facepiece respirators to im-
prove fit, comfort, and tolerability. A new low-noise, light-
weight, PAPR and a face shield that is reusable and easy to 
clean should be designed and developed. The efficacy and 
effectiveness of antiviral-coated PPE and impacts on main-
tenance and reuse of PPE should be assessed. 
 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Recommendation: Continue and Expand Research on PPE 
for Healthcare Personnel 
NPPTL and other agencies, private-sector companies, and 
other organizations should continue to advance research in 
designing and evaluating the effectiveness of respirator pro-
tection for healthcare personnel and expand its research ef-
forts to improve and evaluate the effectiveness of gloves, 
gowns, eye protection, face shields, and face masks in pre-
venting the transmission of influenza or other viral respira-
tory diseases. Areas of focused research needs include 
 
• effectiveness in preventing fomite, droplet spray, or 
aerosol transmission; 
• decontamination and feasibility of reuse; 
• comfort, fit, and usability; 
• impact on task performance; and  
• development of technologies specifically for health-
care personnel. 
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Recommendation: Improve Fit Test Methods and Evaluate 
User Seal Checks   
NPPTL should develop novel, simpler fit test methods and 
evaluate the effectiveness of performing user seal checks on 
N95 respirators.  
 
Recommendation: Develop and Certify PAPRs for Health-
care Personnel 
NPPTL should develop certification requirements for a low-
noise, loose-fitting PAPR for healthcare personnel.  
 
Recommendation: Examine the Effectiveness of Face Masks 
and Face Shields as PPE 
NPPTL should investigate the effectiveness of face masks and 
face shields in preventing transmission of viral respiratory 
diseases. 
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Using PPE: 
Individual and Organizational Issues 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Workers in a wide range of industries are required to wear personal 
protective equipment (PPE) to reduce or prevent exposures to hazardous 
chemicals, fire, particulates, or other health risks. As noted in Chapter 3, 
researchers, designers, and manufacturers continue to look for improve-
ments to the equipment that can reduce the physiological burdens, im-
prove communication, and be more comfortable and less of an 
encumbrance to wear. For healthcare personnel, the trade-offs of hazard-
ous exposures with the challenges of donning, wearing, and doffing PPE 
often end up with healthcare personnel not fully adhering to PPE and 
infection control protocols. This chapter focuses on what has been 
learned about use of PPE by healthcare personnel and efforts to improve 
the safety culture in healthcare facilities. The chapter concludes with 
recommendations for future research.  
 
 
BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT FROM THE 2008 REPORT 
 
Although healthcare personnel often face hazardous working condi-
tions with potential exposures to a variety of toxic and infectious agents, 
adherence to PPE protocols is often quite low. Observational studies and 
survey questionnaires of individual workers have looked at the reasons 
for the noncompliance and barriers to use, which often include the host 
of comfort and workability issues discussed in Chapter 3. Few studies 
have tested interventions to improve adherence rates.  
113 
Copyright © National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
Preventing Transmission of Pandemic Influenza and Other Viral Respiratory Diseases:  Personal Protective Equipment for Healthcare Workers: Update 2010
114 PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT FOR HEALTHCARE PERSONNEL 
 
The range of factors that impact PPE-related behaviors and com-
pliance were organized in the 2008 Institute of Medicine (IOM) report 
and in other studies into three categories: 
 
1. individual factors, such as knowledge, beliefs, attitudes, percep-
tion of risk, history, and sociodemographics;  
2. environmental factors, including availability of equipment and 
negative-pressure rooms; and 
3. organizational factors, such as management’s expectations and 
performance feedback, workplace policies, and training and edu-
cation programs. 
 
Discussion in the 2008 report focused on the concerted efforts 
needed by individual healthcare personnel, managers, and institutions to 
improve the safety culture in healthcare facilities. This culture requires 
“an organization-wide dedication to the creation, implementation, evalu-
ation, and maintenance of effective and current safety practices” (IOM, 
2008, p. 8). Although organizational and cultural factors in the context of 
patient safety have received a great deal of attention in recent years, less 
attention has been focused on healthcare worker safety. In industrial set-
tings, such as chemical and power plants, a focus on achieving high safe-
ty performance has been found to result from a sustained emphasis on 
safety factors at all levels of the organization: the individual level (e.g., 
attitudes, training), microorganizational level (e.g., management support, 
safety representatives, accountability), and macroorganizational level 
(e.g., communication, organization of technology, work processes) 
(Hofmann et al., 1995). Much can be learned from “high-reliability or-
ganizations” (e.g., nuclear power industry; certain military operations, 
including aircraft carriers; commercial aviation), which are given that 
term because of their highly complex and hazardous missions and few 
safety-related failures. Characteristics of these organizations include 
commitment to safety articulated from the highest level of the organiza-
tion; resources, incentives, and rewards to carry out the commitment; 
continuous emphasis on safety; safety as the priority even at the expense 
of production or efficiency; communication across all levels that is fre-
quent and candid; openness about errors and issues as well as regular 
reporting; and valuing organizational learning and improvements (Gaba 
et al., 2003; Roberts, 1990; Rochlin, 1999; Singer et al., 2003; Weick et 
al., 1999). In many industrial work situations PPE use is considered a 
mandatory practice with a specific type of PPE or PPE ensemble re-
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quired whenever a certain job or task is performed. In health care, PPE 
use is often indicated for certain tasks, but often only under certain 
conditions.  
Implementing a culture of safety can require changes in the organiza-
tion’s policies, procedures, managerial actions and priorities, and re-
sources dedicated to safety with access to effective safety equipment. 
Furthermore, the commitment to, and support of, safety is conveyed to 
workers at all levels through active and sincere engagement by those in 
leadership positions who model, encourage, and enforce appropriate PPE 
use and safety. Finally, and importantly, individual accountability is key 
to improving and sustaining PPE use.  
The 2008 report identified four key factors in promoting a culture of 
safety within healthcare facilities; factors where research is still needed 
to improve PPE adherence are as follows: 
 
1. Provide leadership, commitment, and role modeling for 
worker safety: Employees who perceive a strong organization-
wide commitment to safety have been found to be more than 2.5 
times more likely to adhere to safety protocols than those who 
lack such perceptions (Gershon et al., 1995).  
2. Emphasize healthcare worker education and training: The 
presence of safety education within a hospital or other healthcare 
facility demonstrates the organization’s commitment to safety 
and increases individual knowledge of safety practices.  
3. Improve feedback and enforcement of PPE policies and use: 
The purpose of developing a positive and strong culture of safety 
in the workplace is to promote habitual safety practice. As noted 
in the IOM report,  
 
Employees should feel uncomfortable when not wearing PPE dur-
ing appropriate situations, and supervisors should reinforce the im-
portance of PPE and enforce policies so that noncompliance is the 
rare exception and not the rule. . . . Each healthcare employer 
should assume responsibility for taking an active role in facilitat-
ing, promoting, and requiring safety actions. Healthcare facilities 
need to foster and promote a strong culture of safety that includes a 
commitment to worker safety, adequate access to safety equip-
ment, and extensive training efforts that utilize protocols requiring 
specific safety actions and detailing consequences for noncom-
pliance. (IOM, 2008, p. 8) 
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4. Clarify worksite practices and policies: Much remains to be 
learned about specific issues related to wearing PPE in the 
healthcare setting, particularly during an influenza pandemic. A 
concerted effort to identify best practices in infection control and 
to disseminate this information to other healthcare facilities 
could increase worker and patient safety and have positive rami-
fications well beyond preparedness for an influenza pandemic.  
 
 As noted throughout the prior report, the use of PPE is only one 
component of promoting a strong safety culture in healthcare settings. In 
addition to PPE, the continuum of infection prevention and safety con-
trols includes environmental and engineering controls (e.g., number of 
air exchanges, availability of isolation rooms with negative-pressure ven-
tilation) and administrative or work practice controls (e.g., protocols to 
ensure early disease recognition, vaccination policies, infection control 
guidelines for patients and visitors).  
 
 
UPDATE ON RECENT RESEARCH 
 
Organizational Factors Influencing Use of PPE 
 
 In healthcare organizations much of the emphasis on safety in the 
past decade has focused on patient safety (IOM, 2000). The relationship 
between patient safety and worker safety is beginning to be further ex-
plored, and research continues into delineating the role of a number of 
factors in creating and sustaining a culture of safety in the healthcare 
workplace (Lowe, 2008; Singer et al., 2009; Tucker et al., 2008). High-
hazard industries, such as commercial aviation and nuclear power, are a 
major source for research on safety culture and provide useful information 
to mitigate hazard risk. For example, Lombardi and colleagues (2009) 
conducted a series of focus group discussions with 51 personnel—
primarily from manufacturing, construction, and retail industries as well 
as a few in health care—on the use of protective eyewear. The authors 
reported that risk perception, barriers to use of PPE, and enforcement and 
reinforcement are important safety culture concepts. Investigators further 
indicated that safety culture emerged as an important theme in encourag-
ing PPE use, which included proper training, personal responsibility, 
peer pressure to use PPE, and appropriate and comfortable equipment. 
Supervisor and peer use of PPE was deemed important. As noted by 
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Lombardi and colleagues, “If the supervisor doesn’t have [protective 
eyewear] on, no one else is going to wear them” (2009, p. 758). Positive 
reinforcement was seen as encouraging; however, personnel often re-
ported negative reinforcement by supervisors, such as being written up or 
threatened with job loss. Without enforcement, personnel questioned 
management’s sincerity about safety. 
A recent experimental study of social modeling of PPE use found a 
moderate positive correlation in the number of participants wearing PPE 
(hearing protection in this study) and the number of safety model peers 
who wore the hearing protection (Olson et al., 2009). Safety leaders 
should consider peer influence as one important factor in the use of PPE 
as well as interventions such as training, adequate PPE supply, and posi-
tive reinforcement as a package. 
In another example of the impact of safety culture, Lowe (2008) sur-
veyed 5,131 allied healthcare personnel, including emergency medical 
staff, community health personnel, and long-term care providers, about 
safety culture. Lowe reported that in the healthcare setting, teamwork, 
fair workplace processes, supportive and people-centered supervisors, 
leadership, a learning environment, and evidence that employers were 
working collaboratively to improve the work environment contributed to 
a culture that values safety. This broader research base that examines 
safety culture influences and barriers should be further explored in order 
to inform the work of healthcare organizations. 
An in-depth review of Canada’s experience with severe acute respi-
ratory syndrome (SARS) by the SARS Commission emphasized the im-
portance of a robust safety culture in healthcare facilities and pointed to 
the need for close cooperation between infection control and occupation-
al safety and health programs and personnel (Possamai, 2007). Although 
safety culture issues in health care go well beyond a discussion of PPE, 
they are important components of those discussions. Recent research on 
organizational factors that impact the use of PPE (Cavazza and Serpe, 
2009; Lombardi et al., 2009; Olson et al., 2009) has reinforced many of 
the factors identified in the 2008 IOM report, including  
 
• availability of and participation in training and refresher courses, 
• supervisor use of PPE, 
• peer use of PPE, 
• organizational support for worker safety and health—the extent 
to which the company minimizes hazards and prioritizes safety 
goals. Support is also evidenced by senior manager support of 
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safety practices and the level of encouragement for worker par-
ticipation in health and safety discussions,  
• positive reinforcement of individual compliance behavior, and  
• negative reinforcement (e.g., verbal warnings). 
 
Nichol and colleagues (2008) reported results from 177 nurses in 2 
acute care hospitals in Canada. They found that compliance with PPE use 
was significantly related to organizational support for health and safety 
(however, no details were provided on what constituted organizational 
support). Other factors positively affecting the use of facial PPE included 
full-time employment status, more than 5 years of experience as a nurse, 
monthly or more frequent use of PPE, and belief in media coverage 
about the risks of communicable diseases. The absence of job hin-
drances, such as heavy workloads, was an important contributor.  
Saint and colleagues (2009) conducted telephone and in-person in-
terviews with 86 hospital staff in 14 U.S. hospitals about barriers to im-
plementing evidence-based practices to prevent healthcare-associated 
infections. The authors identified two types of personnel barriers: “active 
resisters” and “organizational constipators.” Active resisters were identi-
fied as hospital staff who actively and openly opposed changes in prac-
tice. One person identified this group as “entrenched culture.” Another 
type of active resister was one who had competing authorities on new 
practice implementation, such as hospital policy being in conflict with 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention guidelines. Organizational 
constipators tended to be mid- to high-level executives who prevented or 
delayed certain actions, thereby acting as barriers to evidence-based 
change implementation. They appeared to undercut changes and put their 
own interests ahead of those of organizations and patients. Strategies to 
overcome these behaviors need to be identified and implemented. 
Additional studies point to the need for better training, equipment, 
and facilities. Ganczak and Szych (2007) conducted research on 601 sur-
gical nurses in Poland and found that compliance with PPE varied con-
siderably, ranging from 83 percent compliance with glove use to only 9 
percent compliance with eye protection. Only 5 percent routinely used 
PPE when in contact with potentially infectious material. Compliance 
was higher among nurses who had received training in infection control. 
The most common reason reported for noncompliance was lack of PPE 
availability (37 percent). These findings related to adequate training were 
also found in a survey of 1,290 healthcare personnel as demonstrating the 
organization’s commitment to keeping employees informed and up to 
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date on best practices (Yassi et al., 2007). Yassi and colleagues (2009) 
used questionnaires, workplace assessments, and discussion groups at a 
South African hospital to gather information from health and safety rep-
resentatives and occupational health practitioners. Findings showed 
weaknesses in knowing how to use N95 respirators and handle sharps, as 
well as limited supplies and training related to practice procedures. 
Turnberg and investigators (2008) conducted a survey of 653 hospital 
staff in 5 medical centers in Washington state and found lack of knowl-
edge by healthcare personnel about, and limited training on, recommend-
ed infection control practices and PPE usage, as well as limited resource 
support. Investigators indicate there is a clear need to identify and reduce 
barriers to safe practice. 
Recent research highlights the importance of the worker–task inter-
face and work organization factors. Previous PPE research has often 
shown that physicians display poorer compliance than other categories of 
healthcare personnel. Although some recent data confirm this gradation 
(Manian and Ponzillo, 2007), other work suggests that these differences 
may be at least partially related to task assignments and the general or-
ganization of work (Chiang et al., 2008). Chiang and colleagues found 
that physicians complied better than nurses with PPE requirements dur-
ing resuscitation activities in an intensive care unit. In this study, the 
poorer compliance of nurses was linked to the lack of specific task as-
signments, inadequate preparation for procedures, and the spatial charac-
teristics and arrangement of the workspace. Lack of readily available 
PPE and time pressures continue to play a role in poor compliance 
(Shigayeva et al., 2007; Visentin et al., 2009). Other research shows that 
compliance may be more problematic in healthcare settings where staff 
vary on a day-to-day basis or rotate in and out of the setting (Trick et al., 
2007). Job and task design, workgroup factors, supervisory practices, and 
other micro- and macro-work organization factors may also help to ex-
plain observed inconsistencies in compliance rates among healthcare per-
sonnel. These inconsistencies have been attributed previously to 
individual characteristics, such as job category, training level, job tenure, 
age, and even gender. 
 
 
Individual Factors 
 
Research published since 2007 on healthcare personnel and PPE 
shows that a number of individual factors continue to contribute to poor 
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compliance and other safety-related outcomes. Three sets of factors de-
serve mention. First, studies continue to show knowledge gaps and train-
ing deficiencies among healthcare personnel with respect to proper PPE 
usage, modes of transmission, and other infection control topics. Re-
search by Bryce and colleagues (2008) found that even though healthcare 
personnel may use appropriate PPE, they often do so incorrectly or in-
completely. Examples include not doing a fit check after donning a respi-
rator, continuing to use familiar devices regardless of fit test results, and 
not getting fit tested annually. Composite compliance and comfort scores 
were assessed for use of N95 respirators and eye protection (goggles, 
face shields, and other protective eyewear) among nurses, respiratory 
therapists, and other healthcare personnel at a tertiary care hospital that 
provides treatment for patients infected with tuberculosis (Bryce et al., 
2008). For respirators, the composite compliance score was 86 percent of 
full compliance, and eye protection use was 74 percent of full com-
pliance. No significant differences in compliance were observed for the 
three different models of N95 respirators used. The composite comfort 
score for N95 respirators was 68 percent of full comfort. For protective 
eyewear, the ability to see clearly was significantly and positively asso-
ciated with both compliance and comfort. No association was reported 
between compliance and comfort for either respirators or protective eye-
wear. Healthcare personnel reported that they “felt better protected” with 
N95 respirators than with face masks.  
Knowledge gaps also have been identified with respect to properly 
removing PPE (Hitoto et al., 2009), differentiating the protection levels 
offered by different types of PPE and PPE materials (Kanjirath et al., 
2009), and having familiarity with newer protective devices (Ellison et 
al., 2007). This research highlights the fact that most PPE compliance 
behaviors are not simple, discrete actions. Rather, they are sets or se-
quences of behaviors that can vary under different circumstances. Total 
and perfect compliance with PPE use is a daunting task under the best of 
circumstances.  
Second, research continues to indicate that healthcare personnel of-
ten rely on their own personal assessments of risk in deciding whether or 
not to use PPE. Results from a study by Visentin and colleagues (2009) 
suggest that, despite administrative directives, emergency medical tech-
nicians may fail to use certain PPE when they are not convinced it is 
needed in particular situations. Shigayeva and colleagues (2007) pro-
duced similar findings with respect to barrier protection during the SARS 
outbreak in Canada. One study found that healthcare personnel may be-
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lieve they know more about PPE and infection control than they actually 
do (Shigayeva et al., 2007). Studies on the willingness of healthcare pro-
viders to work during crises involving infectious diseases have shown 
that having an adequate supply of PPE is an influential factor in being 
willing to respond and work (Balicer et al., 2010; Chaffee, 2009; 
Gershon et al., 2010a; Mackler et al., 2007; Wicker et al., 2009).  
Third, recent research shows that healthcare personnel still believe 
that PPE can interfere with the patient–provider relationship and/or re-
duce the quality of care. For example, concerns about PPE include de-
creases in the field of vision or reductions in manual dexterity 
(Daugherty et al., 2009; Ellison et al., 2007; Visentin et al., 2009). Fifty-
four healthcare personnel in a hospital emergency department were asked 
to wear a respirator (P2, an N95 equivalent) for a 4-week period during 
the influenza season whenever they were working within 1 meter of a 
patient with respiratory symptoms (Seale et al., 2009). During the first 
week, 24.1 percent of the participants wore the respirator “occasionally,” 
while 42.6 percent never wore the respirator. In week 2, only 3 of the 54 
participants wore the respirator “on most shifts.” During weeks 3 and 4, 
only 1 healthcare worker wore the respirator “on most shifts.” By week 
4, 70.4 percent of the healthcare personnel reported that they never wore 
the respirator. Their reasons were that it was hot, was difficult to breathe 
through, interfered with patient communication, and had to be stored 
somewhere between uses. 
Patient perceptions of PPE and its impact on provider behaviors is an 
area of ongoing research. Recent findings are providing insights into pa-
tient expectations and preferences with respect to PPE. Routine use of 
PPE by dental care providers seems to be well accepted by patients and 
expected as the norm (Molinari, 2010). Using a set of pictures of physi-
cians with transparent face shields and traditional surgical masks, Forgie 
and colleagues (2009) asked parents and children (ages 4 to 10) which 
set of physicians they would prefer for patient care. Although 62 percent 
of parents thought their children would choose face shields, 59 percent of 
the children did not have a preference and found neither set to be fright-
ening. A survey of dental patients found that face mask use was pre-
ferred by a majority of the patients (72 percent), with younger patients 
(< 46 years of age) more supportive of face mask use (McKenna et al., 
2007).  
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Interventions to Improve Infection Control 
and/or PPE Compliance 
 
Gammon and colleagues (2007) conducted a literature review of re-
search on healthcare worker compliance with standard/universal infec-
tion control precautions. They found suboptimal compliance in 24 
studies that assessed compliance and only short-term improvements in 
the 13 studies examining interventions (primarily training classes) to im-
prove compliance. In most intervention studies, compliance was moni-
tored for only a few months after the intervention, and compliance often 
returned to baseline levels within a relatively short time. For example, a 
study of emergency medical services personnel found poor retention of 
donning and doffing procedures at a point approximately 6 months after 
the initial training (Northington et al., 2007). 
Since 2007, several training-related intervention studies have been 
done. Howard and colleagues (2009) tested a clean-practice protocol and 
found that it significantly improved hand decontamination and overall 
infection control after 3 months. However, this was a small study without 
a control or comparison group. No further follow-up assessment was 
conducted to assess long-term maintenance.  
Hon and colleagues (2008) reported that an online infection control 
course adequately transferred knowledge regarding PPE selection and 
use. But again, no control group was used, and the online course was not 
compared to other instructional modalities. In one better designed study, 
Trick and colleagues (2007) conducted a 3-year intervention study of 
hand hygiene and glove usage. Hygiene significantly improved in two of 
the three treatment hospitals compared with the control hospital. The best 
performing hospital also showed a reduced incidence of antimicrobial-
resistant bacteria infections. The third treatment hospital showed insig-
nificant improvement. This hospital was a large, public teaching hospital. 
These recent studies tentatively suggest that multicomponent training 
interventions may be more effective than single-component efforts and 
that communications and convenient reminders placed throughout the 
work environment may boost compliance. Training and other interven-
tions that make use of social-cognitive and other behavioral theories also 
appear to hold promise (Godin et al., 2008).  
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Use of PPE by Home and Community 
Healthcare Personnel 
 
 A segment of the healthcare workforce often overlooked in discus-
sions on PPE and pandemic influenza planning is the more than 1.5 mil-
lion home healthcare personnel and those working in community settings 
other than hospitals and large clinics (e.g., schools, physician’s offices, 
long-term care settings) in the United States (Baron et al., 2009). These 
settings do not generally offer the administrative and environmental safe-
ty controls that should be available in hospitals or other large healthcare 
facilities. A recent study examined factors relevant to the willingness and 
ability of home healthcare personnel to take care of their patients during 
an influenza pandemic (Gershon et al., 2010b). Of the 384 home health-
care personnel responding to the questionnaire, 16 percent (57 workers) 
reported that their employer gave them a “respirator mask,” with 41 
workers reporting that they received training on how to use the equip-
ment and 16 reporting that they had been fit tested on the equipment they 
were provided. When asked about whether they would be willing to pro-
vide care during a pandemic to their current patients, respiratory protec-
tion was a significant factor, with willingness to work being associated 
with “being confident that the mask would protect me” (51 percent) and 
“being given a respirator mask” (47 percent). 
Hinkin and colleagues (2008) conducted a literature review and 
found poor compliance with standard precautions among community 
nurses. Employers must provide suitable facilities, sufficient supplies of 
PPE, and adequate training. The authors note that most research has been 
done in hospitals, which has only limited applicability to other communi-
ty settings. 
 
 
SUMMARY OF PROGRESS 
 
Research during the past several years reveals modest gains in un-
derstanding that self-protective behavior in the healthcare settings in-
volves a constellation of interacting and independent components. At a 
minimum, consideration should be given to the user, the device, the task, 
and the general work and organizational context. Daugherty and col-
leagues (2009) found that knowledge and task hindrances were related to 
poor compliance among critical care clinicians, with the authors conclud-
ing that organizational factors were more important than individual fac-
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tors in explaining PPE usage. The growing acknowledgment of contex-
tual and organizational factors means that research on PPE and health-
care personnel is closing in on the larger body of occupational safety 
research, which increasingly emphasizes contextual and organizational 
factors in understanding occupational safety performance.  
Although there are clear gaps and deficiencies in our knowledge base 
about PPE usage in health care, existing knowledge is sufficient to rec-
ommend a four-pronged strategy for immediate implementation. The 
four elements are as follows: (1) deliberate planning and preparation at 
the leadership and organizational levels; (2) comprehensive training, in-
cluding supervisors and managers; (3) widespread and convenient avail-
ability of appropriate PPE devices; and (4) accountability at all levels of 
the organization. In essence, there should be universal acknowledgment 
that PPE usage is an integral component of providing quality health care. 
As with other priorities, this aspect of healthcare delivery needs to be 
planned carefully at the organizational/institutional level, managers and 
frontline workers alike need to understand and accept their roles and re-
sponsibilities, and PPE usage needs to be as easy and convenient as pos-
sible. PPE should be factored into all decisions involving task design, 
staffing, and work assignments. Input from frontline workers should be 
used to facilitate planning and decision making and maximize accep-
tance. Environmental/engineering controls should be utilized wherever 
possible to control exposures, with PPE used as a supplement or alterna-
tive when environmental/engineering controls are not sufficient or feasi-
ble. The overall implementation of the PPE program should be 
monitored regularly, with the goals of continuous improvement, adoption 
of best practices, and accountability of both supervisor and worker.  
 
 
FINDINGS AND RESEARCH NEEDS 
 
This is an opportune time for research on promoting and enhancing 
healthcare worker safety and the use of PPE. As noted throughout the 
chapter, extensive work has been done in recent years on improving pa-
tient safety. Efforts are needed to build on those efforts and identify the 
linkages between patient safety and worker safety, particularly with the 
use of PPE. Additionally, safety research conducted in other types of 
work settings has potential applicability to improving safety performance 
and PPE use in health care. Furthermore, much can be learned from re-
cent experience by healthcare personnel and organizations during the 
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2009 H1N1 influenza, and exploring lessons learned can be instructive 
for moving research efforts forward. Increased knowledge and commu-
nication on the severity of the disease will also be important as decisions 
are made by organizations regarding PPE compliance. Box 4-1 highlights 
the committee’s findings in this area.  
The committee has identified the following research needs and rec-
ommendations. Some of these can and need to be addressed expeditious-
ly; others will require longer-term efforts. The goals will be to identify 
and evaluate strategies to mitigate organizational and other barriers that 
limit the use of PPE by healthcare personnel and to identify incentives 
and enforcement mechanisms to ensure ongoing organizational commit-
ment and continuous improvement. Efforts should be aimed across the 
spectrum of healthcare personnel and should consider language, educa-
tional, and cultural issues. 
Studies have examined barriers to PPE use; however, research gaps 
remain on identifying effective strategies for sustaining PPE use related 
to training, policies, and actions, including assessment of the knowledge, 
attitudes, and priorities of healthcare personnel and senior management 
about PPE. Research is needed on the following issues: 
 
• PPE issues in health science school curriculums: Studies are 
needed to determine the level of inclusion of contemporary con-
cepts and applications regarding PPE in the curriculums of 
 
 
 
BOX 4-1 
Findings 
 
• Self-protective behavior in healthcare settings involves a constella-
tion of interacting and independent factors.  
• Organizational and individual changes are complex, time consum-
ing, and difficult to sustain.  
• Personal protective equipment usage presents varied challenges 
across different types of healthcare settings. 
• Existing knowledge is sufficient to begin to incorporate the following 
practices into PPE usage in health care: deliberate planning and 
preparation at the leadership and organizational levels; compre-
hensive training, including supervisors and managers; widespread 
and convenient availability of appropriate PPE devices; and ac-
countability at all levels of the organization. 
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health science and allied health schools. These studies should in-
clude all levels of education where practice is a component. 
Recommendations should be made for closing identified gaps 
and improving the development, content, and dissemination of 
PPE training materials.  
• Healthcare worker safety culture: Recent efforts focused on 
patient safety should be expanded to examine the worker safety 
climate specific to the healthcare arena and PPE use. This in-
cludes examining the applicability to health care of research 
findings in the areas of patient safety, high-reliability organiza-
tions, high-hazard industries, and general industry. Lessons 
learned from the experience with 2009 H1N1 influenza could be 
informative in identifying best practices, learning from organiza-
tions successful with PPE compliance by healthcare personnel as 
well as from those with lower rates of compliance, and examin-
ing issues relevant to PPE policy and implementation relevant to 
both large and small healthcare employers. To improve appro-
priate use of PPE, it will be vital to better understand the motiva-
tions and risk assessment processes used by healthcare personnel 
regarding use of and demand for PPE.  
• Incentives and enforcement: Innovative approaches to incident 
reporting systems and other incentive and enforcement actions 
need to be examined that promote PPE use by fostering a strong 
and positive culture of safety in the workplace and learning from 
mistakes. 
• Task and work organization: Efforts are needed to examine the 
contribution of task and work organization factors (how work 
processes are structured and managed) to PPE usage and other 
safe work practices in healthcare settings.  
• Metrics: Similar to measures of the patient safety culture, met-
rics are needed to measure worker and organizational safety cul-
ture and use of PPE. 
• Varying healthcare settings: In order to determine practice 
needs in different work settings, research is needed to examine 
and differentiate PPE policy and implementation strategies in 
large and small healthcare delivery settings.  
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RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Recommendation: Explore Healthcare Safety Culture and 
Work Organization  
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 
(NIOSH) and other relevant agencies, such as the Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality, and professional organiza-
tions should conduct research to better understand the role 
of safety culture and other behavioral and organizational 
factors on PPE usage in healthcare settings. These efforts 
should include 
 
• conducting human factors and ergonomics research 
relevant to the design and organization of healthcare 
work tasks to improve worker safety by reducing 
hazardous exposures and effectively using PPE (e.g., 
reduce unnecessary PPE donning and doffing), 
• exploring the links between patient safety and 
healthcare worker safety and health that are relevant 
to the use of PPE, and 
• identifying and evaluating strategies to mitigate or-
ganizational barriers that limit the use of PPE by 
healthcare personnel.  
 
Recommendation: Identify and Disseminate Effective Lead-
ership and Training Strategies and Other Interventions to 
Improve PPE Use  
NIOSH and other relevant agencies and professional organi-
zations should support intervention effectiveness research to 
assess strategies, including innovative participatory ap-
proaches to training, for healthcare and supervisory staff at 
all levels to improve PPE usage and other related outcomes 
across the range of healthcare settings. To identify best prac-
tices, efforts should be made to 
 
• conduct observational studies of PPE usage by health-
care personnel in different types of work settings; 
• develop, implement, and evaluate comprehensive 
leadership and training strategies and interventions 
that go beyond simple knowledge-based training; 
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• design training interventions specifically for supervi-
sory and managerial personnel in different types of 
healthcare settings; 
• examine long-term practice change and safety culture 
implementation related to educational interventions;  
• improve use and understanding of PPE by home and 
community healthcare personnel;  
• develop assessment tools and metrics that take a 
broader approach to PPE and acknowledge the inter-
action of worker, task, and environmental factors; 
and 
• be informed by a lessons-learned summit on PPE use 
by healthcare personnel during the 2009 H1N1 expe-
rience. 
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Policy Research and Implementation:  
Healthcare Systems, Standards, 
and Certification 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The emergence of 2009 H1N1 influenza and the ensuing dilemmas 
regarding personal protective equipment (PPE) for healthcare personnel 
highlighted challenges in healthcare delivery policy at institutional, state, 
regional, and national levels as well as policies about the relevant stan-
dards and certification processes. This chapter highlights issues regard-
ing standards and policies for PPE for healthcare personnel and 
summarizes the experience and literature on the 2009 H1N1 pandemic 
relevant to PPE. The chapter also provides the committee’s recommenda-
tions on the next policy and regulatory steps needed to address the cur-
rent challenges and improve PPE for healthcare personnel.  
 
 
PPE STANDARDS AND CERTIFICATION 
 
As described in Chapter 1 (with more detail provided in Box 5-1), a 
number of state and federal agencies and organizations have regulatory, 
standards-setting, and policy responsibilities regarding PPE for health-
care personnel. This section highlights several recent and ongoing efforts 
with potential impact on PPE for healthcare personnel, some of which 
require further attention and action.  
 
 
Recent and Ongoing Changes to Standards and Regulations 
 
Two recent regulatory changes implemented by the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) impact workplace access to 
133 
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PPE and voluntary consensus standards. A Final Rule, issued in Novem-
ber 2007, requires employers to provide PPE at no cost to their em-
ployees; this change took the burden of responsibility off the employees, 
who in some cases had been paying for their own protective equipment 
(29 Code of Federal Regulations [CFR] 1910.132; OSHA, 2007). In Sep-
tember 2009, a Final Rule was promulgated to address various revisions 
of the voluntary consensus standards as they applied to several types of 
PPE, including eye and face protection (29 CFR 1910.133), head protec-
tion (29 CFR 1910.135), and foot protection (29 CFR 1910.136; OSHA, 
2009). Because many consensus standards are updated on a regular basis, 
the new OSHA regulations state that the employer needs to supply PPE 
that meets the current voluntary consensus standard or either of the past 
two versions of that standard; thus employers do not have to purchase 
new PPE every time a consensus standard is revised. 
In October 2009, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and 
Health (NIOSH) proposed total inward leakage (TIL) requirements for 
the certification of negative-pressure, tight-fitting respirators. The new 
regulation would require that half-facepiece, air-purifying respirators 
(including filtering facepiece respirators such as the N95 respirator) be fit 
tested to an anthropometrically selected panel of wearers. Respirators 
would need to be able to achieve an acceptable fit to a wide range of 
faces. Two public meetings have been held, and the docket for public 
comments closed in September 2010 (NIOSH, 2010a). NIOSH will eval-
uate the comments received and may then release a final standard. The 
goal is to improve the fit of respirators. 
In 2009, California became the first state in the nation to issue a stan-
dard requiring employers to protect healthcare personnel from influenza 
and other viral respiratory diseases when it promulgated its aerosol-
transmissible diseases standard (California Code of Regulations, 2010). 
This standard uses Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
guidelines and terminology to classify whether an aerosol-transmissible 
disease requires droplet precautions (use of face masks is permitted) or 
requires aerosol precautions (respiratory protection is required using 
N95s at a minimum, and where aerosol-generating procedures are per-
formed, a powered air-purifying respirator [PAPR] or greater level of 
protection is required) (Siegel et al., 2007). Thus, by adopting the CDC 
guidelines, healthcare employers in California would, for example, pro-
tect personnel against seasonal influenza using face masks, while expo-
sures to measles virus would require respirators (N95s or greater). For 
novel or unknown pathogens (e.g., the 2009 H1N1 pandemic influenza 
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virus), the California standard sets the default protection level at airborne 
precautions where use of respirators would be required (California Code 
of Regulations, 2010). 
Recent efforts have also focused on voluntary consensus standards 
development and on third-party conformity assessment. ASTM Interna-
tional announced in April 2010 the establishment of a working group that 
will develop test methods to assess the effectiveness of antimicrobial 
gloves (ASTM International, 2010a). Additionally, a task group within 
the subcommittee on consumer rubber products has begun developing 
standards that focus on preventing the transfer of microorganisms 
through the use of antimicrobial agents (ASTM International, 2010c). 
Furthermore, an ASTM International subcommittee is focused on devel-
oping a product certification process for protective clothing and equip-
ment that would include an option for third-party independent 
verification that the product met the relevant performance standards 
(ASTM International, 2010b).  
 
BOX 5-1 
Existing Standards, Guidelines, and Certification Processes 
 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
Medical device legislation beginning in 1937 and amended in 1976 makes 
the FDA the principal agency for clearing personal protective equipment (PPE) 
for use by healthcare personnel. PPE devices used in healthcare environments 
are considered medical devices and are regulated as either Class I or Class II 
devices. Class I devices are considered low risk to the user, and the basic re-
quirement is that the manufacturer meet general standards for good manufactur-
ing processes. Some Class I devices require that the manufacturer provide a 
510(k) submission and demonstrate that the device meets specific voluntary 
standards and is substantively equivalent to a similar “predicate” device currently 
on the market. Examples of Class I devices that require a 510(k) submission in-
clude surgeon and examination gloves. Class II devices are considered interme-
diate risk and must be cleared through the 510(k) process before they are 
allowed to be marketed. Surgical gowns, face masks, and respirators are also 
categorized as Class II devices.  
The FDA does not conduct tests on medical devices; the agency reviews 
data submitted by manufacturers to demonstrate that the product has been 
tested (by the manufacturer or an independent testing organization) to meet 
specified consensus standards. Respirators are required to be certified by the 
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) and must meet 
additional requirements for flammability and fluid protection. The FDA does not 
have any specific PPE requirements for protection against infectious diseases 
such as influenza. Therefore, masks and  respirators have requirements that  are 
 
continued  
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specifically geared for surgical room use, not for protection against influenza or 
other viral respiratory diseases. The FDA has begun clearing such devices that 
make claims for antiviral protection. 
FDA regulations are designed to control the manufacture and sale of PPE. 
These regulations do not specifically apply to employers or employees. Require-
ments regarding the use of PPE in the healthcare workplace are overseen by the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), along with state and 
local agencies and employers.  
 
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health  
NIOSH is the principal governmental agency with responsibility for testing 
and certifying respirators. The National Personal Protective Technology Labora-
tory (NPPTL) establishes the testing requirements and performs tests on respira-
tors submitted by manufacturers. Testing and certification requirements are 
incorporated in the Code of Federal Regulations (42 CFR Part 84). Once a respi-
rator is certified, the manufacturer is not required to resubmit the device for fur-
ther testing unless modifications are made.  
NIOSH respirator testing and certification requirements are specific to the 
type of respirator (e.g., air-purifying, self-contained breathing apparatus) and are 
not specific to the type of workplace where they will be used. There is no specific 
certification of respirators for healthcare personnel or for protection against infec-
tious agents such as influenza. However, as discussed in Chapter 3, NPPTL staff 
and other researchers have studied the performance of certified filters against 
nanoparticles that would be applicable to virons and also have conducted some 
research with antiviral filters. The NIOSH certification process does not evaluate 
or indicate the efficacy of antiviral treatments that may be applied to filters on 
certified respirators.   
NIOSH does not certify other forms of PPE, such as gloves and goggles, that 
would be relevant to the protection of healthcare personnel. NIOSH staff do par-
ticipate in the development of voluntary consensus standards for other PPE and 
perform some research in these areas (IOM, 2010). 
 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration  
OSHA has the primary responsibility for enforcing the proper use of PPE in 
the workplace, including in healthcare facilities. The two main regulations rele-
vant to PPE use by healthcare personnel relevant to viral respiratory diseases 
are 29 CFR 1910.134, which governs the use of respirators, and 29 CFR 
1910.132, which governs the use of PPE other than respirators. All respirators 
used by healthcare personnel must be NIOSH certified, and their use must be 
part of a respiratory protection program that includes attention to issues regarding 
medical clearance, fit testing (where applicable), and training. OSHA requires 
that other types of PPE meet specified voluntary consensus standards (in some 
cases—e.g., for eye and face protection—OSHA regulations include additional 
specifications as noted in 29 CFR 1910.133). OSHA does not have specific stan-
dards covering the use of PPE by healthcare personnel and does not require that 
such PPE be cleared by the FDA. 
 
Other Agencies and Organizations 
A number of other organizations also impact the use of PPE by healthcare 
personnel. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) provides in-
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fection control guidance,  including guidance on the use of respirators and masks  
by healthcare personnel for protection against influenza. During the 2009 H1N1 
pandemic, the CDC infection control guidelines for healthcare personnel during 
seasonal influenza (which recommend droplet infection control precautions, e.g., 
a face mask for non-aerosol–generating procedures) were changed to recom-
mend airborne precautions involving the use of respirators (respirators are rec-
ommended for aerosol-generating procedures in both). However, some state 
health agencies or local healthcare facilities continued to recommend face masks 
consistent with seasonal influenza guidelines for the use of respirators and 
masks. In summer 2010, the CDC guidelines were revised to reflect the seasonal 
infection control precautions based on availability of an effective vaccine and 
updated knowledge about the risk of hospitalization and death from 2009 H1N1 
influenza (CDC, 2010). 
The Joint Commission provides accreditation for many hospitals and a varie-
ty of other employers of healthcare personnel, such as home healthcare agen-
cies. The use of PPE is included in the Joint Commission’s requirements for 
employers.  
State and local health agencies provide guidance and licensing to employers 
of healthcare personnel. These agencies provide assistance to employers in the 
case of pandemic influenza that may include stockpiling of PPE and offering 
guidance on what type of PPE is appropriate for specific tasks.  
Standards development organizations (such as the American National Stan-
dards Institute and ASTM International) work through professional organizations 
and standards development committees to develop voluntary consensus stan-
dards that specify testing methods and performance expectations.  Standards-
development committees include experts who represent manufacturers, employ-
ers, users, and government regulators. Each standards-development organiza-
tion has its own rules about the balance of these committees and voting. Most 
standards must be updated on a regular basis (e.g., 5 years) or they are with-
drawn. Standards may specify whether PPE must be tested by an independent 
third party or whether the manufacturer can perform the testing. 
 
 
 
Moving Forward on PPE Standards and Certification  
 
Many of the issues that require activity by regulatory agencies for 
worker protection regarding PPE use during pandemic influenza involve 
respirators and masks. Face (eye), hand, and body protection issues all 
involve barriers, such as goggles or face shields, gloves, and gowns, 
which should provide an adequate barrier against influenza transmission 
provided that they cover the exposed area.  
A major challenge in preventing influenza transmission continues to 
be clarifying the modes of transmission (Chapter 2). Occupational safety 
and health principles emphasize the importance of protecting the worker, 
particularly when dealing with hazards of unknown severity or health 
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impacts. For novel respiratory viruses, the committee reiterates the 
statements in the 2008 Institute of Medicine report regarding transmis-
sion of influenza A: “[w]ithout knowing the contributions of each of the 
possible route(s) of transmission, all routes must be considered probable 
and consequential” (IOM, 2008, p. 53). 
As reiterated throughout this report, PPE is one part of a comprehen-
sive infection control program that includes engineering, administrative, 
and workplace controls, including vaccination. Because transmission of 
influenza occurs in the community and does not just occur in healthcare 
settings from patients and coworkers, vaccination—when effective—is a 
preventive measure that offers protection that is not tied to a specific 
workplace setting or on-the-job practices and equipment. 
 
 
Face Masks and Face Shields 
 
As discussed throughout this report, one of the most contentious is-
sues regarding PPE to prevent influenza transmission is the use of masks 
versus respirators. Protection of healthcare personnel is paramount in 
these discussions. For employers, the issues to consider include purchase 
and training costs. As discussed in Chapter 3, more research is needed to 
determine the extent and nature of the protection that face masks and 
face shields can provide against viral respiratory disease transmission; a 
role in providing contact and droplet spray has been suggested but re-
mains unclear. As information becomes available that clarifies the PPE 
role that face masks and face shields play in preventing transmission of 
viral respiratory diseases, voluntary consensus standards and certification 
processes will need to be developed, implemented, and refined so that 
healthcare personnel and other consumers will have information on the 
effectiveness of these products.  
OSHA’s respiratory protection standard (29 CFR 1910.134) includes 
requirements for the selection, use, and maintenance of respirators.  
Since face masks are not respirators, they are not covered by this stan-
dard. OSHA general PPE standard (29 CFR 1910.132) applies to face 
shields and face masks; however, specific performance standards or other 
design or performance criteria for these products are not included in this 
OSHA regulation. To move forward with this issue, OSHA could work 
with other agencies and organizations to identify relevant voluntary 
consensus standard requirements and consider if selection, mainten-
ance, storage, and inspection requirements for face masks and face 
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shields should be detailed in OSHA regulations to provide further protec-
tion for healthcare personnel.  
 
 
Respirators  
 
Fit and fit testing  Several significant policy and regulatory issues exist 
regarding respirator fit and fit testing that could impact healthcare worker 
safety and health in the midst of an influenza pandemic or an outbreak of 
a novel viral respiratory disease. During an emergency situation, em-
ployers may run out of respirators that have been fit tested on personnel 
and may be unable to obtain additional supplies from the same manufac-
turer or an emergency stockpile. If supplies of other types of respirators 
are available, then OSHA requirements stipulate the need for repeat fit 
testing with the new type of respirator to ensure proper fit and protection 
(29 CFR 1910.134). The challenge during an emergency situation could 
be the need to do fit testing for large numbers of workers in a short pe-
riod of time. Therefore, a user seal check or other quick method of de-
termining the fit of a respirator needs to be developed and recommended 
by NIOSH and/or OSHA as a temporary measure to be used during 
emergencies until the required fit testing can be completed.  
A second issue is that the current NIOSH respirator certification pro-
gram has no requirement for a TIL test for filtering facepiece respirators 
(e.g., many N95 respirators). Therefore, a respirator may be NIOSH cer-
tified for filtration efficiency, but have poor-fitting characteristics and be 
unable to fit a large number of workers. When health agencies or em-
ployers stockpile respirators, they may choose devices based on cost and 
availability but may not have the knowledge about how well the device 
will fit their population. This issue became widely recognized during the 
2009 H1N1 pandemic when a California stockpile of respirators was 
used and healthcare personnel could not obtain a satisfactory fit (NIOSH, 
2010b). The proposed respirator TIL regulations would assist in ad-
dressing this issue and provide employers and workers with better fit-
ting respirators. 
 
 
PAPRs  During an influenza pandemic, some healthcare personnel who 
do not normally wear respirators may need to wear them. These individ-
uals are unlikely to be able to obtain a respirator fit test in a timely man-
ner. In addition, some individuals may have facial hair or other facial 
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features that do not allow them to be fitted adequately to a typical N95 or 
other tight-fitting respirator. These individuals would need to be assigned 
a loose-fitting PAPR. These types of respirators provide forced-flow fil-
tered air but currently have high noise levels that are not conducive to 
healthcare tasks and patient interactions, including speech perception and 
listening to chest sounds. Efforts are underway by the National Personal 
Protective Technology Laboratory (NPPTL) to develop regulations for 
testing and approving lower flow PAPRs that would provide acceptable 
respiratory protection in a healthcare environment but emit less noise and 
thus be more useful for healthcare work that requires communication 
with patients. Expediting these efforts is critical to improving PPE for 
healthcare personnel.  
 
 
Aerosol-transmissible disease standard  As noted above, California 
adopted an aerosol-transmissible diseases standard in 2009 (California 
Code of Regulations, 2010). The standard includes a list of diseases and 
pathogens that require airborne precautions as outlined by CDC, includ-
ing “novel or unknown pathogens” (California Code of Regulations, 
2010). The scope of airborne precaution measures includes the require-
ment for “at least the use of an N95 respirator” (Jensen et al., 2005). Dur-
ing the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, the California standard was the only 
workplace standard in the United States that required a mandatory level 
of worker protection to be provided to healthcare personnel. Other state 
and local health departments had access to the CDC and OSHA guid-
ance, but practices at healthcare facilities varied in whether and when 
they followed airborne or droplet infection control precautions. In May 
2010, OSHA issued a Federal Register notice requesting information on 
occupational exposure to infectious agents in health care and related set-
tings (e.g., laboratories, medical examiner offices) (OSHA, 2010). 
OSHA needs to work toward the development of an aerosol-
transmissible diseases standard that would provide adequate protection 
for healthcare personnel and that would, in situations of unknown or 
novel pathogens, default to providing full respiratory protection until 
more was known about the lethality or contagiousness of the disease.  
 
 
Other regulatory issues  To gain approval for marketing as a medical 
device, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) stipulates that the res-
pirators must be NIOSH certified and meet flammability and fluid pro-
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tection standards; these standards are not relevant for most situations in 
which workers must be protected from influenza. During the recent pan-
demic, the FDA identified non-cleared respirators that would be accepta-
ble for healthcare personnel. To alleviate this issue for future crises, the 
FDA could consider a separate 510(k) requirement that allows manufac-
turers to market any appropriate NIOSH-certified respirator during an 
influenza pandemic. This would rapidly allow all certified respirators to 
be available for use by healthcare personnel.  
 
 
LESSONS LEARNED FROM 2009 H1N1 POLICIES 
RELEVANT TO PPE FOR HEALTHCARE PERSONNEL 
  
 The arrival of novel H1N1 influenza A in 2009 was accompanied by 
a number of policy questions relevant to PPE. The lack of precise infor-
mation about the modes of influenza transmission, the contagiousness, 
the virulence of novel H1N1 influenza A, the at-risk population, and the 
efficacy of different devices in preventing transmission led to a variety of 
recommendations at different times by federal and local government 
public health agencies. Delayed and/or disparate recommendations often 
led to confusion among healthcare personnel and their employers, who 
had to decide what to tell personnel about what type of PPE to wear and 
when. In addition, little research was available to guide health system 
officials in making decisions about the quantities of various types of PPE 
needed to protect their workforce. A major problem encountered was a 
slow response in tailoring recommendations as more knowledge about 
virulence and affected populations became available.  
The committee looked to two examples of response to 2009 H1N1 
(New York City [NYC] and Northern Virginia), with information pro-
vided by committee members, workshop speakers, and individual inter-
views. Northern Virginia hospitals, for example, developed standardized 
infection control policies that included a definition of high-risk workers. 
To address supply chain shortfalls, the 14 member hospitals of the 
Northern Virginia Hospital Alliance (NVHA) agreed to follow CDC res-
pirator guidelines until no longer practical. As a matter of practice, hos-
pitals modified the CDC guidelines in regards to PPE requirements for 
non-high-risk workers, especially as it became clear in fall 2009 that the 
virulence of 2009 H1N1 was similar to seasonal influenza viruses (Per-
sonal communication, Zachary Corrigan, NVHA, 2010).  
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In NYC, the fire department emphasized the need for paramedics and 
emergency medical technicians to use N95 respirators as they work in 
the pre-hospital environment where environmental controls do not exist. 
When the H1N1 virus first emerged, the NYC Department of Health and 
Mental Hygiene and the New York State department of health initially 
recommended N95 respirators but then scaled back the recommendations 
to face masks to be consistent with seasonal influenza recommendations 
once it was determined that the virulence and transmissibility were simi-
lar to seasonal influenza. However, once CDC published its interim in-
fection control guidance in October 2009, the New York city and state 
departments of health revised their guidance to be consistent with the 
federal recommendations for N95 respirators. In anticipation of the 
second wave of H1N1 returning in Fall 2009, the city health department, 
working with the NYC Office of Emergency Management, convened 
regular healthcare emergency planning meetings to improve hospital and 
primary care preparedness. The NYC health department also put in place 
a program to provide additional N95 respirators from a local government 
stockpile for healthcare facilities experiencing supply shortages during 
the 2009 pandemic (Personal communication, David Prezant, New York 
City Fire Department).  
 
 
PPE Policies During the Novel H1N1 Influenza Pandemic 
 
During the initial phase of the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic, in-
fection control guidelines from some of the major public health organiza-
tions differed, primarily as related to respiratory protection (Table 5-1). 
The World Health Organization (WHO) recommended standard and 
droplet precautions (including a face mask, a gown, gloves, eye protec-
tion, and hand hygiene) for those working in direct contact with patients, 
and additional precautions for aerosol-generating procedures, including 
wearing a facial particulate respirator (WHO, 2009). The WHO recom-
mendations took into account the need for sustainability in a variety of 
countries and encouraged each country to issue its own guidelines. CDC 
recommended a fit tested, disposable N95 respirator or better for health-
care personnel who enter the rooms of patients in isolation with sus-
pected or confirmed novel H1N1 influenza (CDC, 2009b). For 
emergency medical responders, CDC recommended a fit tested, dispos-
able N95 respirator for those personnel “who are in close contact” with 
patients with confirmed or suspected 2009 H1N1, for personnel “en-
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gaged in aerosol generating activities,” and for personnel involved in the 
“interfacility transfer” of patients with suspected or confirmed 2009 H1N1 
(CDC, 2009a). The Public Health Agency of Canada used a tiered ap-
proach that recommended N95 use for aerosol-generating procedures 
with direct patient contact only (PHAC, 2009a,b,c,d).  
 
 
Overview of Recent Policy Research 
 
 Research on healthcare policies and their implementation is lacking 
as it pertains to the use of PPE. Given the many PPE policy issues during  
 
TABLE 5-1 Overview of 2009–2010 H1N1 Policies and Practices 
Regarding Personal Protective Equipment and H1N1 Influenza 
  
CDC 
Guidance 
4/29/09 
Novel 
Pandemic 
Influenza  
 
CDC 
Guidance 
10/15/09 
Novel 
Pandemic 
Influenza 
 
 
CDC 
Guidance for
Seasonal 
Influenza 
9/20/10 
 
 
 
 
 
WHO 
Guidance 
Public 
Health 
Agency of 
Canada  
Guidance 
for Novel 
H1N1 
Recommended 
level of infection
control 
precautions  
 
Standard 
and contact 
precautions 
and eye 
protection 
 
Standard 
and droplet 
precautions 
Adhere to 
standard 
and droplet 
precautions 
Standard 
and droplet 
precautions
Tiered 
approach 
Recommended 
respiratory 
PPE  
NIOSH-
certified 
N95 
respirator 
NIOSH-
certified 
N95 
respirator 
Face mask 
except for 
aerosol-
generating 
procedures, 
use N95 or 
better 
 
Face mask 
except for 
aerosol-
generating 
procedures 
 
Face mask 
except for 
aerosol-
generating 
procedures 
 
Did the respi-
ratory PPE 
recommenda-
tion differ by 
work task? 
Yes—
direct care 
versus 
indirect 
patient 
contact 
Yes—
direct care 
versus 
indirect 
patient 
contact 
Yes—
direct care 
versus 
aerosol- 
generating 
procedures 
Yes Yes 
NOTE: CDC = Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; NIOSH = National Institute 
for Occupational Safety and Health; PPE = personal protective equipment; WHO = 
World Health Organization. 
SOURCES: CDC (2009a,b); PHAC (2009a,b,c,d); WHO (2009). 
Copyright © National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
Preventing Transmission of Pandemic Influenza and Other Viral Respiratory Diseases:  Personal Protective Equipment for Healthcare Workers: Update 2010
144 PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT FOR HEALTHCARE PERSONNEL 
 
the initial stages of 2009 H1N1, more papers are likely to be forthcoming 
as healthcare institutions document their experiences and researchers 
have the opportunity to publish their findings. This section reviews some 
of the research and summaries published since 2007 regarding policies 
on PPE use. Because PPE is one part of infection control strategies, some 
of the communications and emergency planning aspects are part of a 
larger discussion on pandemic planning (see, e.g., Daugherty et al., 
2010). 
 
 
Supplies of PPE 
 
One issue faced during 2009 H1N1 was ensuring that healthcare fa-
cilities had adequate supplies of PPE and other supplies. As noted in an 
article by Rebmann and Wagner (2009), less than a month after the first 
case of laboratory-confirmed novel H1N1 was reported in the United 
States, CDC had deployed 25 percent of the Strategic National Stockpile 
(SNS) of N95 respirators. A focus group study of infection control spe-
cialists identified issues faced in the first months of the pandemic 
(Rebmann and Wagner, 2009). Supply issues of prime concern included 
running out of respirators or certain sizes of respirators and facing back 
orders early in the pandemic. Similar supply issues were seen in the early 
months of the pandemic in Australia, with concerns noted about the 
amount of time and quantity of PPE supplies retrieved from the SNS 
(Eizenberg, 2009). 
Determining the quantities of PPE required was the focus of a report 
by Murray and colleagues (2010) that examined the use of facial protective 
equipment from late June through mid-December 2009 in three Vancou-
ver, Canada, hospitals. During that time, 865 patients with suspected cases 
of H1N1 influenza were admitted, with 149 patients having laboratory-
confirmed H1N1 influenza infection; 134,281 masks and 173,145 N95 
respirators were used. Comparisons were made of the number of respira-
tors, masks, and protective eyewear used within the same period in 2008, 
with increases of 107 percent in the number of respirators, 70 percent in 
the number of eyewear, and 196 percent in the number of masks. The 
authors reported that the Ministry of Health plans for pandemic influenza 
called for hospitals to have a 10-week supply of PPE equipment, but they 
did not account for increases in the supplies that would be needed.  
Two reports provide detailed descriptions of the planning process 
used by the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs to determine the quanti-
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ties and types of PPE needed to respond to pandemic influenza. This 
process included considerations of many factors that weighed into those 
decisions, such as the anticipated number of patients, the number of 
healthcare worker contacts per patient, PPE needs, and cost (Koenig et 
al., 2007; Radonovich et al., 2009).  
The Northern Virginia Regional Hospital Coordinating Center, the 
operational arm of the Northern Virginia Hospital Allliance Emergency 
Preparedness and Response Program, reported that member hospitals 
developed regional stockpiles of respiratory PPE based on a risk stratifi-
cation of their personnel. They used OSHA’s occupational risk pyramid 
for pandemic influenza to estimate the numbers of personnel at higher 
risk and then used a formula that considered the size of the facility and 
the number of providers to get final estimates for distribution. Supplies 
of PAPRs, reusable elastomeric N95 respirators, disposable N95 respi-
rators, and surgical masks were provided to member hospitals from re-
gional stockpiles (Personal communication, Zachary Corrigan, NVHA, 
2010). 
Several studies have made initial attempts to estimate the quantity 
of PPE needed, but further work on predictive models is needed. 
Swaminathan and colleagues (2007) conducted a simulation study in 
nine Australian hospital emergency departments designed to evaluate the 
number of contacts between patients and healthcare personnel and to de-
termine the number of types of PPE that would be required. Compliance 
of healthcare personnel in using the appropriate PPE was also examined. 
The study focused on only the first 6 hours of contact1 with a suspected 
case. The researchers reported an average of 12 close contacts, with 19 
exposures per “case,” and estimated that approximately 20 N95 respira-
tors, 22 gowns, and 25 gloves would have been required to protect 
healthcare personnel during the first 6 hours of care. Given the rates of 
compliance noted in this study, up to 40 percent of healthcare personnel 
may have required post-exposure prophylaxis. This study provides some 
initial objective evidence regarding the numbers of PPE sets that might 
be required, but it was limited by its short duration of only 6 hours and 
by the simulation of a patient who was not critically ill. Similar types of 
research that extend the observation duration and simulate more severe 
illness would be helpful in estimating PPE requirements.  
In Japan, Hashikura and Kizu (2009) used the severe acute respirato-
ry syndrome outbreak as a paradigm for PPE use. The researchers re-
 
1Close contact was defined as being within 1 meter of a patient or within an isolation 
room. 
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viewed the literature and the guidelines on PPE use from many countries, 
and then estimated the numbers of PPE ensembles that would be required 
during a pandemic, using information on the type of pandemic, type of 
healthcare worker, and numbers of PPE ensembles per classification per 
day. They estimated (using OSHA recommendations) that four sets 
(N95, gloves, gowns, and goggles) would be used per day by high-risk 
healthcare personnel, who are defined as persons performing high-risk 
procedures, such as intubations, suctioning, and manipulating respiratory 
equipment. Two sets of appropriate PPE was the estimate for medium- 
and low-risk healthcare personnel (this included an N95 respirator for 
medium-risk and a surgical mask for low-risk workers). The researchers 
also estimated that two surgical masks would be required for every in-
patient and one for every out-patient. They then estimated the total num-
bers of PPE required for a 300-bed hospital during an 8-week pandemic—
nearly 20,000 N95 respirators, 122,000 surgical masks, 21,000 goggles 
and gowns, and 172,000 pairs of gloves would be needed. This study 
provides an initial start on the question of estimated quantities, but is 
theoretical and based only on published recommendation guidelines. The 
methodology is logical, but needs to be validated. Data on actual use of 
PPE by a hospital is needed to compare the accuracy of the predictions.  
A study comparing single-use versus reusable surgical gowns high-
lights another area of discussion regarding costs and quantity of supplies. 
Baykasoglu and colleagues (2009) conducted a cost/benefit study that 
considered a number of factors, including laundry, sterilization, and 
waste disposal costs, as well as the extent of protection and functionality. 
The study determined that the single-use sets had higher benefits, but 
when costs were considered, the more expensive reusable sets had higher 
benefit/cost ratios. This area of research and modeling could provide 
practical insights, particularly as effective decontamination processes 
become defined.  
 
 
H1N1 Experiences with Use of PPE by Healthcare Personnel 
 
Evidence of transmission to healthcare personnel was reported dur-
ing the pandemic, indicating the need for comprehensive PPE policies. 
Santos and colleagues (2010) examined an NYC hospital’s absentee 
records for 3 months (April through June 2009) and compared the results 
with the same periods in 2007 and 2008. The researchers found that 
healthcare personnel in the adult and pediatric emergency departments 
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had the highest infection rate per department. The peak of influenza in 
healthcare personnel was noted to have lagged slightly behind the peak 
in the general public.  
The literature on policies put in place during 2009 H1N1 will likely 
grow in the next several years. At this point only a few articles have been 
published that focus on PPE use during the initial phases of H1N1. Early 
in the epidemic, Perez-Padilla and colleagues (2009) reported their expe-
rience in Mexico City. They focused on the clinical presentation of 
H1N1, but also noted information on the transmission of disease to 
healthcare personnel. The report noted that 22 of 190 workers who be-
came infected had been involved in caring for the first 3 H1N1 patients 
in a series of 18 patients admitted during the first month of the pandemic 
in spring 2009. These included 19 out of 104 emergency department 
workers who had been within 2 meters of a patient or had direct contact 
with a patient. These 22 workers had mild to moderate disease, and none 
required hospitalization. The hospital then instituted strict infection con-
trol measures, including N95s, gowns, gloves, goggles, and hand hy-
giene, and noted that no additional workers became ill with influenza-
like illness, although 26 did have varied respiratory symptoms and were 
treated with oseltamavir.  
Focus group discussions with a group of infection preventionists in 
the United States pointed out the logistical issues that were faced in the 
first months of the pandemic in trying to fit test a large number of staff 
(Rebmann and Wagner, 2009) as well as the challenges in determining 
whether and when to recommend the use of face masks or respirators. Of 
the focus group participants, approximately one-third said that PPE-use 
guidelines changed at their facilities about halfway through the event.  
A survey of healthcare epidemiologists, administrators, and other 
members of the Society for Healthcare Epidemiology of America in May 
2009 found that 19.3 percent of respondents strongly agreed and 52.7 
percent agreed that “the recommendation for airborne precautions for 
suspected H1N1 cases was appropriate at the beginning of the H1N1 cri-
sis” at his or her institution (Lautenbach et al., 2010, p. 3). When asked 
whether airborne precautions for suspected cases were appropriate 
throughout the H1N1 crisis, 7.5 percent strongly agreed and 17.5 percent 
agreed. Supplies of N95s were a concern with some respondents; 16.9 
percent disagreed and 8.8 percent strongly disagreed with the statement 
that “N95 masks were readily available throughout the H1N1 crisis at my 
institution” (Lautenbach et al., 2010, p. 3).  
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Changes in PPE guidelines were an issue for healthcare personnel in 
Australia, as identified in a questionnaire and focus group study (Corley 
et al., 2010). Healthcare staff reported confusion over the changing re-
quirements and noted that this led to staff feeling “undervalued” and 
“unprotected.” Discomfort in wearing a respirator for a 12-hour shift 
with maybe a 1- to 1.5-hour break was noted as a challenge, as was the 
considerable amount of time spent on donning and doffing PPE.  
The need to reinforce education and communication about PPE and 
other infection control processes for pre-hospital healthcare personnel, 
including paramedics, was noted as one of the key lessons learned in the 
H1N1 pandemic by a group reviewing the response in Victoria, Australia 
(Smith et al., 2009).  
Prior to the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, simulations and other planning ef-
forts included a focus on PPE issues and policies. Phin and colleagues 
(2009) assessed a 24-hour simulation exercise in England and high-
lighted PPE cost and procurement issues as well as issues involving the 
storage of PPE supplies and increases in the amount of trash generated. 
The exercise noted unnecessary staff movement related to delivery of 
supplies and provision of services that also impacted PPE use. A review 
of emergency plans in three Ontario hospitals noted a number of PPE 
issues, including addressing fit testing requirements; regular training, 
including practice drills; stockpiling, warehousing, and inventory man-
agement; and storage and maintenance of PPE (Amaratunga et al., 2007). 
An extensive planning effort by a task force of the European Society of 
Intensive Care Medicine addressed a range of policy issues related to 
pandemic planning, including the need to develop protocols for safe per-
formance of procedures (including aerosol-generating procedures) that 
might put personnel at risk (Sprung et al., 2010). Training regarding PPE 
and an organizational culture that promotes safety were also discussed.  
 
 
SUMMARY OF PROGRESS 
 
 Preparations and implementation of infection control plans for 2009 
H1N1 influenza brought into sharp focus the efforts by healthcare pro-
fessionals, emergency planners, professional associations, healthcare fa-
cilities, policy makers, government agencies, labor unions, and others to 
address PPE policies and logistics. Articles continue to be published on 
the recent experience and the challenges and successes in providing face 
masks, respirators, and other PPE to healthcare personnel. As lessons 
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learned during that experience continue to add to the body of knowledge, 
incorporating this information into research, policy, and practice efforts 
will be important. In the initial phases of an epidemic or pandemic—
when there are many unknowns about the virus or agent—one of the 
challenges is to determine PPE policy and then to adapt those policies as 
information is gained on the severity, transmission, and nature of the dis-
ease with an emphasis on communicating those changes. Standards-
setting, regulatory, training, and research efforts continue to move to-
ward improved respiratory protection, and recent work has begun to fo-
cus on the specifics of how to tailor PPE devices and PPE training to 
address the specific needs of healthcare personnel. 
 
 
FINDINGS AND RESEARCH NEEDS 
 
 This chapter has provided an overview of the many policy and regu-
latory issues relevant to developing and improving PPE for healthcare 
personnel. The committee’s findings (outlined in Box 5-2) and research 
needs and recommendations (below) point to the many opportunities 
available, making now a particularly urgent time to build on recent expe-
riences and needs and to move forward with the policy research and reg-
ulatory changes that will improve protection for healthcare personnel.  
 The committee highlights the following research needs:  
 
• Lessons learned from the 2009 H1N1 policies relevant to 
PPE: Case studies of the implementation of 2009 H1N1 PPE-
related policies should be gathered and evaluated.  
• PPE supply estimates: Studies are needed that compare theoret-
ical models of estimating quantities of PPE for emergency pre-
paredness with recent experience to inform future public health 
planning.  
• Cost-effectiveness research: Research is needed into cost-
effectiveness issues relevant to PPE, including issues of disposa-
ble and reusable equipment. 
• Impact of public health guidance: Prospective research efforts 
should examine the impact of public health guidance on PPE 
compliance by state, local, and health system policy; clinical 
practice; and costs. 
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BOX 5-2   
Findings 
 
• Public health guidance regarding personal protective equipment (PPE) 
use for protection from novel viral respiratory infections needs to be 
timely, flexible, and consistent and should require the appropriate PPE 
based on what is known at the time about transmission and virulence. 
• Public health policy regarding PPE use for healthcare personnel’s pro-
tection from viral respiratory infections needs to recognize that trans-
mission occurs in the community from family and friends as well as in 
the work environment from patients and coworkers. Recognition of this 
fact is the foundation for an aggressive vaccination program for health-
care personnel.  
 
 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Recommendation:  Move Forward on Better Fitting Respirators 
NPPTL should continue rulemaking processes for TIL regu-
lations that require respirators to meet fit criteria. To im-
prove consumer and purchaser information on fit capa-
bilities, NIOSH should establish a website to disseminate fit 
test results for specific respirator models on an anthropomet-
ric (NIOSH) test panel, where such data exist.  
 
Recommendation:  Clarify PPE Guidelines for Outbreaks of 
Novel Viral Respiratory Infections 
NIOSH, other CDC divisions, OSHA, and other public 
health agencies should develop a coordinated process to 
make, announce, and revise consistent guidelines regarding 
the use of PPE to be worn by healthcare personnel during a 
verified, sustained national/international outbreak of a novel 
viral respiratory infection. The agencies should tailor their 
guidance in a timely and coordinated manner as the viru-
lence, contagiousness, and affected populations are further 
characterized.  
 
Recommendation:  Standards and Certification for Face Masks 
and Face Shields 
NIOSH, OSHA, and standards-development organizations 
should develop the standards and certification processes 
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needed to assess the performance of face masks and face 
shields as PPE. The development of standards and certifica-
tion processes should be guided by research regarding their 
efficacy as PPE. 
 
• OSHA and CDC should clarify that face masks are 
governed by the general PPE standard (29 CFR 
1910.132) and not by the respiratory protection stan-
dard (29 CFR 1910.134).   
• NIOSH should work with other agencies and standards-
setting organizations to develop voluntary consensus 
standards and independent third-party testing and 
certification processes for face shields and face 
masks, with specific tests for assessing prevention of 
transmission of viral respiratory diseases. 
 
Recommendation:  Establish PPE Regulations for Healthcare 
Personnel 
CDC, including NIOSH, and OSHA should develop and 
promulgate guidelines and regulations that are consistent re-
garding the use of PPE by healthcare personnel for influenza 
and other viral respiratory diseases: 
 
• To assist employers in complying with the OSHA 
PPE standard, OSHA should specify the voluntary 
consensus standards that are required to be met for 
non-respirator PPE (e.g., gowns, gloves, face shields, 
face masks) in the event of influenza and other viral 
respiratory diseases. 
• OSHA, with input from CDC and other agencies and 
organizations, should work toward promulgating an 
aerosol-transmissible diseases standard that would 
include prevention of the transmission of influenza 
and other viral respiratory diseases.  
 
As noted throughout the chapters, this report is an update of a prior 
IOM report. In surveying the landscape of research that has been con-
ducted since the 2008 report and even in the wake of the 2009 H1N1 in-
fluenza pandemic, the committee was struck by the lack of urgency in 
addressing the basic, applied, and clinical research questions that, if an-
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swered, would go a long way toward improving preparedness and pre-
vention against future influenza epidemics and pandemics and outbreaks 
of other respiratory viral agents. Looking back is often a way to propel 
efforts in moving forward. The committee hopes that this review will 
jumpstart and strengthen improvements in PPE for healthcare personnel 
that could be relevant to a range of viral respiratory diseases. 
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Workshop Agenda 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The National Academy of Sciences 
Board Room 
2100 C Street, NW 
Washington, DC  
 
Meeting Agenda 
 
Thursday, February 25, 2010 
 
11:00 a.m. Welcome and Introductions 
 Elaine Larson, Committee Chair 
  
Sponsor’s Charge to the Committee and Background 
Information  
Maryann D’Alessandro, Associate Director for Science, 
National Personal Protective Technology Laboratory 
(NPPTL), National Institute for Occupational Safety 
and Health (NIOSH) 
Les Boord, Director, NPPTL, NIOSH 
David Weissman, NIOSH Healthcare Program Manager 
Roland Berry Ann, Deputy Director, NPPTL 
 
 Discussion 
 
12:45 p.m. Lunch 
 
1:30 p.m. Context for the Study 
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1:30–2:30 Current NPPTL Research on Personal Protective 
Equipment (PPE) and Influenza  
 Ron Shaffer, NPPTL 
 
Discussion 
 
2:30–3:30 Project B.R.E.A.T.H.E. and the Respiratory 
Protection Clinical Effectiveness Trial 
Lewis Radonovich, Director, National Center for 
 Occupational Health and Infection Control, 
 Veterans Health Administration 
  
 Discussion  
 
3:30 p.m. Adjourn 
 
 
 
 
Institute of Medicine 
Current Research Issues—Personal Protective Equipment for 
Healthcare Workers to Prevent Transmission of Pandemic Influenza 
and Other Viral Respiratory Infections 
 
WORKSHOP 
 
Venable Conference Center 
575 Seventh Street, NW 
Capitol Room–Eighth Floor 
Washington, DC 
 
Thursday, June 3, 2010 
 
Objectives: 
• Provide an overview of recent research (2007–2010) 
• Identify lessons learned from the 2009–2010 H1N1 pandemic relevant 
to PPE for healthcare workers 
• Identify research gaps and directions needed for future research 
 
8:00 a.m. Welcome and Opening Remarks 
Elaine Larson, Chair, Committee on Personal Protective 
Equipment for Healthcare Workers to Prevent 
Transmission of Pandemic Influenza and Other Viral 
Respiratory Infections: Current Research Issues 
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8:15 a.m.   Panel 1: Research on Influenza Transmission 
Facilitators: Peter Palese, Allison Aiello 
 
8:15–8:30  Update on animal studies 
  Daniel Perez, University of Maryland  
8:30–8:45  Update on environmental monitoring studies 
  Bill Lindsley, NIOSH  
8:45–9:00  Update on aerosol-dispersion modeling studies 
  Mark Nicas, University of California–Berkeley  
9:00–9:15  Update on nosocomial transmission studies 
  Caroline Breese Hall, University of Rochester 
9:15–9:30  Update on human challenge studies 
  Jonathan Van-Tam, University of Nottingham 
  9:30–10:00 Discussion with the committee  
 
10:00 a.m.   Panel 2: Research on Advances in PPE Technology 
Facilitators: Karen Coyne, Howard Cohen, Ken Gall, Bill 
Kojola 
 
10:00–10:25 Update on mask and respirator technology  
  Lisa Brosseau, University of Minnesota   
10:25–10:40 Update on PPE performance in preventing 
influenza transmission  
   Joe Wander, U.S. Air Force 
 10:40–10:55 Update on human interface research and 
materials technology 
  Sundaresan Jayaraman, Georgia Institute of 
Technology 
 10:55–11:10 Update on face shield/eye protection technology 
   Gilad Shoham, Medonyx, Inc.  
 11:10–11:25 Update on gown and glove technology  
   Vicki Barbur, Cardinal Health  
 11:25–12:00 Discussion with the committee 
 
12:00 p.m.   Lunch 
 
12:45 p.m.   Panel 3: PPE Implementation—Observational and 
Clinical Studies 
Facilitators: Richard Wenzel, Allison McGeer, and Bob Cohen 
 
12:45–1:00 Observational studies on PPE use by healthcare 
workers and barriers to use  
 Annalee Yassi, University of British Columbia 
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1:00–1:15  Implementation of PPE programs in California 
during the 2009–2010 flu season  
  Robert Harrison, University of California–San 
Francisco  
 1:15–1:30  Update on clinical studies 
 Trish Perl, Johns Hopkins University  
1:30–1:45  Proposed clinical study 
  Lewis Radonovich, U.S. Department of Veterans 
Affairs 
1:45–2:15  Discussion with the committee 
 
2:15 p.m.   Panel 4: PPE Implementation—Individual and 
Organizational Studies 
 Facilitators: Bonnie Rogers and David DeJoy 
   
2:15–2:30 Update on research on organizations and worker 
safety culture 
  David Hofmann, University of North Carolina  
2:30–2:45 Update on research on organizational and team 
learning 
  Ingrid Nembhard, Yale University 
2:45–3:00 Dental community experience 
  John Molinari, University of Detroit  
3:00–3:15 Update on research on home and community 
healthcare workers’ use of PPE 
  Ruth Ann Ellison, Apria Healthcare 
3:15–3:45 Discussion with the committee 
 
3:45 p.m.   Panel 5: PPE Implementation—International and U.S. 
Policy Research Perspective on the H1N1 Experience with 
PPE 
Facilitators: Gloria Addo-Ayensu and David Prezant 
 
3:45–4:00 Australia’s experience with H1N1 and PPE 
 Dominic Dwyer, Westmead Hospital (via phone) 
4:00–4:15 Mexico’s experience with H1N1 and PPE 
 Rogelio Perez-Padilla, Instituto Nacional de 
Enfermedades Respiratorias (via phone) 
4:15–4:30 New York City’s experience with H1N1 and 
PPE 
Marcelle Layton, New York City Department of 
Health and Mental Hygiene  
4:30–4:45 Update on policy research 
 David Henderson, National Institutes of Health  
4:45–5:15 Discussion with the committee 
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5:15 p.m.   Public Comment—Registered Speakers (3 minutes per 
speaker) 
 Moderator, Elaine Larson 
 
• Gamunu Wijetunge, National Highway Traffic Safety  
 Administration 
• Donald Milton, University of Maryland 
• Nicole McCullough, 3M 
• Kathy Robinson, National Association of State EMS 
Officials 
• Eileen Storey, NIOSH 
• Robert Guidos, Infectious Diseases Society of America  
• William Borwegen, Service Employees International 
Union 
• Judene Bartley, Epidemiology Consulting Services, APIC  
 Representative 
• Padma Natarajan, Infectious Diseases Society of America 
• Leslie McGorman, Infectious Diseases Society of 
America  
• Korlu Kuyon, Maryland Department of Health and 
Mental Hygiene, Perkins Hospital Center 
 
6:00 p.m.   Summary 
Howard Cohen and Richard Wenzel 
 
6:15 p.m.   Adjourn
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TABLE C-1 Studies of the Clinical Effectiveness of Personal Protective 
Equipment During Outbreaks of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome 
and Respiratory Syncytial Virus 
Reference Description Results 
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) 
Seto et al., 
2003 
Case-control study in 
five Hong Kong 
hospitals of 13 
SARS-infected staff 
and 241 non-infected 
staff 
Odds ratio of staff with specific protection 
not getting infected: 
• Masks: OR= 13 (95% CI 3 to 60, p = 
 0.0001) 
• Gloves: OR = 2 (95% CI 0.6 to 7, p = 
 0.364) 
• Gowns: OR not calculated 
• Handwashing: OR = 5 (95% CI 1 to 19, 
 p = 0.047) 
 
Lau et al., 2004 Case-control study in 
Hong Kong of 72 
hospital workers 
with SARS and 144 
matched controls  
• Risk of SARS infection in those report-
ing problems with mask fit: OR = 1.00 
(95% CI 0.51 to 1.95, p = 1.0000) 
• Risk of SARS infection in those who had 
problems with fogging of goggles: OR = 
0.61 (95% CI 0.31 to 1.17) 
 
Continued  
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Reference Description Results 
Loeb et al., 
2004 
Retrospective cohort 
study of 43 nurses 
working with SARS 
patients in Toronto 
critical care units  
Risk of acquiring SARS based on use of 
PPE: 
• Gown: RR = 0.36 (95% CI 0.10 to 1.24, 
 p = 0.12) 
• Gloves: RR = 0.45 (95% CI 0.14 to 1.46, 
 p = 0.22) 
• N95 (respirator at least once) or surgical 
mask: RR = 0.23 (95% CI 0.07 to 0.78, 
p  = .02) 
• N95: RR = 0.22 (95% CI 0.05 to 0.93,  
p = 0.06) 
• Surgical mask:a RR = 0.45 (95% CI 0.07 
 to 2.71, p = 0.56) 
• N95 vs. surgical mask:b RR = 0.50 (95% 
 CI 0.06 to 4.23, p = 0.51)  
 
Teleman et 
al., 2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Case-control study in 
Singapore of 36 
healthcare workers 
with probable SARS 
and 50 healthcare 
workers in the same 
ward with history of 
exposure  
 
Adjusted odds ratio (multivariate analysis) 
associated with transmission of SARS: 
• Wearing of N95 mask: 0.1 (95% CI 0.02 
 to 0.9, p = 0.04) 
• Wearing of gloves: 1.5 (95% CI 0.3 to 
 7.2, p = 0.6) 
• Wearing of gowns: 0.5 (95% CI 0.4 to 
 6.9, p = 0.6) 
• Handwashing after each patient: 0.07 
 (95% CI 0.008 to 0.7, p = 0.02)  
 
Respiratory Syncytial Virus (RSV) 
Hall and 
Douglas, 
1981 
Comparison of use 
and nonuse of gowns 
and masks by staff 
members on a pedia-
tric ward with child-
ren < 3 years old 
 
• Proportion of infants acquiring RSV: 
o When masks and gowns were used by 
staff: 32% 
o When masks and gowns were not 
used by staff: 41% 
• Proportion of staff acquiring RSV: 
o During the time masks and gowns 
were used by staff: 33% 
o During the time masks and gowns were 
not used by staff: 42% 
• Measurable benefit not found in control-
ling spread of RSV 
 
Murphy et al., 
1981 
Prospective study of 
use and nonuse of 
masks and gowns by 
staff members caring 
for infants with res-
piratory disease 
• Number of RSV or other respiratory  
infections did not differ significantly  
between the two groups of staff (hand-
washing only; and handwashing, gown-
ing, and masking)  
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Reference Description Results 
Gala et al., 
1986 
Comparison of use 
and nonuse of eye–
nose goggles by staff 
members on an infant 
ward 
 
• Frequency of RSV infection in hospital 
personnel: 
o Three weeks during goggle use: 8% 
(p = 0.003) 
o Three weeks with no goggle use: 34% 
(p = 0.003) 
 
Agah et al., 
1987 
Comparison of use 
and nonuse of mask or 
goggles by staff mem-
bers caring for child-
ren with RSV 
infections on a pedia-
tric inpatient service  
 
• RSV illness rate in healthcare workers 
caring for children with RSV infections: 
o Wore masks or goggles: 5% (p < 0.01 
compared to no masks or goggles cat-
egory) 
o Did not wear masks or goggles: 61% 
 
Madge et al., 
1992 
Prospective study of 
four infection control 
strategies in prevent-
ing RSV in four 
pediatric wards  
 
• Combination of cohort nursing with use 
of gowns and gloves significantly re-
duced RSV infection  
• Use of gowns and gloves alone did not 
result in a significant reduction of 
infection 
  
Langley et al., 
1997 
Prospective cohort 
study comparing 
isolation policies and 
RSV infections in 
pediatric patients in 
nine hospitals 
• Various combinations of requirements 
for use of gowns, gloves, and masks did 
not result in decreased nosocomial rates 
in patients; gowning for any entry to the 
patient’s room was associated with in-
creased risk of RSV transmission  
NOTE: CI = confidence interval; OR = odds ratio; RR = relative risk.  
The terms (masks, surgical masks, and respirators) used in this table are those used by 
the investigators or authors of the cited journal article or report. In some cases, it is not 
possible to determine whether the authors’ use of the term masks refers to medical masks, 
respirators, or both.  
a Comparator is use of no mask. 
b Consistent use of N95 versus consistent use of surgical mask. 
SOURCE: IOM (2008). 
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Examples of Relevant Voluntary 
Consensus Standards 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ASTM International standards are used extensively by the Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) for 510k submissions of personal protective 
equipment (PPE). Examples of standards relevant to PPE used by 
healthcare workers include the following: 
 
D3577 Specification for Rubber Surgical Gloves 
D3578 Specification for Rubber Examination Gloves 
D5151 Test Method for Detection of Holes in Medical Gloves 
D5250 Specification for Poly(Vinyl Chloride) Gloves for Medical 
Application 
D6124 Test Method for Residual Powder on Medical Gloves 
D6319 Specification for Nitrile Examination Gloves for Medical 
Application 
D6499 Test Method for the Immunological Measurement of Antigenic 
Protein in Natural Rubber and Its Products 
D6977 Specification for Polychloroprene Examination Gloves for 
Medical Application 
F1671 Test Method for Resistance of Materials Used in Protective 
Clothing to Penetration by Blood-Borne Pathogens Using Phi-
X174 Bacteriophage Penetration as a Test System 
F1862 Standard Test Method for Resistance of Medical Face Masks to 
Penetration by Synthetic Blood (Horizontal Projection of Fixed 
Volume at a Known Velocity) 
F2101 Standard Test Method for Evaluating the Bacterial Filtration 
Efficiency of Surgical Masks Using a Biological Aerosol of 
Staphylococcus aureus  
F2407 Standard Specification for Surgical Gowns Intended for Use in 
Healthcare Facilities 
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American National Standards Institute (ANSI) 
 
ANSI has standards that include guidance to employers for the 
practice of respiratory protection, but not the devices themselves. These 
include the following: 
 
Z88.2 Practices for Respiratory Protection 
Z88.6  Medical Qualifications of Respirator Wearers 
Z88.10 Fit-Test Requirements for Respiratory Protection 
 
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration has incorporated 
the following ANSI standard into its eye and face protection standard 
(Code of Federal Regulations 1919.133):  
 
Z87.1 Standard Practice for Occupational and Educational Eye and 
Face Protection  
 
 
Association for Advancement of Medical Instrumentation (AAMI) 
 
AAMI has a standard for fluid resistance of gowns worn by 
healthcare workers. Minimum performance levels ranging from 1 (least 
protective) to 4 (most protective) have been determined. These levels 
apply to the product’s Critical Zone, including seams, but excluding 
cuffs, hems, and bindings. 
 
 
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standards  
 
The FDA includes the following NFPA standard into its require-
ments for masks and respirators: 
 
702  Standard for Classification of Flammability of Wearing Apparel 
 
Another example of a relevant NFPA standard includes 
 
NFPA1999  Standard on Protective Clothing for Emergency Medical 
Operations 
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Committee Biographies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Elaine L. Larson, R.N., Ph.D., FAAN, CIC (Chair), is associate dean 
for research and professor of pharmaceutical and therapeutic research, 
Columbia University School of Nursing, and professor of epidemiology, 
Columbia University Mailman School of Public Health. She is a former 
dean of Georgetown University School of Nursing. Dr. Larson has been 
a member of the Board of Directors, National Foundation for Infectious 
Diseases, and the Report Review Committee, National Academy of 
Sciences. She is the director of the Center for Interdisciplinary Research 
to Prevent Antimicrobial Resistance at Columbia University and has 
been editor of the American Journal of Infection Control since 1994. She 
has published more than 200 journal articles, 4 books, and a number of 
book chapters in the areas of infection prevention, epidemiology, and 
clinical research.  
 
Gloria Addo-Ayensu, M.D., M.P.H., is the director of health for Fairfax 
County, VA. In this capacity she provides overall direction for public 
health programs in the county, including emergency preparedness. She 
has led Fairfax County’s comprehensive pandemic influenza prepared-
ness efforts and engaged a wide range of community stakeholders in the 
process. As past chair of the Metropolitan Washington Council of Gov-
ernments Health Officials Committee, she facilitated initial coordination 
of the National Capital Region’s pandemic planning in 2006. Dr. Addo-
Ayensu is interested in international health and has served as a consultant 
to research and public health programs in Ghana. 
 
Allison E. Aiello, Ph.D., is the John G. Searle Assistant Professor of Pub-
lic Health at the University of Michigan School of Public Health in the 
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Department of Epidemiology. Dr. Aiello held a Robert Wood Johnson 
Foundation Health and Society Scholars Fellowship at the University of 
Michigan and an Emerging Infectious Diseases Fellowship at the Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Dr. Aiello’s research focuses 
on the use of non-pharmaceutical interventions, including masks and 
hand hygiene interventions, for mitigating influenza transmission. She 
also investigates socioeconomic and race/ethnic disparities in infectious 
diseases, the relationship between infection and chronic diseases, and the 
emergence of antimicrobial resistance in the community setting. Her 
work on these topics has been presented at numerous national and inter-
national conferences and published in peer-reviewed journals, including 
Lancet Infectious Diseases, Emerging Infectious Diseases, American 
Journal of Public Health, Journal of Infectious Diseases, Clinical Infec-
tious Diseases, and the American Journal of Epidemiology. Dr. Aiello is 
on the editorial board of the American Journal of Infection Control, as-
sociate editor of BMC Public Health, and an invited member of the 
American College of Epidemiology Minority Affairs Committee. She 
received her Ph.D. in epidemiology from Columbia University’s Mail-
man School of Public Health, where she held a National Institute of Al-
lergy and Infectious Diseases training fellowship and was the recipient of 
the Ana C. Gelman Award for outstanding achievement and promise in 
the field of epidemiology. 
 
Howard J. Cohen, Ph.D., M.P.H., CIH, is professor emeritus (formerly 
professor and chair of the Occupational Safety and Health Department) 
at the University of New Haven. He is an associate (adjunct) professor at 
Yale University’s Department of Occupational and Environmental Medi-
cine. He formerly was the manager of industrial hygiene at the Olin Cor-
poration and editor in chief of the American Industrial Hygiene Associa-
tion Journal. He is certified in the comprehensive practice of industrial 
hygiene by the American Board of Industrial Hygiene. Dr. Cohen is the 
former chair of the American National Standards Institute Z88.2 commit-
tee on respiratory protection and a current member of the editorial board 
of the Journal of Occupational and Environmental Hygiene. He is the 
past chair of the American Industrial Hygiene Association’s (AIHA’s) 
respiratory protection committee, a past president of the Connecticut 
River Valley Chapter of the AIHA, and a past officer and treasurer of the 
American Board of Industrial Hygiene. Dr. Cohen served on the Institute 
of Medicine (IOM) Committee on Personal Protective Equipment for 
Healthcare Workers During an Influenza Pandemic and on the IOM 
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Standing Committee on Personal Protective Equipment for Workplace 
Safety and Health. He is currently working as a consultant to the Veter-
ans Administration’s North Florida/South Georgia Center for Occupa-
tional Safety and Infectious Disease (on the Advisory Board and assist-
ing on an upcoming clinical study of influenza). Dr. Cohen is also a con-
sultant to a pharmaceutical company that has developed the first antiviral 
N95 surgical respirator to be certified by the Food and Drug Administra-
tion (FDA) and National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 
(NIOSH). He is a graduate of Boston University, where he received a 
B.A. in biology. Dr. Cohen received his M.P.H. and Ph.D. in industrial 
health from the University of Michigan. 
 
Robert Cohen, M.D., FCCP, is chair of the Division of Pulmonary and 
Critical Care Medicine for the Cook County Health and Hospitals Sys-
tem and chair of pulmonary and critical care medicine at the John H. 
Stroger, Jr., Hospital of Cook County, IL. His early research focused on 
the resurgent epidemic of tuberculosis in the City of Chicago and at 
Cook County Hospital. Dr. Cohen has worked closely with patients suf-
fering from chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), and he 
founded Cook County Hospital’s pulmonary rehabilitation program. He 
has worked as the medical director of the Black Lung Clinics at Cook 
County Hospital and as medical director of the federally funded Black 
Lung Clinics Program, a program dedicated to the care of coal miners 
throughout the United States. He has worked closely with the American 
Lung Association of Metropolitan Chicago and is a member of the 
American Lung Association’s COPD task force, currently serving as the 
medical director of the Community Spirometry Initiative. He is a reci-
pient of its Public Health Service Award in 2006 and Outstanding Clini-
cian Award in 2007. Dr. Cohen’s work on respiratory disease in coal 
mining populations has involved consulting in areas of mining-related 
health issues for federal agencies, including the U.S. Agency for Interna-
tional Development (USAID), CDC, and NIOSH. He has recently served 
as a member of the Mine Safety Research Advisory Committee. In addi-
tion, he has provided expert consultation on occupational lung disease to 
clinics supported by USAID in Donetsk, Ukraine. Dr. Cohen graduated 
from Northwestern University’s Honors Program in Medical Education 
in 1981. He did his internship and residency at Cook County Hospital, as 
well as subspecialty training in pulmonary medicine and critical care. 
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Karen Coyne, Ph.D., is research general engineer at the U.S. Army 
Edgewood Chemical Biological Center (ECBC). Dr. Coyne has 8 years 
of experience in respiratory protection research and testing at the U.S. 
Army ECBC. Her specific areas of expertise are in testing and modeling 
the physiological impact of wearing respiratory protection and in devel-
oping novel test systems. Prior to this, she spent 7 years at the University 
of Maryland–College Park (UMCP), conducting respiratory protection 
research and developing data collection and instrumentation systems for 
assessing the impact of protective equipment on respiration, vision, 
communications, and work performance. Dr. Coyne has authored or 
coauthored 20 journal publications, 8 technical reports, and 18 platform 
(2 international) and 6 poster conference presentations, has given 5 uni-
versity guest lectures, and is coinventor on a patent. She taught a physio-
logical modeling course at UMCP for 3 years. She served as a member of 
the Project B.R.E.A.T.H.E. working group. Dr. Coyne won the John 
White Best Paper Award in respiratory protection from the Journal of 
Occupational and Environmental Hygiene for 2000 and 2006 and the 
Michigan Industrial Hygiene Society Best Paper award in 1998. She re-
ceived her Ph.D. in biological resources engineering from UMCP. 
 
David M. DeJoy, Ph.D., is professor of health promotion and behavior 
and director of the Workplace Health Group in the College of Public 
Health at the University of Georgia. Dr. DeJoy has 30 years of expe-
rience in workplace safety and health as a researcher, instructor, and con-
sultant. His areas of research include safety climate/culture, work organi-
zation, safe work practices, risk communication, and theory-based inter-
vention design/intervention effectiveness. He has published approximate-
ly 120 scientific articles and book chapters and presented more than 200 
papers at scientific and professional meetings. He currently serves on the 
editorial boards of Safety Science, Journal of Safety Research, and Jour-
nal of Occupational Health Psychology. Extramural funding for his re-
search has come from CDC, the National Institutes of Health (NIH), and 
NIOSH. Dr. DeJoy has served on numerous expert panels, review com-
mittees, and advisory panels at the national and international levels.  
 
Ken Gall, Ph.D., is a professor in the School of Materials Science and 
Engineering and Mechanical Engineering at the Georgia Institute of 
Technology. Before joining Georgia Tech in 2005, he was an associate 
professor of mechanical engineering at the University of Colorado at 
Boulder and a post-doc at Sandia National Laboratories. Dr. Gall’s re-
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search combines polymer chemistry, materials science, bioengineering, 
and mechanical engineering in order to synthesize and characterize new 
materials for use in emerging technologies. His specific interests include 
metallic and polymer biomaterials, mechanically active materials, and 
nanometer scale materials and characterization. He has published more 
than 130 journal articles, which have been cited more than 2,200 times, 
and he has given approximately 200 professional talks. He has provided 
extensive consulting on materials and engineering for law firms, indus-
try, national labs, and the U.S. military. His research on shape memory 
alloys and polymers was the basis for founding MedShape Solutions, a 
company developing shape memory material-based orthopedic devices. 
He received his B.S., M.S., and Ph.D. in mechanical engineering from 
the University of Illinois. 
 
William H. Kojola, M.S., is the industrial hygienist for the American 
Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations’ (AFL–
CIO’s) Department of Occupational Health and Safety. His experience in 
health and safety spans more than 30 years. During that time, Mr. Kojola 
has been the director of the Occupational Safety and Health Division of 
the Laborers Health and Safety Fund of North America, an occupational 
safety and health specialist for the International Brotherhood of Boiler-
makers, and director of safety and health for the United Cement, Lime, 
Gypsum and Allied Workers International Union. Prior to this, he was a 
health research scientist at the University of Illinois School of Public 
Health, studying the human health effects of air and water pollutants. 
With the AFL–CIO, Mr. Kojola is responsible for developing strategies 
for securing new safety and health protections through federal and state 
regulations, coordinating with affiliates on and leading a unified labor 
response to proposed Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(OSHA) regulations, and representing the AFL–CIO before government 
regulatory agencies, on federal advisory committees, and in consensus 
standard-setting efforts. He also works with affiliate unions to address 
emerging workplace hazards and issues. Mr. Kojola holds a B.S. in biol-
ogy and an M.S. in genetics from the University of Minnesota, and stud-
ied toxicology and industrial hygiene at the University of Illinois School 
of Public Health. 
 
Allison McGeer, M.D., is a professor in the Departments of Laboratory 
Medicine and Pathobiology and at the Dalla Lana School of Public 
Health at the University of Toronto. In addition to her positions as mi-
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crobiologist and director of infection control at Mount Sinai Hospital, 
Toronto, Dr. McGeer is an infection control consultant to the Baycrest 
Centre for Geriatric Care. She currently serves on Canada’s National 
Advisory Committee on Immunization and on the infection control sub-
committee of the Ontario Provincial Infectious Diseases Advisory Com-
mittee. She is a member of several local, provincial, and national pan-
demic influenza committees. She is an expert reviewer for many research 
funding agencies, including the Canadian Institute of Health Research 
and U.S. NIH, and has served on the editorial boards of several journals, 
including the Canadian Medical Association Journal and Infection Con-
trol and Hospital Epidemiology. She returned to Mount Sinai Hospital in 
1989 as a microbiologist and director of infection control. Her major re-
search interests are in the prevention of infection in hospitals and nursing 
homes, and the use of surveillance to advance the prevention, diagnosis, 
and treatment of infectious diseases. She is the principal investigator of 
the Toronto Invasive Bacterial Diseases Network and the Ontario Group 
A Streptococcal Study, two collaborative surveillance networks studying 
the epidemiology of severe community-acquired infections. Dr. McGeer 
served on the Council of Canadian Academies expert panel on influenza 
transmission and the role of personal protective equipment, and on the 
IOM Committee on the Development of Reusable Facemasks for Use 
During an Influenza Pandemic. Dr. McGeer completed an undergraduate 
and master’s degree in biochemistry and her M.D. at the University of 
Toronto. She specialized in internal medicine and infectious diseases, 
followed by a fellowship in hospital epidemiology at Yale New Haven 
Hospital. 
 
Peter Palese, Ph.D., is a professor of microbiology and chair of the De-
partment of Microbiology at the Mount Sinai School of Medicine in New 
York. His scientific publications include research on the replication of 
ribonucleic acid (RNA)–containing viruses, with a special emphasis on 
influenza viruses, which are negative-strand RNA viruses. Specifically, 
he established the first genetic maps for influenza A, B, and C viruses; 
identified the function of several viral genes; and defined the mechanism 
of neuraminidase inhibitors (which are now FDA-approved antivirals). 
Dr. Palese also pioneered the field of reverse genetics for negative-strand 
RNA viruses, which allows the introduction of site-specific mutations 
into the genomes of these viruses. This technique is crucial for the study 
of the structure/function relationships of viral genes, for investigation of 
viral pathogenicity, and for development and manufacture of influenza 
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virus vaccines. In addition, an improvement of the technique has been 
used effectively to reconstruct and study the pathogenicity of the highly 
virulent but extinct 1918 pandemic influenza virus. His recent work in col-
laboration with Dr. Adolfo Garcia-Sastre has revealed that most negative-
strand RNA viruses possess proteins with interferon antagonist activity, 
enabling them to counteract the antiviral response of the infected host. 
Dr. Palese was elected to the National Academy of Sciences in 2000 for 
his seminal studies on influenza viruses. He serves on the editorial 
board for the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences and as 
an editor for the Journal of Virology. Dr. Palese was president of the 
Harvey Society in 2004 and is a past president of the American Society 
for Virology.  
 
David Prezant, M.D., is the chief medical officer and special advisor to 
the fire commissioner for health policy, fire department of the City of 
New York (FDNY). He is also a professor of medicine in the Pulmonary 
Division at Albert Einstein College of Medicine. Dr. Prezant is board 
certified in internal medicine, pulmonary medicine, and critical care 
medicine. He is a member of the John P. Redmond International Asso-
ciation of Fire Fighters Medical Advisory Board and represents FDNY as 
a member of the technical committee for the Fire Service Joint Labor 
Management Wellness/Fitness Initiative. Dr. Prezant is the author of 
numerous peer-reviewed articles on the health and safety of firefighters, 
thermal protective equipment to reduce burn injuries and improve exer-
cise performance for firefighters, and recently the effect of World Trade 
Center exposures on respiratory health of firefighters and emergency 
medical services personnel. Dr. Prezant serves on the IOM Standing 
Committee on Personal Protective Equipment for Workplace Safety and 
Health. He was a member of the IOM Committee on Personal Protective 
Equipment for Healthcare Workers During an Influenza Pandemic and 
the IOM Committee to Review the NIOSH Personal Protective Technol-
ogy Program. He received his B.S. from Columbia College and his M.D. 
from the Albert Einstein College of Medicine. 
 
M. E. Bonnie Rogers, Dr.P.H., M.P.H., COHN-S, LNNC, FAAN, is 
an associate professor of nursing and public health and director of the 
North Carolina Occupational Safety and Health Education and Research 
Center and the Occupational Health Nursing Program at the University 
of North Carolina, School of Public Health, Chapel Hill. Dr. Rogers was 
a visiting scholar at the Hasting Center in New York and is an ethics 
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